

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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NO. 29

6 FEBRUARY 1973

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has served its purpose or within
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CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL

LOS ANGELES TIMES

15 JAN 1973

The Danger of Terrorists Getting Illicit A-Bombs

BY LOWELL PONTE

In 1968, when I was editing a satire magazine, a "think tank" hired me. Its masters needed someone to write reports, they said—someone with a bizarre mind.

The reports, it turned out, were commissioned by the Pentagon. The first dealt with "non-national nuclear threats"—what if atomic bombs fell into terrorist hands? My gothic fantasies on this theme filled half the report.

In one scenario, young radicals parked a Volkswagen van, atomic bomb inside, a few blocks from the Capitol in Washington, D.C., and an hour later destroyed the heart of the U.S. government by remote control.

In another, the terrorists were extortionists, holding New York City for \$10 billion ransom. Their demands refused, they loaded an A-bomb and timer into a small private airplane on a Canadian airfield, flew into the United States, parachuted out 50 miles from their target—and let the craft's automatic pilot carry it over Manhattan Island.

In a third scenario, the terrorists were pacifist scientists who secretly put together A-bombs in suburban basements around the country, booby-trapped them to thwart defusing attempts, then demanded that the government dismantle its missiles or lose cities, one by one.

This last fantasy troubled Dr. Theodore Taylor, head of the "think tank," more than the others. After a few cities were buried under mushroom clouds, he conceded in 1969, the government would "undoubtedly" knuckle under to terrorist demands.

Taylor had been deputy director of the Pentagon's Defense Atomic Support Agency during the mid-1960s, when a newly nuclearized Peoples Republic of China was talking loosely of spreading atomic weapons to many Third World powers. Having come to view terrorism by A-bombs in private hands as more probable than global nuclear

war, he saw my fantasies as prophecies that could begin coming true at any moment.

The source of such weapons, in his estimation, would not be other nations but a criminal black market supplied by thefts from our "peaceful" nuclear reactor program. Thus the second half of our report told how the lack of precautions would simplify the theft of plutonium and uranium from our electricity-generating reactors.

After all, the supposedly "secret" technical information was openly available, and so the explosive materials, in criminal hands, could be converted readily into crude atomic bombs.

The security precautions are still lacking in 1973, and the chance of terrorists acquiring atomic bombs grows daily.

In April, 1971, with Taylor's help, the journal *Science* evaluated the prospects for a criminal black market in plutonium. By the year 2000, *Science* estimated, the United States will get 70% of its electricity from nuclear reactors, most of them "fast breeders" that use plutonium as fuel and produce more of it as a byproduct.

By then, civilian plutonium supplies will top 720,000 kilograms, any five kilograms of which could make a bomb comparable in size to the one used on Nagasaki. (Five kilograms of plutonium come to one handful, weighing 11 pounds.)

According to Atomic Energy Commissioner Clarence Larson, the reactor industry will probably always have an "unavoidable" loss rate of 1% to 2% in radioactive materials—the percentage that, without causing alarm, can "disappear" in processing.

By the year 2000, a 1% loss in plutonium stores would involve enough missing material to make 1,440 A-bombs.

The motive is strong to divert materials, perhaps even to arrange "accidents," to account for larger-than-usual losses.

Said *Science*: "At present, plu-

tonium sells for about \$10,000 per kilogram. It is thus five times as costly as heroin and 10 times as expensive as gold. What its value would be on an illegal market is anybody's guess."

Nevertheless, criminal penalties for mere theft of radioactive materials are milder by far than those for heroin pushing.

Some materials are already listed as missing. According to *Science*, the AEC reported one Arkansas reactor facility deficient in "a few kilograms" of plutonium and a processing facility in Pennsylvania unable to account for 6% of its materials over a six-year period. In Bradwell, Eng., reactor workers were caught hauling 20 loaded fuel rods over a fence, apparently to be picked up by accomplices.

If security is poor at reactor facilities, it is worse on vehicles carrying radioactive materials from site to site. The AEC has made it a common practice to send large radioactive shipments on ordinary airliners and trucks, usually unguarded.

On one flight in the late 1960s, 503 kilograms of enriched uranium were transferred to the Seln reactor in Italy; had this shipment been hijacked, it could have provided the fixings for 25 uranium A-bombs of 20 kilograms each—the sort and size that destroyed Hiroshima.

One nuclear power specialist insists that radioactive airliner shipments have been hijacked to Cuba and at least one truck shipment has been diverted to Mexico.

In these cases, says Dr. Dean Abrahamson, director of the Center for Studies of the Physical Environment at the University of Minnesota, the shipments were recovered, along with the vehicles, since their presence abroad had not become known. The AEC has denied Abrahamson's report on the Cuba hijackings, but as of this writing it has not denied a similar Cuba hijacking report this month by nuclear specialist Lawrence Sheinman of Cornell, nor has it denied the possibility that such incidents

Lowell Ponte lives in Redlands. He is a former defense researcher and has often written about weaponry.

could happen in the future.

Last January, a poorly shielded AEC shipment aboard a Delta Airlines plane "leaked" radioactivity at 11 American airports. The AEC said the amounts were not hazardous to people, which may be true, but the incident demonstrates the limited care that such shipments receive.

Taylor's think tank now works on environmental concerns, but his nightmares continue. Last November, he said some small steps were being taken to prevent thefts—automatic alarms on shipments, for example, and surveillance at facilities.

In addition, the AEC is slowly adding stricter regulations to licensing agreements with private reactor and processing companies, and it is moving toward a

policy of "dedicated vehicles" whose sole job would be the transporting of plutonium and uranium, presumably under guard.

But the AEC is moving at a snail's pace, Taylor added, in part because reactor companies resent and resist paying the cost of security measures. Complete safeguards, he estimated, would raise the consumer cost of nuclear-generated electricity by less than 1%, but, in the absence of public demand for them, the risk persists of uranium and plutonium being stolen and converted into weapons of almost inestimable danger.

(Two years ago, Taylor warned: "If the AEC doesn't get some kind of safeguard system and operating system set up by

1973, there will be leaks of special radioactive material that would be very hard to stop," for the losses by then would have grown routine. "Then" has become "now.")

After a year submerged in think-tank thinking, I took my bizarre mind elsewhere. My nightmares, like Taylor's, were too real for comfort.

Then, as now, I found it deeply unsettling to dwell on this simple scenario: that the average American millionaire, regardless of race or creed or sanity, might buy the makings of 20 atomic bombs and then, for less than \$15, purchase the know-how for producing nuclear bombs from—no, not from some underground tipster—the U.S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1973

NOW: A WORLDWIDE BOOM IN SALES OF ARMS

Talk of peace is in the air—but nations today are dealing in weapons as never before. Selling of military hardware, vital to some countries, is hotly competitive and expanding rapidly.

Buying and selling of military weapons around the world is surging to record levels—and no end to the boom is in sight.

At latest count, international trade in aircraft, missiles, ships, tanks, small arms and other hardware totaled nearly 7 billion dollars a year.

That is about double the amount sold a decade ago and does not count billions in arms given away free each year, mostly by the United States.

What's more, says one leading arms expert, the weapons trade is likely to double again by 1980, approaching the 15-billion-dollar mark.

Big-power play. It is a fiercely competitive business, with the U. S., the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain the principal suppliers.

"International anarchy" is the way one authority describes the competition, with each nation setting its own rules, offering equipment on generous credit terms, moving in quickly when another

seller pulls out of the market for diplomatic or other reasons.

It is a business, too, which has seen many of the small private dealers all but squeezed out of the market.

Private sellers who deal chiefly in small arms and ammunition account for about 200 million dollars annually in sales. The great bulk—about 97 per cent—is sold by one government to another or by large private manufacturers, with the encouragement and blessing of their governments. The rapid growth in the arms trade comes at a time when nations all over are sinking more and more of national incomes into their military establishments.

Arms and men. In 1971, according to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 120 nations spent 216 billion dollars on defense, an increase of 82 per cent since 1960. Over the same span, the number of men under arms worldwide increased from 19 million to 23 million.

It is the developing nations that are the main purchasers of weapons from the industrialized countries, accounting for about 4 billions of annual sales. Nations of the Middle East, India and Latin America are the principal buyers.

The chart on page 52 gives some idea of how much is sold by the chief arms makers and who their major customers are—as well as can be determined in a field wrapped in secrecy.

The figures were compiled chiefly by "U. S. News & World Report" correspondents based overseas and with the aid of experts within the United States Government.

The U. S. sold 2.8 billion dollars' worth of arms in the year ended June 30, 1972, up from 2.1 billion the preceding year. The Soviet Union sold an estimated 2.2 billions' worth in 1972.

The "Big Four" suppliers account for about 90 per cent of the sales, with the rest divided up mostly among Sweden, Canada, Belgium, Israel, West Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

Aircraft lead off. Warplanes are the No. 1 sales item, accounting for roughly half the arms sold. Tanks and armored vehicles, ships, missiles and ammunition

are other big-selling items in international markets.

Why the urge to sell more arms? One reason is purely economic—to improve a country's balance of payments, or to help a particular industry. Often though, officials say, sales are regarded as a matter of "national interest"—that is, to improve the seller's influence in the purchasing nation.

Russia, for example, supports Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Libya, not for ideological reasons, but to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean basin. It also is in a position to threaten oil supplies to the U.S. and the Far East. The U.S. supports Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, not only to offset these Soviet moves, but to counter the growing Russian presence in the western section of the Indian Ocean.

In recent years, the mix of "give-aways" and sales of U.S. arms has moved sharply in the direction of sales.

From 1950 through 1965, this country gave away 31.7 billion dollars of military goods to other nations—and sold just 6.5 billion.

Since 1965, however, the U.S. has provided 4.5 billions in military aid while selling 11.1 billions' worth of hardware.

The arms network. The U.S. arms-sale network involves about 10,000 military and civilian attachés around the world. Through these "agents," the U.S. learns what the "customer" wants. Transactions themselves are generally handled on a government-to-government basis.

Before a big transaction has been signed, more than a dozen agencies within three Cabinet departments may get involved.

At the Pentagon, a special agency must approve a sale. Then another one seeks credit for the buyer through the U.S. Treasury or major private banks.

At the State Department, one agency gets involved in licensing exports, while a host of others determines such things as whether the sale is in the nation's best interests, or whether it involves the transfer of military secrets.

For other nations— Elsewhere among arms-selling nations—

For France, the manufacture of arms is vital to its economy. Only automobiles and textiles rank ahead of arms among its exports.

The French arms industry provides jobs for 270,000 people, of whom 15 per cent are involved in producing arms for export. There are enough orders now on the books to keep the industry busy for years.

Of late, however, incoming orders have been declining, even as deliveries of arms have been rising. What worries many French officials is that recent

"breakthrough sales" in Latin America and the Middle East, as one expert recently put it, "may have been one-shot affairs that will not continue in the future."

In the Persian Gulf region, the French sales pitch is based on the offer of well-trained Pakistani personnel, experienced with France's Mirage aircraft, to provide technical help in flying and servicing the supersonic jets.

In Europe, French arms salesmen offer to share technical know-how with customers if they sign contracts to buy French aeronautical products.

For Great Britain, the arms trade, according to a London economist, is "no longer just a welcome shot in the arm to the balance of payments. In many sectors of the defense industry, it has become vital to staying in business."

Britain's arms sales, estimated at 700 million dollars in 1972, have doubled since 1965, when the country began overhauling its whole overseas sales effort. Now Britain is challenging France to regain its former position as the world's third-biggest arms-trading nation.

A major change: making sure that a new weapons system has a potential for foreign sales before the Government buys it for the country's own defenses.

Old marketing methods have been revamped, and sales campaigns intensified. Embassy posts, for example, have been created in five key capitals—Washington, Paris, Bonn, Canberra and Ottawa—to deal specifically with arms trading.

Exhibitions of British wares are put on at major international air shows. Weapons' capability is demonstrated in Britain and abroad for foreign buyers.

Twice a year, a comprehensive catalogue is published, showing what equipment is available.

Another move increasing arms sales: Since coming to power in 1970, Brit-

WHAT U.S. HAS SOLD OR GIVEN AWAY

From 1950 on—

U.S. sold
\$17.5 billion
worth of arms,
including—

209 bombers
521 cargo planes
1,492 fighters
580 helicopters
45 destroyers
15 submarines
11,270 armored personnel carriers
4,351 tanks
627,233 rifles and carbines
19,199 missiles

U.S.
gave
away
\$36.2 billion
worth of arms, including—

184 bombers
1,027 cargo planes
9,683 fighters
714 helicopters
100 destroyers
24 submarines
2,034 other ships
19,855 tanks
403,439 trucks
4,967,844 rifles and carbines
271,291 machine guns
27,012 missiles

Note: Dollar totals are through mid-1972; details on arms through mid-1971, latest available.

Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense

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ain's Conservative Government has lifted embargoes on arms deals with South Africa and Spain.

In West Germany, where the Government's policy has been to restrain arms sales to other countries, a build-up in volume is expected in years ahead. One

reason: Many NATO countries will be re-equipping their forces with new generations of weapons systems. West Germany's "Leopard" tank is expected to be introduced within NATO in growing numbers.

Hard facts on Russia's arms sales are difficult to come by. As well as Western experts can piece things together—

Not counting shipments to Vietnam by either Russia or the U. S., the Soviet Union has probably become the largest supplier of weapons to developing countries.

Until the recent break with Cairo, Egypt was the chief recipient of Soviet arms, getting weapons valued at 250 million dollars in 1970 and 420 million in 1971, chiefly aircraft and missiles.

Next came India, which has been licensed to make MIG-21 aircraft, including the missiles and engines with which the craft are equipped. Soviet shipments to India include planes, anti-aircraft missiles and tanks.

Since 1955, the Soviet Union has provided an estimated 22 billion dollars of military aid to its clients and customers, the great bulk of it in the form of sales.

Roughly 10 billion dollars of that amount has gone to its East European satellites.

Of all the arms dealers, Czechoslovakia is, in the words of a former U. S. arms-control official, "the nastiest, without a doubt." The Czechs have established an arms-sales firm, Omnipol, which is an agency of the Ministry of Foreign

Trade. Wherever there is trouble in the world, officials say, Czech arms usually can be found. When terrorists can find weapons nowhere else, they can always turn to Omnipol.

Arms on the cuff. Most suppliers sell arms on fairly liberal credit terms. Russia, for example, offers loans for military purchases at an annual interest rate of 2 to 2½ per cent for periods of six to 12 years. French and British deals generally involve loans of 5½ to 6 per cent.

The U. S. charges one half of 1 per cent above the cost of borrowing by the U. S. Treasury, which now comes to about the charges leveled by the French and British. The repayment period is six to 12 years in most cases.

It's in the Middle East where the market for arms is growing most rapidly—even though some Western nations claim they have imposed restraints on sales to the region.

In Italy, newspapers a few months ago published reports that military equipment, including armored cars, were being sold to Libya. Italian authorities first denied these reports, then later admitted they were true—and, in fact, that an agreement had been reached a year earlier to provide military arms to Libya.

France insists it will not sell offensive weapons to any of the Mideast belligerents. It has, however, sold 114 Mirage fighters to Libya—which is a staunch supporter of Egypt.

The arms-trade business can produce some ironic situations in the Mideast.

Israel has a 500-million-dollar line of

credit with the U. S. for the purchase of weapons in its struggle against surrounding Arab nations.

Yet Great Britain, a close ally of the United States, is reportedly in the process of concluding a 236-million-dollar deal with Israel's chief enemy, Egypt, for Cairo's acquisition of light tanks, patrol boats, armored cars, short-range anti-aircraft missiles and helicopters.

Two good customers. Among Middle East nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia represent perhaps the largest arms markets for the immediate future. Both are building their forces rapidly to fill the vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the area.

Iran's Air Force has already taken delivery on more than 100 U. S.-made Phantom fighter-bombers, valued at around 340 million dollars. It has placed orders with Britain for somewhere between 700 and 800 tanks.

There are reports that Bell Aerospace Company is negotiating the sale of 580 helicopters to Iran at a cost of 720 million dollars.

From the Soviet Union, Iran is buying jeeps, trucks, personnel carriers and artillery and air-defense systems.

Saudi Arabia signed a 350-million-dollar contract earlier this year for the purchase of Northrop Corporation's supersonic F-5 fighter-bombers. It is setting aside another 145 million for its Navy—in all likelihood for the purchase of patrol boats and possibly some submarines from the U. S. The French are reportedly negotiating an 80-million-dollar tank deal.

THE WORLD'S BIG ARMS SUPPLIERS

Based on estimates for 1972—

UNITED STATES

Total sales: 2.8 billion dollars.

Major customers: NATO countries, plus Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan.

Major items sold: Aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, ammunition, missiles.

BRITAIN

Total sales: 700 million dollars.

Major customers: NATO countries, plus Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, South Africa, Australia, India, Ecuador, Brazil.

Major items sold: Aircraft, missiles, helicopters, ships.

SOVIET UNION

Total sales: 2.2 billion dollars.

Major customers: Warsaw Pact countries, plus Egypt, India, Syria, North Korea, North Vietnam.


Major items sold: Aircraft, missiles, tanks, armored personnel carriers.

FRANCE

Total sales: 700 million dollars.

Major customers: South Africa, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Argentina, Venezuela, Lebanon, Libya, Algeria.

Major items sold: Aircraft, engines, tanks, armored vehicles.



In both Iran and Saudi Arabia, rapidly rising revenues from oil production are providing the wherewithal to spend more heavily on arms.

In Iraq and Syria, it is the Soviet Union that is the chief arms supplier. One authoritative estimate is that Russia has sold more than 500 million dollars of arms to Iraq since the 1967 war,

and roughly the same amount to Syria.

"Back to strong exports." As arms experts see it, competition is going to get tougher in the years ahead—with the U. S. a formidable foe. One assessment from Paris:

"The end of the war in Vietnam, along with the Soviet-American agreement to limit strategic nuclear weapons, is expected to bring the U. S. back more

strongly into the export of conventional weapons.

"Many of the sophisticated weapons developed by the U. S. for the war in Vietnam will then become available for sale to buyers around the world."

In short, while world leaders talk hopefully of a "generation of peace," the world goes right on buying and selling weapons at a record rate.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1973

WHERE ARMS BAN BACKFIRED ON U.S.

Latin America is one part of the world where the U. S. is trying to sell fewer, rather than more, weapons—a policy that is coming under increasing fire.

The big clampdown on U. S. arms to Latin America, imposed by Congress in 1967, has been so successful that European suppliers have been outselling U. S. arms manufacturers by 5 to 1.

Top officers in the Pentagon call this arms-control policy a military blunder. Diplomats say it has failed in its political goals. Executives of U. S. arms firms complain that it has diverted profits to foreign suppliers and worsened trade woes. Members of Congress, as well as national-security officials, are voicing serious second thoughts.

Heavy ceiling. U. S. restrictions now in force place a 100-million-dollar ceiling on U. S. Government military grants and sales to all nations in the Hemisphere combined.

The regulations ban shipments of "sophisticated weapons systems" of all kinds—including supersonic jet fighters—and forbid military assistance to governments of the region which are deemed to be dictatorial.

All of this represents a sharp departure from the sort of co-operation in the arms field that marked U. S. inter-American policy earlier.

Until the 1967 clampdown, the U. S. had been the No. 1 supplier of arms to Latin America ever since World War II.

It was after the U. S. gained a near stranglehold on the military-aircraft market in Latin America in the 1960s that Washington began a tacit policy of regional arms control.

Hold-down on expenses. Policy makers explained at the time that they wanted to prevent underdeveloped nations of the Hemisphere from wasting scarce funds.

Equally important, said Washington officials, was a conviction that no nation in the region needed such sophisticated weapons as the new and costly supersonic jet warplanes. Latin-American military men had been pressing for such jets in seeking to modernize and to get rid of World War II surplus aircraft.

Congress first imposed a ceiling of 75 million dollars on total annual arms sales in the Hemisphere. Later, boosting the ceiling to 100 million, Congress provided that the President could raise it by up to 50 per cent if he deemed this to be in the interest of national security. Other restrictions followed, led by the Conte-Long amendment to foreign-aid legislation, barring use of U. S. funds for buying advanced military equipment, and the Symington amendment restricting aid to countries that may be determined to be spending an "unnecessary" amount of their financial resources on military equipment.

Cutoff to dictators. When a number of military coups took place in Latin America in the 1960s, Congress reacted by passing the Reuss amendment. This provided for cutting off aid to countries ruled by dictatorial regimes "denying the growth of fundamental rights or social progress to their own people."

Recalls one U. S. official:

"America's sudden case of cold feet stemmed from more than just fears of an arms race. The U. S. at that time still had high hopes for the Alliance for Progress.

"There was a feeling in many quarters that by delaying or denying Latins supersonic jets, they might be pressured into spending more of their available resources for food, roads, hospitals."

Not too successful. But things turned out differently. Lt. Gen. E. B. LeBailly, the U. S. Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, describes what has happened under five years of arms restrictions in this way:

"Attempts to have the Latin-American governments concentrate on national-development projects to the exclusion of military needs have not been very successful. Our restrictions have not resulted in a direct switch of funds from 'guns to butter,' but only in a switch from the U. S. to Europe as principal arms supplier."

Chile led the way by buying 21 subsonic Hawker Hunter fighters from Britain at a cost of 9.6 million dollars. It had sought to purchase F-5 Freedom Fighters—a relatively low-cost supersonic

jet developed with U. S. official encouragement as suited to the needs of developing countries. But Chile was turned down on this, and refused Washington's counteroffer of subsonic Skyhawks or F-86 Sabers.

The Chile-Britain deal—made by a reform Government carrying out just the type of social programs favored by U. S. Alliance for Progress officials—marked the beginning of the turn toward European markets, away from the U. S.

The first sale of supersonic warplanes to a Latin-American country came a year later, in 1967, when France concluded an agreement to deliver to Peru 14 faster-than-sound Mirages.

That plane is said by military men to cost about five times as much as the F-5 Freedom Fighter that the U. S. was declining to sell.

Repercussions from that sale brought about a partial retreat by Washington. In an effort to salvage some part of the jet-warplane market and maintain some control, the U. S. Government offered to relent and sell F-5 fighters after all. But the U. S. offer proved to be too late.

Then—more vendors. The French have followed up their Mirage sales to Peru with similar deals in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. British shipyards have obtained frigate orders from Brazil and Chile. West German yards have sold mine-sweepers and submarines to Brazil and Argentina.

All told, the Latin Americans have in five years turned to Europe for 1.5 billion dollars' worth of arms free of any restrictions. These arms sales often have been followed up by a rash of commercial deals. The U. S., which once made 70 per cent of the total arms sales, now is down to 6 per cent.

No wild race. In spite of unlimited opportunities to buy in Europe, no massive arms race has taken place in the region as American lawmakers feared in voting for the 1967 clampdown.

Hemisphere officials say that, even with the increased purchases of recent years, Latin-American countries spend less of their gross national product on arms—about 2 per cent—than any other region in the world, including Africa.

Says Calo Plaza, Secretary General of the Organization of American States:

"Actually, we have a kind of balance. One country buys some Mirages, so another country feels it must do the same. But the second buys only about the same number as the first. So there is no real

race.

"It's simply a matter of prestige, of the military establishment in each country keeping up with the times."

With nationalism on the rise, Latin Americans are increasingly resentful of what they regard as unwarranted interference by the United States in their internal affairs.

As one U. S. authority puts it:

"Our generally paternalistic approach and denial of military hardware has tended to alienate a large segment of Latin-American leadership—civilian as well as military. They all deeply resent our implication that we know better than they what's best for them."

The Nixon Administration recently has made known that it opposes some of the arms controls and has urged their repeal. Outgoing Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who as a Congressman helped push through some of the controversial measures, says he has changed his mind.

In testimony in 1972, Mr. Laird said the "restrictions have worked to the disadvantage of not only the countries involved, but also of the United States."

Secretary of State William P. Rogers appeared to sum up the present official mood for change when, in seeking to boost the coiling on arms sales to Latin America, he declared that such a step will enable the U. S. to "secure important economic and political advantages."

WASHINGTON POST
19 JANUARY 1973

U.S. Surprised Heroin in Bags Made in China

United Press International

State Department officials yesterday expressed disbelief that heroin seized in New York City Wednesday was from mainland China.

New York authorities said the confiscated heroin was in bags made in the People's Republic of China.

State Department spokesman Simone Poulain said, "Our investigations of previous charges of People's Republic of China involvement have not produced evidence to substantiate the allegation. We find it difficult to believe that any country shipping illegal narcotics abroad would carefully label it so that everyone would know who was involved."

NEW YORK TIMES
28 January 1973

INDONESIA DESTROYS MARIJUANA FIELDS

MEDAN, Indonesia, Jan. 27 (Reuters)—The police have burned off more than 240 acres of marijuana plants around Medan in the last few months and farmers in this north Sumatra area have been sternly warned about growing it.

The crackdown was brought about by north Sumatra's sudden popularity among young Westerners and a growing struggling trade along with signs that young Indonesians in large numbers were starting to smoke marijuana.

But supplies show no signs of drying up. All the police apparently did was to force the sources of supply farther from the city.

Marijuana grows in profusion here and residents have used it for years—to spice their food and cure upset stomachs and sore feet. For years government officials ignored its sale and purchase.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 January 1973

A Top Heroin Smuggler Is Given 20-Year Sentence, the Maximum

By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY

Auguste Joseph Ricord, whom the Government called the largest trafficker in heroin ever brought to trial in the United States, received the maximum 20-year prison sentence in Federal Court yesterday for conspiracy to smuggle narcotics.

Ricord, a 62-year-old Argentine citizen of Corsican extraction, had been found guilty at a jury trial last month. The small, bald restaurateur, known as Monsieur André, had been accused of being the mastermind of a many-tentacled ring operating from his Paris-Nice motel-restaurant on the outskirts of Asunción, Paraguay.

In imposing the harshest sentence he could, Judge M. Cannella noted that Ricord was not an addict or a pusher accused of making a few sidewalk sales.

Suffering and Death

"This is a sale of a very large quantity of heroin," the judge said. "The end product in suffering and mortality from this quantity would probably equal the recent figures given for the war in Vietnam."

Walter M. Phillips Jr., an assistant United States attorney in charge of the narcotics unit in the Southern District of New York, said that Ricord's rings

were responsible for bringing in at least 2,000 pounds of pure heroin a year into the United States.

Mr. Phillips said he had evidence that, in the three years before his arrest in 1971, Ricord had changed between \$350,000 and \$400,000 from American to Paraguayan currency at just one of the exchange shops he used in Asunción.

In addition to the 20-year prison sentence, Judge Cannella imposed a \$20,000 fine—the maximum under the law—and directed Ricord to pay the costs of prosecution.

Ricord Questions Locale

In a statement before sentencing, Ricord said that he had never been in the United States until his extradition from Paraguay last September. "It is entirely possible that I never committed any offense in the territory of the United States," he said, consulting handwritten notes.

Ricord said that in his years in the restaurant business "some traffickers" had been among his customers. "But I never, never was an accomplice to anybody," he said. He said he was a "victim of an intrigue," which he did not

specify. He also said he was sick with kidney stones, ulcers and diabetes.

Ricord's lawyer, Herbert I. Handman, said in his plea that his client had a "complex and difficult background" because he had "grown up in Europe in the turmoil of war."

Marseilles Background

The records show that Ricord began his career as a small-time hoodlum and pimp in Marseilles and was an agent of the French Gestapo during World War II. He fled to Latin America after the war and, it is believed, began his narcotics activities in the nineteen-fifties.

Judge Cannella was critical of the presentence probation report prepared for Ricord. He noted that it leaned heavily on an interview the probation officer had with Nathan Adams, an investigative reporter for the Reader's Digest who has done more than a year's research on Ricord. His 30-page article, "The Hunt for Andre," is to appear in the March issue of the magazine.

The judge said that he did not think the interview was proper material for a probation report, and that he was ignoring that portion of it in fixing the sentence. Mr. Adams, who works in Washington, said that he had given his information to the authorities because he felt strongly about the case and Ricord's implication in it.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 January 1973

When aid doesn't work in the Third World

A provocative book argues that the benefits of modernization too often do not filter down to the people in most developing countries. The reason: local citizens are not involved in the decisions that affect them nor do they have access to the money, skills, and information they need to take advantage of local resources.

By Richard Nenneman
*Business and financial editor of
The Christian Science Monitor*

Washington

SCOTT FITZGERALD ONCE SAID TO ERNEST Hemingway, "The rich are different from us." Hemingway is supposed to have answered, "Yes, they have more money."

Now Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, two developmental economists, also are saying that the rich are different from the poor — only in another way. The poor, they argue, lack access — access to the means of production, to credit, to the market, and to technical knowledge. And all the foreign aid the United States might continue dispensing and even major increases in the gross national products (GNPs) of Third World countries will neither relieve poverty nor increase the lot of the average man if there isn't the political decision to give this access.

There is no dearth of discussion about the developing countries. The talk has focused on the disappointments, which have outnumbered the successes.

Edgar Owens has been with the Agency for International Development since 1960 and has served in both the former parts of Pakistan, in Thailand, and in South Vietnam. Out of his experience in AID he began to piece together the reasons for the limited success of many Third World development projects. Along with Mr. Shaw, a young Briton working for the Overseas Development

Council who has done extensive work on employment problems in developing countries, he has written "Development Reconsidered."

Strong case for new type

Their book makes a formidable case for a new kind of development. It goes to the heart of any economy, to its people. And while they argue that jobs are the important thing (since jobs create purchasing power and raise the lot of the average man), they say that something else comes even before jobs. And that is the organization of a country so that (1) the proper decisions are made at the right levels of government, (2) as many people as possible are involved in decisions that affect their own lives, and (3) there are effective links between the different levels of decisionmaking. "The creation and diffusion of sufficient political power to enable governments to govern is the great political problem of development."

Messrs. Owens and Shaw divide the Third World into what they call "modernizing" and "dual" societies. By dual, they mean any society that is still essentially split into a group who do the ruling and a group who are ruled. This is not a Communist vs. democratic split, they argue. One must look below the label and see how power is really exercised in any nation. The modernizing societies are those which are to some extent learning to trust their own people and share decisionmaking.

Taiwan comes out as their prize example of a country that is successfully modernizing. Several other nations are mentioned as good examples in at least part of what they have done — Egypt, Yugoslavia, the part of Pakistan that is now Bangladesh, and both Koreas.

On the other hand, Mexico and India, even though democracies, get rated as the old, dual-type societies, since the authors don't find the necessary input into decisionmaking at the local level.

Having established that the organization of a society is of prime importance and that power must be widely diffused, the authors then go on to argue, as does an increasing amount of development literature, that the emphasis from now on must be on developing the small farm and small-town industry.

Cities unable to provide jobs

The cities have shown themselves incapable of putting to work the landless peasants who migrate to urban areas. The spread of urban slums all over the world demonstrates that the type of capital-intensive development going on in the cities does not alone generate enough major new employment opportunities.

It has been a mistake, Messrs. Owens and Shaw argue, for the West to emphasize the kind of capital-intensive industrial development that was appropriate at another time to the Western nations and particularly for the United States, which did not have a large surplus of labor.

This type of development in most Third World countries has only served to create a new class of urban elite (which includes some of the urban workers, too). While the incomes of this elite have grown, the gap between them and the remainder of society has widened. Thus the aims of development, or at least of the foreign aid that supported much development, have been at least

partly thwarted.

It is more appropriate, say Messrs. Owens and Shaw, for the developing nations to emphasize the resource with which most of them are blessed — people. Even in crowded India, there is potential work for today's population if it were organized along these lines.

Messrs. Owens and Shaw suggest specifically that labor-intensive, small farming (using large inputs of fertilizer, miracle seeds, irrigation, and multiple cropping) make it possible in tropical areas for a single family to make a living on one hectare (2.5 acres) of land. But to do this they must have access to all the information, credit, physical inputs, and marketing knowledge that the large farmer has. And there also must be either honest land reform or equitable land-tenure arrangements.

Heartened by receptivity in India

They argue that if the government would make it possible for this to happen, the poor would learn to organize their own lives very well. It is one variation on the thesis that the poor are not basically different from other people, but that individually they cannot fight a structure that keeps them down. And in this case, Messrs. Owens and Shaw argue, the structure that keeps them down may even be a central government that calls itself a democracy.

I watched Mr. Owens "selling" some of these ideas in India a month ago. In one of his talks, he said:

"The distribution of GNP is profoundly influenced by the manner of its production. If GNP is produced by a few it will be consumed by a few, and the gap between rich and poor will continue to widen. If GNP is produced by many, then people in general will share in the material benefits of economic growth." What is most important, he said, is creating the "conditions of access" so that the small people have an equal chance to create their own wealth.

Mr. Owens was heartened by the degree of receptivity he found to at least part of the Owens-Shaw thesis in India.

Some Indians say that three hectares would be a better minimum size farm, and that in some parts of the country one must have at least 20 hectares. Simple arithmetic shows that with today's population in India, which is smaller than tomorrow's, there is only one hectare of arable land for a theoretical family of four. In any case, the method would seem to assure vastly more employment and spreading of income in the rural areas than there is today.

The increased income that would come from honest land reform and intensive small-scale farming would need to be spent. This would support the creation of village industries, which in turn would offer employment for more rural workers. The most interesting part of this small-farm and small-town industry concept is that neither requires the spending of much capital per person — both emphasize putting people to work, and people are the resource that is in abundance. And today in many cases they are a resource that is being wasted.

This small-town industry would produce wares that people needed in rural areas — building blocks and other building materials; simple consumer goods; retail services; and a limited number of luxury goods as well.

"If," they write, "we accept the premise that development should consist of a continuous succession of small advances, millions of individual actions by millions of individual people, then small, much more than large industry, suits the psychology of people in transition from traditional to modernized methods of production."

The development of small towns also would relieve the big cities of the world from pressures that otherwise may make them uninhabitable by the end of the century. (For instance, a United Nations study estimates the combined population of Bombay and Calcutta at 92 million by the year 2000.)

Messrs. Owens and Shaw claim that instead of haphazard growth of the tiny farming villages, there needs to be a national policy in developing countries that identifies certain crossroads towns as natural market centers and fosters their development. Taking the experience of other countries, they say that each 75 square miles of farming area needs a market town. (They are not advocating making every rural village a prosperous center of activity; they are saying that rural society needs reconstructing.)

Applying these figures to a country like India, which has 565,000 villages, they find India sadly lacking in market towns. They say it should have from 12,000 to 14,000 such centers, whereas it has only 3,000. Ten thousand new towns of 10,000 each would absorb an additional 100 million people.

One major result of this type of wide-based development, they say, would be a decline in the birthrate. They note that family planning programs have not been successful in nations in which there is little prospect of economic improvement. But as soon as the incentive of a better life lies ahead, the birth-control techniques that are available begin to be used.

Emphasis on spreading of incomes

There is a new emphasis in most of the aid agencies on job creation and the spreading of incomes (instead of looking at what can be misleading GNP statistics). In this sense, the ideas of Messrs. Owens and Shaw complement the new thinking.

Where they are boldest in their approach is their insistence that a people must be properly organized before the job of development can succeed. And the idea of doing through local organization, not everything, but those things that can best be done there and involve the abundant local talent should sound pleasingly familiar to anyone familiar with the pattern of American westward development and the role not only of states but of county and local government. These institutions all played a major role in giving U.S. citizens a feeling of having at least some control over their own destinies.

The implications for U.S. aid programs are, clearly, that the United States should concentrate its future foreign aid on those countries that try to lift themselves out of the "dual" society classification and modernize themselves along the lines suggested by Messrs. Owens and Shaw.

They make no guesstimate of what demands this might make eventually on U.S. foreign aid. For the moment, they say, "the crucial starting point is ideas, not the amount of money."

WASHINGTON STAR
20 January 1973

Dam on Heroin Flow Claimed

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG
Star-News Staff Writer

The top federal narcotics intelligence official said today that a concerted law enforcement effort has "turned off the open faucet of heroin" into the United States.

"It's still dripping," said John Warner, assistant director for strategic intelligence of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), but we've stopped the flow."

That's the most optimistic assessment yet given by a knowledgeable federal source about success in the war against drug traffickers.

In an interview, Warner said he could document a real heroin shortage in this country now.

He cited fewer heroin overdose deaths and hospital admissions, lower quality heroin and less of it, steadily rising prices and the less-preferred brown Mexican heroin showing up in New York because that's all that's available.

"A Helluva Shortage"

"We've queried all our offices," he said. "We've come to the conclusion there's a helluva shortage. We've made a real dent."

The official attributed the situation to an increasingly worldwide law enforcement effort, supported by good intelligence programs, diplomatic efforts and the White House emphasis on doing something.

What it finally gets down to, though, the narcotics agents themselves, he said.

"Whether they wear French, British or American badges, they are the ones who are doing the job, turning off the faucet," Warner said. "They're penetrating the trafficking organizations, making arrests and seizures."

Latest Seizure

The latest seizure came with the announcement that Thailand's special narcotics organization has seized 28.6 pounds of pure heroin and arrested a woman courier on a bus near Chiang Rai.

The heroin was a consign-

ment of No. 4 Asian heroin, the kind closest to the European variety of injectable heroin, with a street value of more than \$7.5 million.

The task force in Thailand, working close to the opium producing "Golden Triangle" where Thailand, Burma and Laos meet, gets BNDD training, financial and technical assistance and intelligence. Since it started operating last spring, it has seized more than four tons of opium.

Another substantial opium seizure was made recently in India, where a BNDD agent is now working with Indian police.

Widening Attack

Pakistan, too, is typical of the widening attack on the drug traffic. Warner disclosed that a study team of U.S. Customs, BNDD and State Department officials is now helping Pakistan establish a central narcotics investigative bureau.

Warner gave this assessment of the present world narcotics traffic:

o Although growing opium has been made illegal in Turkey, the drug business there is not over. No effect has been noted yet because there was a large quantity of opium and its derivatives in the pipeline and because farmers with held enough opium to provide dowries for their daughter and luxuries in the days ahead. These supplies are coming on the market now.

o There's no change yet in the movement of the opium from Turkey to France, but the drug traffic has been hurt between Marseilles and the United States.

o Recent arrests in France,

Latin America and the United States have "scared the hell" out of traffickers, who are becoming extremely cautious, Warner said. Five major traffickers were captured in France in the last few months.

A 400-kilo seizure in Marseilles, seizure of 60 kilos of heroin hidden in sheepskins aboard ship at Rio de Janeiro and a seizure of similar size in Argentina also were cited.

Risk Increasing

These people can't move without our knowing about it," Warner said. "Fewer and fewer shipments are getting through. They're losing a lot of money and the risk is getting to be too great for them."

But so much money is involved that the traffickers will try new routes to evade capture, and that's what BNDD is checking on now.

Agents know there's illicit cultivation of opium in eastern Turkey. To get it to the market, BNDD predicts, the traffickers will try to go through Syria and Lebanon and then by ship to the heroin laboratories in Marseilles. That would be a new route since most of the traffic so far has been through Yugoslavia and Germany to France.

BNDD will continue to work with Turkish police to beef up border control between Eastern Turkey and Syria.

BNDD intelligence also is aware that Asian traffickers are seeking new routes to avoid a squeeze in Thailand. There's a developing pattern of shipping opium from the "Golden Triangle" to Rangoon and Moulmein in Burma and Penang in Malaysia, where there is access to the sea. "We'll just have to do some

more plugging up," Warner said.

What narcotics officials are determined to block is a major flow of Southeast Asian heroin into the United States.

"Southeast Asian heroin is coming here," Warner acknowledged, "but it's in small quantities, usually no more than five or 10 kilos, often body-packed by Chinese spamen. But the traffic is not well organized, and we're not allowing it to become organized."

"We can't eliminate it but we can prevent it from becoming a major problem. Proportionately more heroin is coming out of Southeast Asia, but these traffickers don't have the long-established trafficking and consumer organizations of the French-Latin-American-U.S. traffickers."

Warner sees increasing evidence that the world is rising up against drug traffickers. As an example, he noted that Afghanistan's new prime minister has announced that one of the major programs he hopes to initiate is elimination of opium production.

It's the first time an Afghanistan official has taken such a stand, and, Warner indicated, it stems from the work there of a BNDD agent and the U.S. ambassador.

Afghanistan's attitude is significant because American "hippies" had been trafficking in hashish from there.

In a recognition of the leadership of the United States in the world-wide struggle against the illegal drug traffic, the 25th session of the U.N. Narcotics Commission, now meeting in Geneva, has elected BNDD Director John Ingersoll as chairman.

MIAMI HERALD
16 January 1973

A War To Help Sell Heroin?

By FREDERIC SHERMAN
Herald Editorial Writer

THERE is at Yale University a doctoral scholar who would like to believe Richard Nixon is trying to cut loose from Vietnam because of evidence that

American involvement in Southeast Asia is a major factor in the increasing problem with heroin addiction here in this country.

Alfred W. McCoy has offered such evidence in his book entitled *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast*

Sherman Asia (Harper & Row).

Those who support American intervention in Vietnam as a selfless act in defense of freedom will judge the McCoy book as a spurious indictment filled with wild and baseless charges. But there is too much in this book for it to be dismissed as anti-Vietnam propaganda. Eighteen months of study produced the names, the places and the dates of trafficking in the poppy gum that is turned into the powder of white death.

Sources of opium and heroin are



traced through the politics and the economies of the military dictatorships in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

Aircraft controlled by General Ky in Saigon transported from Laos the heroin that was pushed on tens of thousands of American servicemen. It was sold cheaply because there were more than 500,000 potential customers. It was General Ky's sister who directed much of the traffic in heroin from the Sedone Palace Hotel in Pakse, a city in western Laos near the Thai border.

The Cambodia invasion did not accomplish the capture of the North Vietnamese headquarters, but it did enable the Saigon Navy to expand its role in the heroin traffic. Up until the invasion of Cambodia, there was no surface transit for heroin from Laos. But with the protection of American air power, the Vietnamese admirals were able to run their heroin in competition with General Ky's aircraft.

THIS is a book the CIA tried to suppress because it documents the use of American money and American airplanes in the heroin traffic. This again is more of the political expediency on which Washington's stumbling in Southeast Asia is based. The loyalty of mountain tribesmen could only be bought by purchases of their poppy crop and transport of the opium gum to processing plants controlled by political leaders in Laos and Cambodia. It was a repeat of the game invented by French intelligence officials who use profits from heroin traffic to finance political machinations.

On Page 263, McCoy writes, "Without air transport for their opium, the Meo (tribesmen) faced economic ruin. There was simply no form of air transport available in northern Laos except the CIA's charter airline, Air America. And according to several sources, Air America began flying opium from mountain villages north and east of the Plain of Jars to Gen. Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng." This, then, is the major factor in the so-called secret American war in Laos: traffic in opium destined for pushers in Saigon and for the smugglers coming into the United States by way of Miami from Latin America.

THE BASIC problem, as McCoy outlines it, is that American officials in Southeast Asia who know the inside story of the heroin traffic cannot or won't do anything about it because of fears that their actions would somehow hamper the war effort.

If agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, for example, were to get tough with Thai leaders mixed up with heroin in Bangkok, American commanders of the airbases in that country would suddenly find it impossible to get jet fuel delivered or other vital supplies delivered.

This is why McCoy called his book *The Politics of Heroin*.

WASHINGTON STAR
31 January 1973

WHITE HOUSE MOVES IN

Arms Control Unit Bypassed

American allies in Western Europe.

Symptoms of Mistrust

These developments are only the most recent symptoms of a mistrust in the White House of ACDA professionals that has been apparent since the first arms-control agreements were concluded in Moscow last May.

One arms expert close to the administration viewpoint explained it this way: "The principle at stake is whether the responsibility of negotiating these arm treaties should be in the hands of an interested agency — one whose mission is to promote arms control."

Kissinger himself moved publicly to take over from ACDA in Moscow last May, when he took charge of a press briefing scheduled to explain the details of the treaty and left Gerard C. Smith, the ACDA head and chief negotiator during two-and-a-half years of talks, standing in the background.

Smith's sudden relegation to the shadows has been cited by sources close to ACDA as a factor in his decision Jan 3 to resign from the agency.

ACDA, has remained without a chief since. But a new chief negotiator to SALT was quickly named in an evident move to keep the SALT negotiating team separate from the arms control experts.

The new chief negotiator is V. Alexis Johnson, the former undersecretary of state, who has also been designated ambassador-at-large in President Nixon's second term.

The White House announced yesterday that the next round of SALT negotiations with the Soviets will begin March 12.

Johnson has been characterized as much more receptive to hard-line Pentagon views on arms control than any of the ACDA professionals.

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

As the strategic arm limitation talks with the Soviet Union enter a new and crucial phase, the Nixon administration is taking steps to concentrate all phases of disarmament policy in the White

In a series of moves culminating in this week's budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been stripped of many of its resources and much of its authority to do its job.

The budget announced Monday shows that ACADA, a semi-autonomous agency housed in the State Department, would lose a third of its operating funds next year — a cut from \$10 million to \$6.7 million.

Much of the cutback, it is understood, is in the agency's research budget. It used to let out contracts for up to \$2 million a year; Next year, the research fund will be only \$500,000.

White House Project

At the same time, informed sources disclosed that the White House itself has quietly let out a research contract on disarmament to a former president of the Hudson Institute who is an outspoken opponent of last summer's arms-control agreements with the Russians.

The researcher is Dr. Donald G. Brennan, a strategic arms specialist who testified in Congress against the agreement to curb an anti-ballistic missile and against its interim five-year freeze on offensive nuclear weapons. Brennan has been engaged by Henry A. Kissinger's foreign policy apparatus in the White House, the National Security Council, to assess the political impact of the arms agreement on

Unsettling Signs for Arms Control:

Will Momentum Be Lost?

NEW YORK TIMES
25 January 1973

Some Suggestions for the New Man at the U.N.

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reply is that it is ineffective primarily because it lacks U.S. support. During its first nineteen years it had U.S. support and it grew steadily stronger. During the last eight years U.S. support has diminished and the U.N. has declined.

Mr. Scali's first and most difficult job, therefore, will be not in New York but in Washington. If he can prevail there, he will soon find that the U.N. structure and the U.N. members are ready to work seriously with the U.S. not only in dealing with the environ-

ment and with economic development but, even more important, in making the U.N. Security Council what Roosevelt and Hull intended it to be, the main instrument both for keeping the peace and for keeping the great powers together. If vigorously used for this purpose, it can be far more effective than separate national security councils, each working in secret to tip the balance of power "just a little bit" its way.

On the other hand, if the U.S. like some others, uses the U.N. mainly as

a propaganda forum, a place to denounce terrorism we don't like while indulging in terrorism we do, a convenient scapegoat when "the games we play" don't work, an international assembly where our principal triumph this year was to reduce our assessment by \$13 million, then the U.N. will conform to what we do, not what we say.

Charles W. Yost was formerly Ambassador to the United Nations.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

21 JAN 1973

France-to-U.S. Heroin Flow Disconnected

By JOHN HARRIS

Special to The News American

PARIS — The "French Connection" is in disarray, according to an American narcotics enforcement official here, and a "classic" drug flow from France to the United States may be coming to a halt.

The official disclosed that during the past two years U.S. Air Force planes, Navy vessels and the Central Intelligence Agency have been used in Europe "with the cooperation of local authorities" to achieve this. He said this use of U.S. military and intelligence elements in narcotics enforcement outside the United States was "absolutely unprecedented."

The official, Thomas P. Murphy, is "narcotics coordinator" at the U.S. Embassy here, with the title of special assistant to the ambassador. Murphy said he plans to return to private life in the United States next month, after serving in his drug enforcement post here for two-and-a-half years.

"For 40 years the narcotics flow from France to the United States has been far and away the classic drug route to the U.S.," Murphy said. "Today the operators of this traffic — popularly known as the 'French Connection' — are frightened, demoralized and on the defensive for the first time."

As a result, Murphy said, the availability of heroin has dwindled drastically in the United States, especially since last July. Street prices of heroin have "doubled and tripled," he added, to the extent that, to an addict, it is often "not much more than aspirin."

Murphy produced a recent U.S. government report that quoted the "wholesale" price of heroin, "delivered in New York City," at \$5,000 to \$7,500 per pound early last year. The report added that since the shortage beginning July, prices up to \$17,000 are being quoted in New York.

Murphy attributed these developments to a massive, combined U.S.-French anti-narcotics drive that began in France after former U.S. Ambassador Arthur K. Watson, who resigned last August, assumed office in 1970. In the process, Murphy added, a growing drug-use problem has been curbed in France, too.

"In two years we've made more progress than in the last 40 years," Murphy said. "For example, five heroin-producing laboratories were smashed in Marseilles in 1972, compared to six in the entire previous 21 years."

The importance of France in the international drug traffic was stressed by other sources here, who noted that Marseilles was a "traditional smuggling way station." It was also pointed out that Marseilles was close to France's major perfume-producing region, a fact which gave it a large supply of skilled chemists who could often be recruited to work in heroin laboratories for high returns.

"Ambassador Watson simply felt the U.S. should bring every area of government that could help into the fight against drugs," Murphy said. "As a result, we have used U.S. Air Force planes, U.S. Navy vessels and even the Central Intelligence Agency — the CIA has big

files, you know.

"All this has been done in cooperation with European authorities — and is absolutely unprecedented outside the U.S.," he added, declining to elaborate. "But it is a battle we have to win, and the ambassador felt that every resource the U.S. has should be used."

Murphy noted that outside the United States the State Department has overall responsibility for other U.S. government agencies.

"So our thought was to support the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with other U.S. resources — and what I've done is pull these others in, and hit them with everything we've got," he said.

Other sources noted that U.S. narcotics agents began to work undercover in France, alongside French agents, during the past two years, too. The sources said that despite official French reluctance to concede it, the U.S. agents frequently go armed on antidrug operations here, "or they might get their heads blown off."

Official figures also attest to a dramatic expansion of French narcotics enforcement agencies. In 1968, for example, the "Police Judiciare" drug force consisted of only 11 officers — but by 1970 this had grown to 63, and in 1972 to 170.

Murphy said cooperation between French and U.S. drug forces was "distant in the old days," when French officials tended to look on the narcotics flow to the U.S. as an American, not a French problem.

"Now we even share office space, particularly in the U.S. consulate in Marseilles," Murphy said. "In addition, one top French narcotics officer has visited the United States so often recently that he's become addicted himself — to cheeseburgers and sundaes with chocolate sauce."

LOS ANGELES TIMES

14 JAN 1973

PUTTING IT TOGETHER AGAIN

Foreign Policy in

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD

Disarray

The New Left's assault on established U.S. foreign policy has been often misinformed, sometimes malevolent, always intemperate. But it has also carried with it an element of enormous potential value to the nation, if we know how to use it.

The single greatest contribution the radical critique has made toward a generally better American foreign policy is in raising questions about the fundamental assumptions concerning this nation's role in the

Prof. Bloomfield, a former State Department U.N. affairs planner, teaches political science at MIT. His article is adapted from Foreign Policy, a new quarterly not to be confused with the venerable Foreign Affairs.

world and about the world itself—assumptions that are rarely recognized let alone challenged inside the system.

I recently made a list of the premises underlying U.S. foreign policy, assumptions that seemed to me to lie beneath the foreign policy consensus as it prevailed from 1945 to, say, 1965. Some or all of these basic assumptions are still shared, consciously or unconsciously, by many in the "foreign policy community," particularly inside the government.

I myself held many of them and still share some. But I now believe that at least some of them have caused great damage to America and sometimes to other people as well. What worries me is that, by and large, most of these underlying assumptions continue to go unchallenged within the system.

If this list appears painfully recognizable, my point will be made. Later on I will suggest some places where I think we should change. But just in case anyone starts muttering about "straw men," consider my comments in parentheses.

★

1—Communism is bad; capitalism is good. (Don't almost all Americans believe this?)

2—Stability is desirable, instability threatens U.S. interests. (This is indisputably the underlying premise of U.S. policy toward the Third World since the 1950s.)

3—Democracy is desirable, but if a choice has to be made, stability serves U.S. interests better than democracy. (This represents the chief political, moral and spiritual problem of our foreign policy.)

4—Any area of the world that "goes socialist" or neutralist is a victory for the Soviet Union and a loss for us. (A boxscore mentality long dominated U.S. postwar policy and still may.)

5—Every other country, and particularly the poor ones, would benefit from American "know-how." (One of our greatest shocks was to learn that we frequently don't know how.)

6—Nazi aggression in the 1930s and democracy's failure to respond provides the appropriate model for dealing with postwar security problems. (Read Dean Rusk's speeches as secretary of state.)

7—Allies and clients of the United States, regardless of their political structure, are members of the Free World. (This may be just rhetoric, but friends of mine in the government get red in the face if you ask them to define "Free World.")

8—Western Europe (a) is indefensible without something like the current U.S. military presence and (b) would not be defended by the people who live there because (c) they don't understand the threat. (For details, apply to NATO headquarters or the Pentagon.)

9—The United States must provide leadership because it (reluctantly) has the responsibility. (This one has fallen from grace, but is still believed by many.)

10—The United States has vital interests in (a) the Pacific and (b) some or (c) all of the offshore territories and (d) or some parts of the Asian mainland. (Easy to show—hard to analyze.)

11—Foreign aid (a) rests on an altruistic concern for the well-being of foreigners, (b) should inspire gratitude and pro-U.S. feelings, (c) is only justifiable if it promotes speci-

fic U.S. interests. (Phrased this way to illustrate our schizoid approach to foreign aid.)

12—In negotiation the United States has a virtual monopoly on sincerity. (Americans since Ben Franklin have believed this, at least until recently.)

13—Violence is an unacceptable way to secure economic, social and political justice—except when vital U.S. interests are at stake. (Most Americans like the revolutions of 1688 and 1776 but deplore those of 1917 and 1949.)

14—Depending on the extent to which U.S. interests are at stake, the United Nations is either the noblest hope of mankind, or a nuisance. (Ask anyone.)

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15—In southern Africa the United States favors racial equality but not at the price of (a) instability or (b) economic loss. (Not necessarily hypocrisy, merely a policy premise with an irreconcilable internal inconsistency.)

16—Incipient foreign conflicts warrant top-level U.S. attention only when they threaten to become violent. When they become acute, only diplomatic and military considerations are relevant. (If this isn't true, why does U.S. decision machinery spring into action only when violence breaks out?)

17—However egregious a mistake, the government must never admit having been wrong. (Eisenhower admitting the U-2 spy flight is the only example of admitting wrongdoing. No one admits having been wrong.)

18—Challenging underlying assumptions is "speculative," "theoretical," and a one-way ticket out of the inner policy circle. (Read a few memoirs. Ask why the Policy Planning Staff is no more.)

If at one time a full consensus existed on these propositions, either on conscious or unconscious levels, it

has substantially crumbled so far as many in the "foreign policy community" are concerned. But a number of these articles of belief are still reflected both in U.S. policies and in the arguments made by defenders of the policy status quo.

Those with short historic memories might well ponder the durable theme of a supernatural calling for this nation. It was not an invention of power-drunk cold warriors, nor even of those imperialists intoxicated at the turn of the last century with the heady wine of overseas empire.

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Rather, it goes back to the very birth of this nation and even earlier. For almost 300 years from Jonathan Edwards through Adams, Clay and Lincoln, through Wilson and Kennedy to Richard Nixon, the theme has recurred of a unique, even divine American world role.

But this strain in American belief and American rhetoric strikes a jarring note today. It combines an embarrassing self-righteousness with what Raymond Aron (speaking, incidentally, of Karl Marx) called "catastrophic optimism." Yet this nation in fact did furnish a beacon for many people and it did provide a model for new democracies and it was for generations unself-seeking in relations with others.

In redefining the U.S. world role, what has to be resolved is not to be found in cost-benefit calculations nor at the level of diplomatic style and maneuver where a "Mettarmark" competes with Wilsonians. Beneath all that, the deepest conflicts in our body politic are over conflicting beliefs about the nature of man, and the meaning of morality in public policy. The sickness in American foreign policy reflects this underlying tragedy of the human condition.

Demoralized in the face of failures and disillusioned about the validity of its self-image, America seems to me paradoxically ready to move decisively to fresh "commitments," not to this or that tin-horn dictator who claims anticommunism, but commitments to redefined purposes such as economic equality and conflict prevention along with such valid older stands as disfavoring naked military aggression.

Reconciling economic gain with human values demands renewed dedication to partnerships, free trade, and a purging of the ideological constipation that blocked such solutions as commodity agreements on which depend the very lifeblood of humans elsewhere.

Revulsion at the "mad momentum" of arms races or at Strangelovian analysis needs to be accompanied by a renewed commitment to genuine rationalism.

Clearly, isolationism is a nonpolicy for the United States in the 1970s, the 1980s, and until the end of the century despite the mood of many Americans who want to put domestic problem-solving first and believe the way to do this is to downgrade foreign affairs. Their urge to decouple America from the globalism that has turned sour is understandable. But the linkage between troubles abroad and troubles at home turns out to be a tricky one.

The "inside" world at home may be profoundly altered, but the outside world is a separate system with its own constants and variables, mostly unsusceptible to manipulation by any single state, even a superpowerful one. U.S. domestic life is long overdue for some basic reforms, and U.S. foreign policies need to change to conform to altered realities and perceptions.

But if the national perspective gets too much out of register with external reality it will become as irrational and inappropriate as previous policies which led us astray.

In recent years we often looked like unprincipled pragmatists in our own sphere, and pious moralists elsewhere. We need to return now to the tradition of an America that dealt realistically with the world while giving primacy to its democratic commitment wherever it's own writ ran. This is not a return to isolationism any more than it is a prescription for renewed military interventionism. It is a step beyond both.

The American task is to decide afresh what is vitally important to the nation, while not abandoning our hold on external reality.

But lastly, in suggesting some specifics of policy, I would echo George Romney, perhaps the only honest man in the United States or any other government, when (speaking of the equally refractory urban problems) he said, "The truth is, none of us are sure what are the right things to do."

The list that follows is my own "decatalogue"—a short catalog of revised fundamental assumptions that in my view should underlie U.S. policy today:

1—Neither states nor ideology nor things but people represent the highest value for American policy.

While men (not women) who are today in their 50s and 60s will continue to run this country for a few more years, others are coming up who believe that the human beings

who live in this country, and for that matter people everywhere, represent the irrefragably highest value for American policy.

This has to be the central point in a restatement of our ideology. It is linked to the spirit for which America used to stand. It can refurbish a tarnished image. Above all, it is ethically right.

2—Nuclear weapons can destroy the United States.

However comfortably strategic analysts and indeed almost everyone have learned to live with nuclear weapons they still could destroy civilization as we know it. This inherently suicidal possibility will persist as a threat until something basic is done about it, such as genuine reductions in stockpiles of H-bombs, and basic turn-downs in the military budgets of the major nations. SALT I was the application of brakes. But we are very far from going into reverse gear.

3—The United States has a major world role, but no God-given mandate.

We have no divine commission either to right all assumed wrongs or to impose our version of right or wrong on others, whether in their

defense or not—and neither does any other country have that right.

The United States is still strong enough to blow up the world, and almost rich enough to buy it. But somehow we haven't proven to be smart enough to run it, so goodbye (and, for my money, good riddance) Pax Americana. At the same time, our influence and power in the service of genuine war prevention, genuine humanitarianism, and genuine collective security, will be desperately needed.

4—The major forces affecting human life are increasingly transitional.

Society does not exist to support bureaucracies but vice versa—Max Weber and all governments to the contrary. The things that affect human life at the human level are what it is really all about. (I confess to having sometimes forgotten that myself, in 16 years in and out of uniform, gripped as I was with what might be called the glamor of the In-Basket).

The greatest single lesson for leadership, and the heart of the needed transformation in American attitudes about its world role turns on this: The air, the water, the quality of people's lives, the communications that enrich them, the wars and diseases that kill them, the consequences of affluence and scientific discovery—every single one of these

will turn out on analysis to be largely indifferent to a single nation's boundaries and effectively approachable only on the basis of regional or international cooperation and eventually international regulation.

★

5—The balance of power mechanism still keeps the peace.

On the most fateful matters of national security, the governing mechanism of world politics, so far as I can see, is still the balance of power. Events which are likely to upset the overall balance are perilous and should be resisted and corrected—although not by ourselves alone. By the same token, events which do not really upset the over-all balance should not be portrayed in terms of Munich, fighting on the beaches of California, or the Apocalypse.

6—Hostile or incompatible forces remain in the world.

Only someone on a very powerful trip could fail to notice that the cold war is not fully ended, that there still exist plenty of groups in the world, some ruling powerful countries, whose notions of how to organize and "improve" mankind are different from ours, and that some of these people are deeply hostile to this country. How we ourselves change is going to reduce this tension to some extent; in other cases it is not, and we had better maintain good intelligence and some dry powder.

7—Worldwide strivings for economic, social, and racial equality will intensify.

All projections into the future confirm the cynical proposition that "the rich get richer and the poor get children." The GNP gap will create a built-in source of tension. On a scale of probability and imminence, led by Latin America and trailed by central Africa, this tension will persist until the poor gain a greater measure of equality with rich, white, Western man.

8—On the surface world order tendencies are weak, nationalism is strong.

The forces that make for conflict, such as virulent nationalism, are increasing in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, and in pockets within the allegedly advanced northern countries.

There is nothing to indicate that the present rate of about 1.5 new conflicts per year won't continue and even increase. As the 1970s began, half the nations of the world—about 70—were either engaged in conflict or preparing for it.

9—Military power remains relevant to some—but by no means all—

national strategies.

Blame for the recent U.S. obsession with military solutions primarily rests not on military men but on civilians who forgot that their business was diplomacy, conflict prevention and compromise, and went whoring off after shiny toys of power, subversion, and *force majeure*. But given the other realities, military power still remains a crucially important element that is relevant to some but by no means all policy problems.

10—Technology is not a frill but a growing determinant of world politics.

As a nation we have thought of exported technology and technical assistance at root as pragmatic instruments for our own national advantage. But the corollary of my premise is that all three have to be confronted on fundamental moral grounds.

It was not very long ago that one could derive the external objectives of America by simply looking around the world and seeing what we were doing. It could be added up and synthesized into a reasonably coherent whole called the "United States national interest," at least as of that year.

For a time that worked as an inductive method of defining national interest. But a list of what we have been actually doing everywhere, in different parts of the world or at home, is no longer acceptable by even a majority of Americans as enabling them to infer a valid statement of American interests and national purpose for the period ahead. Indeed we have been badly served by the invocation of something mystical called the "national interest" as a substitute for the hard, painful analysis needed to devise coherent national policies.

Some Americans—including Presidents—talk as though American national interests were immutable. But of course, apart from sheer survival, they are not. We may have preferences—a democratically ruled, contented, admiring world around us—but we are forced to decide as a nation what is vital to us and what is not. To this extent attitudes, rather than geography or divine law, determine interests.

If Southeast Asia became a new Tonkin Empire under Hanoi, neutralist at best or allied to China or Russia at worst, many people now believe the average American could still live out his life quite happily. Unless the domino theory or the Munich analogy can be more persuasively demonstrated, what vital U.S. interest was really involved in the Vietnam war? There is widespread agreement now that the answer is: None.

How can this be? Is nothing vital except our own survival as sentient human beings? I suspect the answer to this is "yes"—that nothing is vital except what is truly vital, meaning affecting life itself. And so it must be unless we want to let every corner of the world be defined by one or another politician or agency of government as "vital" and therefore deserving of a total American commitment.

To make "vital" mean the same thing as "important" or "desirable" or "appropriate" (or possibly annoying or just interesting) not only degrades the language but may needlessly kill a lot of Americans. The semantics here involve not simply making words mean what you want them to mean, a la Lewis Carroll.

Words may wind up changing the lives of a lot of people.

"Vital interests" can only refer to the danger that the United States can be destroyed or mortally hurt. This may be the first element of clarity in sorting out what we have been calling "vital interests" all over the globe.

The people who run governments, at least our own, are neither malevolent nor stupid, despite a disturbingly widespread opinion to the contrary. For my money they are people who are both bright and devoted to the national well-being as they see it.

I believe the Nixon Administration has made some substantial gains in foreign affairs. But the added ingredient that is needed is to overcome what this President liked to call our failure of nerve. I am afraid he was usually thinking of nerve in the sense of acting unilaterally, if necessary, in defense of what is construed as the national interest.

It can perhaps be seen that for me the needed recovery of nerve is for the purpose of imagining bold and creative designs for a more unified and cooperating world, and then have the courage to push them toward reality. It remains true that without vision the people will perish. But with only vision and no follow-through, idealism becomes hypocrisy.

Let me suggest a final litmus-paper test for policy. After we ask "Is it strategically important?"—which we must—and after we ask "Is it politically feasible or viable?"—which we must—and after we ask "Is it cost-effective?"—which we should—perhaps the greatest lesson of Vietnam for the United States is that we should also ask "Is it humane?"

This is not a substitute for the other questions. But only with this additional question, or so it seems to me, can we cure the sickness that has crept into the veins of American foreign policy.

Far East

BALTIMORE SUN
24 January 1973

Paris talks: years of sound, fury, at last signifying peace

By SCOTT SULLIVAN
Paris Bureau of The Sun

Paris—On March 31, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced to the American people that he was prepared to meet with North Vietnam in "any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end."

In the interests of peace, the President continued, he had decided to withdraw his candidacy for re-election, had ordered the "unilateral" cessation of bombing raids north of the demarcation zone and had appointed W. Averell Harriman, the 77-year-old former Governor of New York and diplomatic trouble-shooter, as his personal representative in the coming talks.

Tet mocked U.S. words

The President's dramatic announcement came after more than 18 years of American involvement in South Vietnam, after 8 years of overt participation in the war. More than 20,000 GI's had died in action in the conflict, and total American troop strength in Indochina had reached half a million.

The Communists' bloody, if inconclusive, Tet offensive two months earlier had brought the war to a new pitch of intensity and horror, making a mockery of official American estimates that the United States and South Vietnam were slowly "winning the war."

In America, the war had divided the country and made Mr. Johnson the most unpopular President in recent memory. At first it was the young—because of their radicalism, because they ran the risk of fighting and dying in the far-off rice paddies—who expressed their opposition to a war they perceived as unjust and degaling.

Then, little by little, older and more conservative Americans began to follow the young. They could not understand how the patently undemocratic regime in Saigon could serve the cause of democracy. They could not justify to themselves the expense

of American blood and treasure.

They grew heartily sick of the war and wanted to get out of it.

So, President Johnson's evidently sincere bid for peace was greeted, except on the extreme right wing, with sympathy and relief. The President's personal standing improved and the American people settled back to wait for peace within a reasonable span of time.

Their hopes were to be bitterly, cruelly disappointed.

Nearly five years passed before another President and his special representative finally patched together a treaty that did little more than register the military stalemate in the war-torn land.

Meantime, 29,000 more Americans lost their lives in battle, about 580 American prisoners languished in Hanoi's prisons, the Communist side unleashed a major offensive unparalleled in the previous history of the war, and the United States responded with massive bombing of the North and mining of its ports.

The official Paris talks, which grew out of Mr. Johnson's initiative, developed into an exercise in pure futility.

As the fighting and the dying went on and on, representatives of the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the Viet Cong met weekly to trade repetitive insults and propaganda, restate invariable arguments and boast of their own "good will."

So manifestly fruitless were the public talks that President Nixon opened an entirely different channel of communications to the Communist side, sending Henry A. Kissinger, his globe-circling personal envoy, for 21 separate "secret" sessions with Le Duc Tho, the charming but rigid plenipotentiary of Hanoi's Politburo.

October movement

For more than three years, the private talks proved as frustratingly useless as the public forum. Each side tirelessly repeated its unvarying demands and rejected the op-

ponent's arguments.

It was not in fact, until October 8 of last year that the secret talks began to move at all.

On that day, Mr. Tho proposed a formula that, in effect, separated the political from the military aspects of the Vietnamese situation. Dr. Kissinger, in turn, agreed to accept the Communist contention that there were "two governments, two administrations, two armies" in South Vietnam.

Futility inevitable

From that moment on despite the tensions and suspense of the previous months, the process of compromise and eventual agreement ineluctable.

The almost five years of futility and frustration that preceded the treaty were also in a sense inevitable.

In the very speech in which President Johnson called for the talks, he added that the United States "will not accept a fake solution."

And he assured his countrymen that the solution reached must include "political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese — all the South Vietnamese — to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference, from us or anyone else."

Mr. Nixon held to that same principle, to the end.

And to the end the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies rejected it—at least in the sense in which the Americans meant it.

Choice of venue

The endless, pointless wrangling that was to surround the talks throughout their life got off to a quick start.

In the first week of April, 1968, American and North Vietnamese representatives in Vientiane, Laos, sat down to choose a venue for the peace talks. The Americans suggested Geneva, New Delhi, Rangoon, Jakarta, Indonesia, and Vientiane itself. Hanoi held out for Phnom Penh, Cambodia or Warsaw.

Gen. Charles de Gaulle, still president of France, felt that the only logical site for the

talks was his country, with its own long history of intimate relations with Vietnam. He said so loudly and often and, after a period of uncertainty, his view prevailed.

Gestapo setting

It was May 13, 1968, when Mr. Harriman sat down with Xuan Thuy, the former poet and journalist who was to represent Hanoi through the almost five long years of the talks.

That first meeting took place, like all the others, in the ground floor grand salon of the old Hotel Majestic on Paris's Avenue Kleber, the once-splendid hostelry that was commandeered by the Gestapo as its Paris headquarters during World War II, then reverted to the French Foreign Ministry that uses it for all sorts of international conferences.

The massive old building, somewhat worn with age, was to become a familiar sight to televiewers the world over and a symbol of the morass into which the talks would slip and founder.

No common view

That first meeting, which took place against a backdrop of a general strike and student disorders on a grand scale, took place in an atmosphere of pleasant courtesy that was almost immediately to dissipate.

On the business side, there was no evidence of a common view. Mr. Harriman spoke of "mutual de-escalation of the war"—an idea that would have required the North Vietnamese to do the unthinkable by admitting their direct involvement in the South Vietnamese conflict. Mr. Thuy accused the United States of "sabotaging" the 1954 Geneva agreements.

So began a long summer of stalemate, and with it the growing realization—on both sides—that the bilateral talks were insufficient, that somehow the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon and the Viet Cong, or National Liberation Front, must be attached to the negotiations.

But Hanoi demanded a stiff

price for the enlarged negotiations, the admission of the front on the same basis as the Saigon government and cessation of the bombing of the demarcation zone.

Throughout the summer, President Johnson refused to pay the price. Mr. Harriman continued to meet in fruitless semi-public sessions with Mr. Thuy, while Cyrus Vance, No. 2 man in the American delegation, handled most of the secret parleys on enlargement.

Finally, on November 1, just a week before the American elections that would see Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic vice president defeated by Richard M. Nixon, Mr. Johnson declared a halt to all bombing of the North. The move came just too late to save Mr. Humphrey.

Nor did it immediately bring the four parties to the bargaining table.

Under the tacit agreement reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam, the Americans felt they had accepted a "two-sided" conference. Hanoi maintained the talks were to be "four-part."

The dispute on principle led to the farcical problem of the "shape of the table," which delayed the actual negotiations for three months.

Round table accepted

During that time, the Americans and North Vietnamese, each verging on rupture with its own principal ally, met in public and private, again and again, and argued whether the table should be four-sided or not, whether there should be two tables or one.

At last, on January 16, it was agreed that the table would be round. Delegates could sit where they wished. The U.S. continued to describe the affair as "two-sided talks." For the Communists, it would remain a "four-part conference."

On January 25, the four parties met at the Majestic, with Henry Cabot Lodge, the former ambassador to Brussels, replacing Mr. Harriman as the American spokesman. For the next four years, the bitter former American envoy was to criticize ceaselessly the handling of the conference, arguing that the United States missed recurring Communist peace signals.

From the day the four parties first met, the history of the Paris conference began to lose the few elements of relief that had characterized its first months.

The endless process of propagandistic argument and recrimination began. The world listened less and less. So often were false hopes raised, so

often were they dashed that observers feel it possible some real signals were missed.

Indeed, the conference developed more as an affair of personalities and setting than of issues.

Permanent smile

There was scrappy little Nguyen Thi Binh, the pleasant, big hearted foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government that the National Liberation Front founded in June, 1969, brimming with nationalist fervor and outraged indignation at the American "neo-colonialists," but charming all the same in her well cut Ao Dai.

There was Xuan Thuy, with a permanent smile pasted to his face, capable of calling his opponent a liar and smiling as he said it. There was Le Duc Tho, the enormously impressive, white-thatched revolutionary leader, who held the real power from Hanoi and left the name-calling to his subordinates.

There was Pham Dang Lam, the scholarly but rigid chief of the Saigon delegation, who wrote out his own speeches in longhand though they were rarely listened to, and spent endless hours explaining his government's positions to the Western press.

Insult for insult

On the American side, the popular, vigorous Mr. Lodge, a Boston blueblood with a long political past, gave way to David K. E. Bruce, whose Baltimore blood was just as blue and whose diplomatic finesse was legendary. But Mr. Bruce was aging and ill, and his interests ran to painting and fine wines. He wanted badly to crown his fine career with a Vietnam peace, but the cards were against him.

Finally in mid-1971, the President transferred the hopeless task to William J. Porter, a younger but widely experienced diplomat who believed that the Communists understood tough-talking and gave it to them, trading lecture for lecture, insult for insult.

Behind the principals, a crowd of colorful supporting players provided a background: Philip C. Habib, the long-time No. 2 in the American delegation, more hawk-like than the hawks of Washington after his long career in Vietnam; Nguyen Thanh Le, the scholarly, much-liked but profoundly deceptive press spokesman for Hanoi; Le Chan, the chief of the North Vietnamese news agency who kept up friendly contacts with his Western journalist "colleagues" from the beginning; Thich Nhat Hanh, the saffron-robed Buddhist, who with his neutralist co-religionists, of-

fered highly moral but ineffective advice from the sidelines; the well-intentioned squads of American Quakers, students and priests who paraded through Paris, listening with naive credulity to the Communist delegations' presentations and automatically proclaiming that peace was near; Senator George S. McGovern, who did the same thing.

Of all the visitors and minor figures, none were more touching than the wives and mothers of American pilots who arrived singly, then in larger and larger groups to try to gain some news of their lost loved ones. Comforted by the American delegation, they were regularly turned away by the North Vietnamese, who politely, but firmly, told them they had no news at all.

Some of the distraught women camped outside the North Vietnamese compound

at suburban Choisy-le-Roi. Others haunted Avenue Kleber, stopping Hanoi's representatives on the street and begging for a scrap of compassion.

None of them received the slightest satisfaction.

Meantime, inside the old hotel, the routine wore on, morning meeting, lunch-break, a round-table discussion, endless press conferences, in which reporters from around the world sought to elicit the slightest nuance in either side's presentation, the faintest ray of hope for peace.

On the surface, the conference abounded with events. But, with the passage of time, most of them revealed themselves as classic pseudo-events.

On May 8, 1969, the Viet Cong offered a 10-point peace plan. A week later, President Nixon replied with an eight-point plan that included the unacceptable demand for a mutual pullout of troops.

Points and clarifications

On September 17, 1970, Mrs. Binh produced a "new" eight-point plan, which the United States saw little new in. On October 7, President Nixon reformulated the American position in five points, and the Communist side lost no time in rejecting it.

July 1, 1971, saw the Communists proposing a seven-point plan that provided for release of all American prisoners of war by the end of the war, if all American troops were withdrawn by that time. Mr. Bruce admitted there were "new elements" in the plan. But it, finally, went nowhere. The same fate awaited the Viet Cong's two "clarifications" of February 5, 1972.

The rhetoric that embellished the weekly meetings varied and the subjects shifted, but the substance remained the same.

Through 1970 and most of 1971, the United States concentrated on the fate of the prisoners. The Communists replied that the prisoners would be released when American troops left Vietnamese soil.

Mrs. Binh and Mr. Thuy hammered at the "fascist" nature of the Thieu regime and demanded that its president be deposed. To do so, the Americans replied would mean denying the South Vietnamese people the right to the government they had "freely chosen." The Communists laughed out loud at the defense.

Mr. Lam, Mr. Thieu's representative, described the North Vietnamese as invaders and called on the Viet Cong to meet directly with him to resolve South Vietnamese problems "between South Vietnamese."

Propaganda window

Systematically, the Communist side used the Paris forum to comment upon and criticize events in Vietnam: in Paris, they denounced the "farfical" election that returned President Thieu to power, they boasted of battlefield victories, they condemned American bombing raids and, on several occasions, called off sessions of the talks in protest against them, they accused the United States of bombing the vital North Vietnamese dam system and practicing "genocide."

American officials commented drily that the Communist side needed the Avenue Kleber talks as a propaganda window on the world, and slowly began to follow suit, hammering away at such subjects as the treatment of American prisoners and the presence of Northern troops in the South.

President Nixon appreciated the propaganda value of the talks to the other side. He also recognized that, "before world public opinion," the United States was obliged to stay at the apparent negotiating table.

11 meetings

Together with the policy of Vietnamization, the President sought, almost from the beginning of his term in office, to exploit the possibility of private contacts with the North Vietnamese.

In Paris, Mr. Lodge met privately with Xuan Thuy on 11 separate occasions in 1969, but to no effect.

And, on August 4, the same year, Dr. Kissinger held his first secret meeting with Mr. Tho and Mr. Thuy.

Communist sources have described the early Kissinger-Tho meetings as exact reproductions of the semi-public talks, with each side reciting exactly the same positions that his country was advancing before all the world.

No progress occurred, but

those meetings, which began in the downtown Paris apartment of Jean de Sainteny, a long-time French representative in Indochina, served at least to develop some sympathy and familiarity between the two plenipotentiaries.

The meetings continued at intervals over the months and years, as the process of Vietnamization moved into full gear, as the Communist side consolidated some positions and lost others, as the Saigon government regained its control over much of the countryside, as the semi-public talks ground on, growing shriller and less useful with each passing session.

Intensive round

By midsummer of 1971, the Vietnamese situation had altered radically from that of March, 1968. American troop strength had dwindled to 230,000 and was falling rapidly. According to American and Vietnamese claims, the vast majority of the country had been "pacified." The Communist side had mounted no major offensive for 3½ years.

Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho began an intensive round of negotiations. They met in Paris on July 13, August 16, September 13 and October 11.

BALTIMORE SUN

25 January 1973

Analysis: Peace asks unprecedented goodwill

By JAMES S. KEAT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Vietnam agreement that will be signed Saturday is a vehicle that can carry the warring parties to peace if they all decide to get aboard.

Given the history of Indochina in the past 25 years, it would be foolhardy to predict that a true peace is in the offing. There are many signs that it is not. But it could be.

Close reading of the agreement and accompanying protocols that were made public yesterday disclose many pitfalls, ambiguities, snares and fragile safeguards.

But, as Henry A. Kissinger, one of the authors of the agreement, insisted yesterday, the agreement can work if the Vietnamese want it to work.

With his customary clarity but without his usual humor, Dr. Kissinger neatly outlined the dilemma. The agreement relies heavily on goodwill, and that emotion is almost totally lacking among the Vietnamese.

How can two parties, the Saigon government and the Viet Cong, who will not even formally acknowledge each other's existence at Saturday's signing ceremony, be expected

There was still little agreement on the principal subjects: the institution of a cease-fire and the form of political arrangement to be provided for postwar South Vietnam.

Chapter closed

But Mr. Tho was talking. The North Vietnamese had offered a new peace plan and offered it secretly. The United States had also offered a new plan, which provided for President Thieu's resignation a month before new elections and for a United States troop withdrawal within four months.

Further secret talks were scheduled for November 20. On November 17, Hanoi called them off, pleading Mr. Tho's "ill health." A chapter had closed.

Throughout the winter, Mr. Porter alternated between refusing to talk to the Communist side at the regular weekly negotiating sessions and scathing them with his own particular brand of sarcasm. The peace talks reached their lowest point.

China visit

On January 25, President Nixon revealed both the existence of the private talks and the content of the two secret peace plans. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong howled

"foul," and "rejected" the American offer publicly.

In February, the President visited China.

On March 30, North Vietnam unleashed its largest, most overt attack on the South in all the history of the long war. For weeks the possibility seemed to exist that the North might overrun the South and finish the conflict with a classic military victory.

On May 8, just days before he was to leave on his state visit to Moscow, Mr. Nixon announced his decision to mine the North Vietnamese harbors.

Sort of peace

The public talks remained as they had been for two months, "indefinitely suspended."

But, at last, the long process that would finally produce a sort of peace had begun in earnest.

The United States agreed to resume the public talks July 13. On August 1, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho met for the 15th time. New meetings followed August 1 and September 15.

Inconspicuous villa

On September 21, somewhere in Vietnam, the leaders of the Provisional Revolutionary Government met and adopted their "two governments, two armies" statement, which was to be the key, ultimately, to peace.

Mr. Tho presented a peace treaty draft to Dr. Kissinger on October 8. Together with their staffs, the two men worked over it in an inconspicuous villa in Choisy-le-Roi until October 11.

There was another meeting October 17, after which President Nixon told Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese premier, that the text could be regarded as "completed."

North Vietnam asked for and said it got an American promise to sign the document on Halloween.

Reluctant ally

But peace, so elusive, so nearly unattainable was not to come that quickly.

In Saigon, President Thieu raised basic objections to the treaty draft. Washington asked for a delay in signing in order to talk around its reluctant ally.

Exasperated, the North Vietnamese published a shortened version of the treaty October 26. Embarrassed, Dr. Kissinger told the world that "peace was at hand" but that there were still matters of detail to be sealed.

Nothing could be achieved before the American election. After it, the Communist side, for the record, accused the U.S. of "bad faith" and said the existing treaty "should be signed immediately."

to observe the provision in Article II that they "immediately . . . end hatred and enmity" and forswear acts of reprisal?

The suggestion is absurd and its authors know it.

However, the fact remains that both the South and North Vietnamese, however reluctantly and for whatever different reasons, have agreed to lay down their arms and try to work out a political settlement. The factors that induced them to reach that bargain might induce them to try to keep it, at least for awhile.

Aside from the deep animosities that would hamper even the most cleverly designed peace machinery, some obvious difficulties are in the agreement itself:

1. The rule of unanimity that governs all of the peace-keeping and reconciliation organs.

2. The careful contradictions built into the pact that paper over the argument whether all Vietnam is one nation or whether there are two Vietnams.

3. The relegation of all but the most temporary political arrangements to negotiations between the Vietnamese themselves.

4. The continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in parts of South Vietnam.

5. The assignment of far fewer international truce supervisors than the United States sought.

6. A lag of as much as two weeks before any substantial number of truce supervisors take positions in the field.

7. Uncertainty over the establishment of an effective cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia.

The provision that the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, composed equally of government officials, Viet Cong representatives and neutralists, as well as the three truce supervisory groups, function by unanimous agreement can be a curse or a blessing to each side.

On the one hand, it provides President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam with some assurance the council will not evolve into the coalition government he fears and permits him to veto any long-range political solution for his nation that does not suit his purposes.

On the other hand, the rule of unanimity is bound to blunt the effectiveness of the joint military commissions that are to

supervise the truce in its initial stages and the new International Commission of Control and Supervision that gradually takes over that task.

That drawback, in Washington's and Saigon's eyes, is tempered by the fact that the international commission's members will be able to initiate investigations on their own and to report their findings even if the other members do not agree.

The four members are Canada and Poland, which have served on the old international control commissions created in Indochina by the 1954 Geneva accords, plus Indonesia and Hungary.

Canada, in particular, was concerned about the unanimity rule, which hamstrung the old commission. Mitchell Strong, the Canadian foreign minister, said yesterday his country will supply troops for the new supervisory group at least in the initial stages of the cease-fire.

The supervisory force will be spread very thin over South Vietnam. United States officials were understood to want between 2,500 and 5,000 observ-

ers. Instead they settled for 1,160. This force, not all of whom can be in the field at the same time, must guard against cheating on the truce, supervise the return of prisoners, help search for missing soldiers and guard the borders against infiltrators and smuggled munitions.

Although the headquarters contingents of international truce supervisors are to reach their posts in the day or two after the cease-fire takes effect, field units are not scheduled to be deployed for as much as two weeks later. In the interim joint government and Viet Cong patrols are to enforce the truce and agree on what territory each controls.

The political provisions in the agreement are equally replete with the potential for trouble. Dr. Kissinger explained that it has always been United States policy to leave

the political future of South Vietnam to its own people to determine. And that is what the agreement does.

The agreement calls for free elections, internationally supervised. Somehow the government and Viet Cong—which at the moment refuse even to acknowledge each other's legitimacy—are to agree in 90 days on a mutually acceptable election process.

Fabric of government

In effect, the agreement calls on these two old foes, fearful and mistrustful of each other, to agree on what amounts to a new constitution for South Vietnam. Although this point is neatly buried, the pact provides in Article 12 that the government and Viet Cong must agree on the "institutions for which general elections are to be held."

To an academic political scientist like Dr. Kissinger, the term institutions has only one meaning in that context: the fabric of a government. He tacitly acknowledged that point in his press conference yesterday by saying that the elections would be for "offices to be decided by two parties."

From Mr. Thieu's point of view, the feature is likely to be regarded as a plus. Agreement on new political institutions is not a likely prospect in the 90 days earmarked for the first steps toward a permanent political settlement.

As Dr. Kissinger carefully noted, the present Saigon regime remains in office until it agrees to step aside. With the right of veto in all organs created by the agreement, Mr. Thieu can maintain the status quo, which on balance favors Saigon.

However, one of Mr. Thieu's predecessors, Ngo Dinh Diem, was in a similar position in 1956, when he decided not to hold the reunification election called for in the Geneva agreement two years earlier. The election was not held, but the second Indochinese war—the one which is to end this weekend—had its genesis in that decision.

The so-called sovereignty issue, which Dr. Kissinger sought to deride as a fundamental question in the recent stalemate, is left at a standoff. It is best illustrated by the preamble to the agreement, which speaks of the "Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights"—implying it is a single nation as Hanoi insists—and "the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination," which is Saigon's incompatible concept.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1973

FEAR IS EXPRESSED FOR THEIR PRISONERS

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Jan. 26—Amnesty International expressed fear today for the safety of political prisoners in South Vietnam.

"The Vietnam peace settlement has failed to provide adequate safeguards for the estimated 100,000 civilian detainees in South Vietnam," the London-based organization that campaigns against religious and political persecution said.

"There is real danger," it contended in a statement, "that key members of the South Vietnamese non-Communist opposition who are detained will be killed before the supervisory commissions come into operation."

It said that there was "evidence that selective elimination of opposition members had begun."

The statement said that last month, "267 political prisoners were sent from Chi Hoa national prison in Saigon to the notorious prison on Con Son Island, home of the 'tiger cage' detention cells." It also said that "300 prisoners traveling on a boat from Con Son to the mainland are reported to have been killed."

BALTIMORE SUN
26 January 1973

Cease-Fire: Some Questions

The clearest facts of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement have to do with America's role, an end of direct American combat military participation. Though we will continue to supply replacement material to the South Vietnamese, we are at last pulling out. For us in the large sense the war may be described as over. Beyond that, most provisions of the agreement depend for implementation on the decisions and the will of the remaining parties. Because it was only through elaborate legalistic-academic ambiguities that an agreement could be reached at all, ambiguity is the tone of the bulk of its provisions and the bulk of the accompanying protocols.

Before we come to those, however, one question about America's role in its late stages cries for an answer. Since the document finally agreed to differs in no way that can properly be called essential from the accord almost reached in October, is there anything even today to explain adequately, much less to justify, the massive American bombing last month? The only explanation offered at all is military; that the bombings damaged North Vietnam's potential for an arms buildup in advance of a cease-fire; and after a cease-fire, making Hanoi stronger than it otherwise would have been for the internal Vietnamese struggle, ahead.

Like most claims for heavy

bombing since the institution of heavy bombing, this does not impress us much. The great and costly attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in World War II comes to mind as one case in point. After the raid, in the Air Force's phrase, ball-bearings were rolling all over Germany, and a vital element in Germany's war production had been virtually knocked out; yet on the day years later when American ground forces captured Schweinfurt ball-bearings were still being made there.

In the Indochina war the story has been similar, with variations. Attacks from the air on industrial targets never, despite all the claims in Saigon and Washington, managed to cripple seriously North Vietnamese capability of action, nor did the "interdiction" by air of North Vietnamese routes of supply in any decisive way serve their purposes. As to the terror aspects of bombing, particularly of the December bombing, what effect did they have on the enemy's will to resist? To judge by the terms of the cease-fire agreement, very little, if any. It may indeed have worked the other way. The North Vietnamese say it did, and in this experience backs them.

Turning to questions about the agreement itself as it may affect the Vietnamese future, one large one can be singled out as an example of matters not resolved, or

even fundamentally dealt with.

In early talks, by all reports, the future of South Vietnam was seen as depending on the cooperation of three elements, the government in Saigon, the Viet Cong and the neutralists—those who, in one definition, though anti-Communist in sentiment held themselves apart from the Thieu government, believing that the best future for Vietnam lay in conciliation and a policy of neutrality.

Some of these are free, if quiet, today in South Vietnam. Many, because the Thieu regime equates neutralism with pro-communism, are among the tens of thousands of people still held as political prisoners. With them the cease-fire agreement does not deal at all. Dr. Kissinger says that this dilemma, because of the difficulty of sorting out political prisoners from others, was deliberately separated from the question of prisoners of war, and will have to be settled by the parties of South Vietnam among themselves. It provides a likely source of immediate and bitter disagreement. To have swept it under the rug is to have evaded an issue with an important bearing on Vietnam's future.

Thus with this as with much else the cease-fire agreement, except in the important matter of an end to direct American military participation, may raise more questions than it answers.

28 January 1973

VIETNAM:

Now the battle for peace

MORE than three months have passed since Dr. Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon with the first draft treaty to end the Vietnam war in his briefcase and the news that Hanoi had capitulated on all major points. For 24 hours the euphoria persisted—and then President Thieu and his principal advisers saw the draft treaty for the first time.

They were shocked. The Demilitarised Zone between North and South, which they wanted enlarged, was abandoned. No provision was made for withdrawal of the North Vietnamese Army that had invaded the South in such massive force at Easter. And, more serious than anything else, the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, to which the English version of the draft assigned the administrative function of supervising and organising elections, appeared in the Vietnamese version as a coalition Government.

I spent several hours, a day or two later, with one of the few people who attended the talks between Kissinger and Thieu, and was briefed in detail on the draft treaty and Vietnamese reactions to it. On the basis of that briefing, there is no doubt that Thieu's dogged resistance to those original terms has given South Vietnam a greater chance to survive as an independent sovereign non-Communist State. But this is the third time in the past 19 years that the war horse in Indo-China has been brought to the trough of peace. Is it reasonable to believe that circumstances are now more propitious and that this time it really will drink? Are we about to see genuine peace with genuine honour?

Peace euphoria about Indo-China is not new. On December 11, 1962, Malcolm MacDonald, British chairman of the 14-nation Geneva Conference working to bring peace to the Kingdom of Laos, opened the day's session with a brief review of past progress and future prospects. "We are in fact on the point of creating a practical and just system of international guarantees which will assure to Laos neutrality, untroubled peace and sovereign independence," he said. A week earlier William Sullivan, acting leader of the American delegation, called it: "A pattern for peace not only in Laos, not only in South-East Asia, but throughout the world."

Not long after the agreement had been signed and both the world and Laos were singularly unmoved by the prospects I was waiting at Vientiane airport for the return from abroad of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Next to me was a Polish officer from the International Control Commission.

"How do you think the new Government will work?" I asked him.

"Government!" he snorted. "This is not a government. It is a comic opera. It cannot possibly work."

In the long sorry story of Indo-China these comments merit special place. For what Geneva created for Laos in 1962 produced neither an effective system of international guarantees nor any sort of pattern for peace, but only a brief breathing-space while preparations for renewed war went on apace.

It is not that the Indo-Chinese people are more warlike than their neighbours, but simply that neither in 1954 nor 1962 had either side established such mastery

Both Vietnamese sides are expected to cheat on the ceasefire agreement signed in Paris yesterday. The North has even codified methods in a party directive. If President Thieu is to win a real future for South Vietnam, he will have to fight for it, reports

DENIS WARNER

on the battlefield as would entitle it to dictate the absolute terms of the peace.

"Peace with honour" provides the Americans with the opportunity to withdraw in good order from the war as the French withdrew before them. It also provides South Vietnam with some sort of chance to survive. How much depends on a number of factors, including the capacity and intentions of the North Vietnamese, the ability of President Thieu to hold the South together once the reassuring weight of American support has been withdrawn, and what happens in those often forgotten theatres of war, Laos and Cambodia.

In the view of one of the closest students of North Vietnam, 1972 was a year of immense strain there, with new pressures developing and old ones, worsening in virtually every sector of its society. The Easter offensive, with its massive demands on manpower and material, failed to deliver decisive victory, and the resumption of American bombing raids and mining of Northern ports and rivers caused great economic distress. Heavily reduced imports added to the already heavy burdens of life in the cities and towns. Agriculture suffered from chronic manpower shortages and past errors in the allocation of resources.

There were pressures from Peking and Moscow to end the war by negotiation, and strong divisions in the Politburo and among party members about whether to continue the war or to embark on bold new strategical gambles.

It would no doubt be comforting to read into this the notion that North Vietnam was beginning to crumble. There is no evidence on which to base such an assumption, but much to suggest that a protracted war was becoming unduly protracted.

And so we come to the Easter offensive. This abandonment of the Maoist

principles of revolutionary war and the refined techniques devised by the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh of operations by big units, small units and guerrillas working in conjunction was caused both by Hanoi's need to accelerate the pace and its legitimate fears that Vietnamisation and pacification were threatening the entire cadre and indigenous Viet Cong network in the South.

Without doubt Hanoi hoped to capture Hue and at least to reach Saigon, but as usual its targets were political rather than military. Political power, it continued to believe, grew out of the barrel of a gun.

According to this view every military victory would be a political gain, a bonus, but the primary intention of the offensive was to put North Vietnam's battle corps into South Vietnam and then to talk peace.

Junior party cadres learned of this decision only in September, when C.O.S.V.N., or the Central Office for South Vietnam, through which Hanoi has run the war, issued Directive Six, which instructed that "cadres and party members must be made to realise that the party's resolution to launch a general offensive to end the war and to bring the South Vietnamese revolution to a new (political and peace struggle) stage is appropriate. It is sound and timely."

This did not in any way imply retreat by Hanoi. To the party leaders there the war is a *guerre sacrée*, its goal one Vietnam under Hanoi's banner. To the achievement of this end everything in the past has been subordinated and everything will be subordinated now.

Even so it cannot but suffer from the wasted years and lack of proper political organisation. I have no doubt that Thieu would win comfortably in any straight two-way political election with the National Liberation Front, but the addition of a "neutralist" element

ensures that the election, if it can really be organized, will be fought out between at least three elements, and this will inevitably diminish the non-Communist vote.

The movement of population that will inevitably follow the ceasefire also seems likely to erode the Government's authority. Hundreds of thousands of refugees will insist on returning to their home areas and most of these will be in regions where the Viet Cong claims authority and where the formidable presence of the North Vietnamese Army will be a potent reminder that it pays to be with "the strength."

Both sides may be expected to "cheat." C.O.S.V.N. Directive Six says, "Although the war will stop with the ceasefire and the big guns will fall silent, the small guns will remain in action and such activities as tyrant elimination, abduction and assassination will continue under various disguises." Secret armed forces, partly Northern and partly Viet Cong, have been established for the purpose. The South has been aware of this since the end of September, and its own arrangements have been made accordingly.

International supervisory teams cannot hope to police the ceasefire agreement. That there will now be 1,160 men instead of the 250 demanded by North Vietnam means that the Commission will learn more about the violations, especially if it is allowed to move with freedom in both Communist and non-Communist areas, but it has no enforcement powers. It will be able to do no more than to note with regret. In fact, if the Laotian experience of a three-power Control Commission counts for anything, the Canadian, Indonesian, Hungarian and Polish observers might as well stay at home. Perhaps, as the Canadians suggest, publication of violations might bring world opinion to bear against the offenders, but that is scarcely a basis for hoping to preserve the peace.

Most of these considerations are for the short term, and this is not the period in which the Government of South Vietnam has most cause for concern. The long term is what will matter—and the long-term outlook is scarcely hopeful.

The agreement provided that both National Liberation Front and Government forces should be reduced and troops progressively demobilized. Since all theoretically indigenous Viet Cong units in the South have now been padded out with up to 80 per cent. of North Vietnamese recruits, the Government faces the unhappy prospect of seeing some Northerners demobilized in the South and sent not to the North but to Southern villages to reinforce the local cadres. It also faces the prospect of becoming weaker militarily while North Vietnam becomes stronger.

The South must begin to disarm. There is no limit to the rearmament of the North. Perhaps this has been settled by agreement between Washington, Moscow and Peking, but unless details are made public the effect must be to undermine the morale of non-Communists.

Finally, the situation in Laos and Cambodia must have a strong bearing on South Vietnam's future. Since the beginning of the war and even long before it began, the struggle for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia has been one and indivisible. Ho Chi Minh never bothered to conceal this. As long ago as 1930, when he created the Com-

munist party of Indo-China, he rejected the suggestion it should be simply an Annamite party and insisted it should embrace not only Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, three component states of Vietnam, but also Laos and Cambodia.

One of his first acts after seizing power in Hanoi in 1945 was to send Prince Souphanouvong, whose Vietnamese wife worked as his secretary, and 10 of his officers to Vientiane to lead the resistance to the French in Laos. Though Ho dissolved the Communist party of Indo-China as a political expediency in 1946, links with Laos were maintained, first through the National United Front of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under the leadership of his successor, Ton Duc Thang, and subsequently through the recreated Laodong (Communist) party, whose members include key figures in the Pathet Lao movement in Laos. From the outset, in the Pathet Lao the controlling authority of the Vietnam was clearly set out and understood.

A Vietminh invasion of Northern Laos by two regular North Vietnamese divisions established the "Government" of Prince Souphanouvong in the two northern provinces of Phoung Saly and Sam Neua in 1952. A second invasion in 1953 and 1954 dissipated French reserves before the decisive battle for Dien Bien Phu, and a third invasion in 1959 marked the beginning of the second Indo-China war.

Having decided to seize South Vietnam by force of arms, Hanoi saw the capture of the strategic Plain of Jars in Laos as essential to the protection of the myriad Ho Chi Minh trails along which military supplies and later troops were to be sent to feed the war effort. As the South Vietnamese discovered when they attempted to cut the trail at Tchepone in February, 1971, the North Vietnamese attached the highest priority to the defence of their Laotian positions.


With heavy American air cover, South Vietnamese forces reached Tchepone on February 8. On March 25 they fell back over the border with heavy losses. If anyone had doubted it in the past, it was now clear that Laos was essential to the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam.

Initially Cambodia was of peripheral importance. During the first Indo-China war the principal Vietminh actions were confined to Tonkin and the Central Annamite Chain. Cambodia and Cochinchina were too remote from sources of supply in China.

When Hanoi began to build up its strength in South Vietnam for the 1968 Tet offensive, however, a helpful Cambodia had become as important to the successful implementation of General Vo Nguyen Giap's plans as a secure corridor in Eastern Laos. The Ho Chi Minh trail could not carry all the supplies needed for the offensive.

By agreement with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, North Vietnamese forces which had already been given sanctuary rights in Cambodia now received substantial shipments of arms through the port of Sihanoukville. Cambodian army trucks ran supplies from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh where they were taken over by a Chinese trucking firm.

The Chinese trucks, operated by a man named Hak Ly, ran the supplies south along the Bassac River and across the Mekong River ferries at points close to the Vietnam border, and delivered them direct to the North



Vietnamese bases. Every night lines of trucks waited at ferries on their way to the border areas east of the Mekong River. "Sometimes up to sixty trucks a night crossed the river here," the chief of the Gendarmerie post at Neak Leung told me. "Not always sixty," said a major who commanded an infantry battalion on the opposite bank. "But sometimes."

At Kompong Cham a British resident had seen up to twenty of the Hak Ly trucks waiting for their turn to use the ferry. "A hundred trucks were going out at a time with rice for Charlie," said Eu Ly In, at that time chairman of the Economic Committee of the National Assembly. "Fifty trucks at a time made the military run."

No country has ever been less prepared for war than Cambodia was when the North Vietnamese struck. I saw children in uniform covering banana fronds with earth in the hope of getting some protection not from the heat but from the North Vietnamese mortars. At Kompong Cham the populace used park benches as barricades to block the road. Outside Phnom Penh they relied on earthenware jars filled with stones.

In those days the Khmer Rouges counted for little. North Vietnamese did the job. Today things are very different. Forty thousand newly trained and blooded Khmer Rouges are capable not only of going it alone but also probably of taking over the country by themselves now that the Government is denied outside support.

In Laos the situation is not much better. General Vang Pao and his guerrillas, a couple of battalions of Thai artillery and the American Central Intelligence Agency have helped to maintain some sort of balance at least in areas not regarded by Hanoi as too sensitive.

"What do you hope of the Ameri-

CARL T. ROWAN

It's No Time to Start Believing the Verbosity

With the fighting stopped and American GIs and prisoners coming home, Americans will rejoice for a long time about the diplomatic achievements regarding Vietnam.

And well they should. The Nixon administration has squeezed out of Hanoi just about the best agreement possible, given the obvious reality that the American public long ago lost the will to wage that war.

But there are two dangers that we ought to avoid:

1. While the joy and euphoria last, we might be foolish enough to take seriously all the "peace with honor" talk and the other rhetoric that is little more than sugar-coating to make the American public think a bitter pill is a lemon drop.

2. When the happiness and giddiness fade, a lot of people will start asking what we really got for over 45,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and \$150 billion washed away in the swamps and paddies. There could be a foolish orgy of recriminations.

We can avoid both these pitfalls if we simply remember that for at least 28 years NO top American official has always been right, or meant everything he said, about Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that anything has changed yet.

It was in February 1945 that Franklin D. Roosevelt told Joseph Stalin that "the Indochinese are people of small stature ... and are not warlike."

From that gem of American sagacity, things went steadily downhill.

Five years later Phillip C. Jessup, a U.S. ambassador-at-large, declared that "Ho Chi Minh is a Communist agent trained in Moscow ... He is not representative of

the nationalistic aspirations of Vietnam."

With that made perfectly clear, it surely was not strange that John Foster Dulles would say, in December 1953, that the Vietnam war "might be successfully concluded in the next calendar year."

But, during that calendar year, 1954, a new generation of American voices was heard.

In April, Sen. John F. Kennedy, D-Mass., asserted that "no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and nowhere, 'an enemy of the people' which has the sympathy and covert support of the people."

Ten days later Vice President Richard M. Nixon would say: "There is no reason why the French forces should not remain in Indochina and win. They have greater manpower, and a tremendous advantage over their adversaries, particularly air power."

Less than a month later the Viet Minh clobbered the French at Dienbienphu.

A few years later Kennedy, as president, was committing at least 16,000 U.S. troops plus "military advisers" to South Vietnam. And on Feb. 18, 1962, his brother Robert was in Saigon saying: "We are going to win in Vietnam. We will remain here until we do win."

If FDR thought the Vietnamese were small of stature and "not warlike," President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers seemed to think they were small of heart. Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed that if the U.S. "bloodied their noses" the North Vietnamese would "leave their neighbors alone."

And there was Johnson himself in 1966 saying that "a

Communist takeover is no longer just improbable ... it is impossible." And Nixon saying a year later that "the defeat of the Communist forces in South Vietnam is inevitable." And the U.S. commander in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, saying still a year later that "the enemy has been defeated at every turn."

Well, it has taken the enemy five years to wake up to his defeat. In fact, the silly fellow is crying, "Victory, victory," as he waves his peace papers.

The horrible truth is that neither the U.S. nor Hanoi has "won" yet; the war is far from over insofar as the contest for control of South Vietnam is concerned. But in case you're inclined to rely too heavily on the rosy rhetoric emanating from the White House, here is a sampling of Nixon's previous track record:

Jan. 26, 1965—"We are losing the war in Vietnam."

Sept. 12, 1965—"It will take two or three more years of intensive activity to win military victory over the Viet-Cong."

April 17, 1967—"The defeat of the Communist forces in South Vietnam is inevitable. The only question is, how soon?"

It was two decades ago, in Hanoi of all places, that Nixon said, "It is impossible to lay down arms until victory is completely won."

All of which proves that, in arranging the present cease-fire, Nixon knows that it is sometimes right to be wrong.

Certainly enough of us Americans have been wrong about those "small ... not warlike" Vietnamese for us to tolerate a little more hyperbole, excuse a few more mistakes by others—and most decidedly to believe only a little bit of what we see and damned near nothing of what we hear.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 January 1973

Strike by Pilots for the C.I.A. In Laos Is Reportedly Averted

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 23—A strike by airline pilots in Laos that would have severely impaired support of anti-Communist forces fighting there has apparently been averted.

The dispute involves Air America, a quasimilitary airline used by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Laos to supply irregular troops, many of whom depend on parachuted or airlifted supplies.

A company spokesman said tonight that the pilots involved in Laotian operations had been ordered by their union organizer to call off the walkout, that had been scheduled to begin tonight at midnight.

The dispute apparently remained unsettled, but the local chapter of the Airline Pilots Association reportedly decided against a walkout at this time.

The spokesman said he did not know whether the strike would go into effect in the other areas of Asia where Air America operates, such as Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, Okinawa and South Vietnam.

In Laos, Air America oper-

ates 31 planes and 35 helicopters. It has 112 pilots stationed here, nearly all of them American citizens under contract to the company.

The pilots are seeking higher salaries and other benefits.

The airline also has six planes based at the nearby Udon Thani base in Thailand, including two C-130 transports, that are sometimes used in Laotian operations.

The United States withdrew direct military air and advisory support from Laos after the Geneva agreement of 1962, which theoretically ended the war here and neutralized the country.

But as the war expanded, the C.I.A. took over many of the functions normally assigned to military units, including, in some cases, the direct command of Laotian irregular units.

Laos is sparsely populated, mountainous, and has few roads or navigable waterways. During the fighting in the interior, especially near the Plaine des Jarres and toward the North Vietnamese frontier, units can be supplied only by air.

cans if they pull out?" I asked a leading Laotian Cabinet Minister not long ago.

"If they take everything else, I hope they leave the C.I.A.," he replied.

With the departure of the C.I.A. and the Thais there will not be much left. It would take half a million men to police the ceasefire here. In effect we may expect to see Laos and Cambodia become outer provinces of North Vietnam, and with no bombers to interdict use of the Ho Chi Minh trail South Vietnam will be outflanked and vulnerable not only militarily if the North Vietnamese decide to "cheat" but also politically whether they cheat or not.

Peace now is an extension of the war and further war will, if necessary, be an extension of the peace. It is not yet game, set and match for Hanoi, but it is scarcely "peace with honour" for South Vietnam either.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 27, 1973

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 January 1973

Men against machines

BY OUR DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT

Vietnam has been a war of profligates. The North Vietnamese have been prodigal in the use of men, the Americans in the use of machines. General Giap flung troops away at Dak To in the autumn of 1967, at Saigon and Hue in the Tet offensive in 1968 and; once again, in the attacks around Quang Tri last spring. He bled the youth of his country white and destroyed many of the Vietcong cadres as well.

The Americans always sought to keep their own casualties low (though they did not always succeed in this) even when they had as many as 500,000 troops in South Vietnam, as they did in 1968 when General Westmoreland asked for more. He did not get them. By that time the Americans were firmly hooked on a doctrine of their own choice and making. To save American lives, they had come to rely on massive tactical concentrations of firepower. Often these concentrations of fire took the form of heavy, sustained bombing attacks from the air, sometimes of artillery barrages and occasionally of sudden raids by helicopter-borne troops. President Nixon brought the soldiers home but the bombers carried on.

Throughout the war, the popular impression was that the key factor was the use of air power. And so it was. Air supremacy of a kind so total not even the Israelis would dare dream of it gave the Americans an ability to concentrate their fire practically where they liked when they liked. But however much they bombed Indochina the Americans failed to knock the North Vietnamese out of the war. Decisive success through the use of machines eluded them just as it eluded General Giap through the use of men.

What air power failed to do in Vietnam was to destroy the guerrillas—as long as they operated in small, dispersed bands, emerging briefly out of hiding to spring an ambush, to intimidate a village or to launch a mortar or rocket attack. Rural guerrilla operations, phase two of General Giap's concept of revolutionary warfare, could not, it was discovered, be defeated by attacks from the air. Bombs save the blood of those who drop them; but they do not beat guerrillas. Similarly, raids by helicopter-borne troops had only a temporary effect. They drove the guerrillas deeper into cover. But once the helicopters and their sky cavalry had been withdrawn, the guerrillas were soon at work again.

What the bombing attacks did achieve, however, was, first, to impose a persistent strain on North Vietnam's primitive industrial economy and, second, to impede but never to check completely the flow of reinforcements

Antiwar groups ponder role if Viet peace comes

By Trudy Rubin
Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

While U.S. antiwar activists, skeptical about the prospects of a cease-fire, continue with plans for counter-inaugural demonstrations this weekend in the capital, they are also beginning to plan what they will do if such an agreement is signed.

Discussions have centered on ways of pressuring Congress to ensure that the United States does not "break the peace"; publicizing any continuing U.S. presence in Indo-China; pressing for release of political prisoners in Saigon jails; and broadening current campaigns to replace bomb-destroyed facilities like the Bach Mai hospital in Hanoi into full-scale American reconstruction brigades, a postwar idea which activists say has the approval of Hanoi.

Spokesmen for all of the various antiwar organizations remain skeptical about the reality of a cease-fire. "For many years there has been such a desire for war to end that people have prematurely tried to believe it," says Tom Hayden, a founder of Students for a Democratic Society in 1962 and co-founder with actress Jane Fonda of a new antiwar group, the Indo-China Peace Campaign. The IPC is working on educational programs on Indo-China in nine industrial states and on encouraging local pressures on Congress to end the war.

But should the cease-fire be genuine, Mr. Hayden believes the way in which the war ends "will determine the future of radicalism. How the Korean war was ended determined the '50's. If the war ends with the peace movement in jail and disintegrated and Vietnam in ashes, that's one thing. But if it is ended with the conscious participation of the American people, that will cause a tremendous upsurge of hope."

Mr. Hayden's group, echoing themes brought up by other activists, hopes to publicize "the role the U.S. continues to play" in Indo-China. This includes, according to Mr. Hayden, "working on getting congressional hearings on the thousands of political prisoners in South Vietnam."

The IPC also hopes to focus on reconstruction in Vietnam, and how the funds provided for North Vietnam in the original draft peace agreement are administered. It and other groups would like to broaden the Bach Mai efforts into "more general reconstruction and supplies to the south. Indeed, the build-up of forces the North Vietnamese were able to achieve both in 1968 and 1972 was impressive. But the effects of the bombing raids were sufficient to ensure that any major assaults by the North Vietnamese against troops or cities in South Vietnam were comparatively short-lived. The initial punch was sharp, but the North Vietnamese lacked the logistic breath to keep the fight going for very long."

After a fair beginning, both the Tet

brigades," according to Ira Arlook, a Boston organizer of the IPC.

"This would be important in trying to build ties between individuals in this country and North Vietnam," he says, "and it would make it harder for the government to reestablish hostilities." Representatives of Medical Aid for Indo-China, the group sponsoring the Bach Mai appeal, say the North Vietnamese have expressed interest in this idea, but only after hostilities have ceased.

The focus on Congress may take other tasks as well. Prof. Sidney Peck, coordinator of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, one of the two co-sponsors of Saturday's counter-inaugural march, says activists will try to push Congress to maintain some kind of watchdog committee to observe the administration of cease-fire agreements.

He adds that activists will try to get such a committee of their own, composed of prominent Americans "like Telford Taylor or Ramsey Clark."

Dr. Peck says also that he would like to see activists move "on the whole issue of war crimes. The (Sen. Edward M.) Kennedy subcommittee on refugees should get out the data they have on war crimes committed by the United States."

Antiwar leaders, just beginning to think through post-cessate-fire plans, admit they are uncertain about forms of future protests or public response.

"Obviously there will be greater difficulty in maintaining sustained interest in Indo-China after a cease-fire, just as there was after the draft ended and large troop withdrawals went on," says Dr. Peck. But he adds, "We feel there is a mood about this war which runs very deep. Any event which challenges the administration's credibility in seeking peace will arouse a response."

This skepticism was echoed by most antiwar leaders who insisted that a renewal of the war might yet once again call forth protests.

"We think there's not going to be a moment of stability in South Vietnam, even if an agreement is signed," said Jerry Gordon, coordinator of the National Peace Action Coalition which has staged the biggest mass marches in the capital and is co-sponsoring the current one.

"The U.S. Government has repeatedly said it will go back in if it thinks there has been a violation of the treaty. People won't be inclined to go out in the streets after a cease-fire, but then, things could blow up at any time."

and the Quang Tri offensives ran out of steam. Moreover, it was exactly at the point where the North Vietnamese grouped their forces together and committed them to open siege or battle, the third and decisive phase of General Giap's concept of war, that bombing attacks by the Americans were tactically most effective. Because the Americans ruled the skies, General Giap could not repeat his 1954 success against the French at Dien Bien Phu and snatch victory from the Americans.

The use of air power in Vietnam has

For the Vietnamese, No Cessation of Pain

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to the New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam—For most of the people of South Vietnam the end of the war—if it is the end of their war—is coming far too late for rejoicing.

Few Vietnamese can even recall without a few moments' reflection when the war began. Most have spent the largest part of their lives at war.

For many Vietnamese the three decades of strife have worn away the old passions of nationalism, political hatred, revenge and even sorrow. There remains only a feeling of numb resignation to whatever the future may bring and a strong urge to escape into the traditional Vietnamese diversions of chess, gambling with cards and drinking baxide, a powerful rice liquor.

With probably around a million Vietnamese killed just in the time since 1959, when war began anew, there is scarcely a family that has not lost at least one member. Many more have been injured or maimed.

Nor will the killing and maiming cease with the end of hostilities. Despite the passing of a generation, farmers are still killed on Okinawa and other battlegrounds of World War II by old mines and bombs. Vietnam has been seeded with far more of these lethal legacies than any other land.

The main victims of the war have been men, and in many ways South Vietnam now seems to be a nation dominated by hard-minded, lonely and sometimes bitter women, for whom idealism and even personal feeling appear to have been largely extinguished.

Two such women, both war widows, are Mrs. T., a 64-year-old former teacher originally from the Mekong Delta prov-

ince of Kien Hoa, and her 35-year-old daughter-in-law, a slightly built woman named Lang.

Abroad, people receive news reports on the ending of war in Indochina, but neither Mrs. T. nor Lang took any interest in such things. When they are not busy preparing meals on a kerosene stove for the many children living with them, they pass the time in silence, gambling with the tiny cards, marked with lacquered Chinese characters, that are universally used in Vietnam.

The big occasions of the year, even the normally joyous season of Tet, the lunar New Year, are mostly associated now with rites that must be performed at the cemeteries where their men are buried.

It is the same for most of the other families in the crowded middle-class Saigon neighborhood of Tan Dinh, where Mrs. T. lives.

In common with many older Vietnamese, she looks back with warm nostalgia to the days of the French colony before World War II. There were political stirrings in the nineteen-thirties. But they had little impact on the lives of most Vietnamese.

The rigid patterns of traditional family life kept existence for most people unexciting but secure. Vietnam had a wealth of food and has a warm climate, so that in the old days at least it was spared the suffering that has afflicted much of the rest of Asia.

The shock of change, which has been continuing ever since, first hit Mrs. T., along with millions of other Vietnamese, when the Japanese arrived at the beginning of World War II.

"The real surprise," an old Vietnamese said, "was not so much that a foreign army was invading us but that it was systematically locking up the French authorities who many of us had taken for granted would be the masters of Vietnam forever."

In North Vietnam the Japa-

nese occupation is remembered as harsh, although Vietnamese have never forgotten that Japan gave Ho Chi Minh his first chance to govern. In the South the Japanese yoke was comparatively mild. Mrs. T.'s children remember friendly Japanese soldiers, sharing their lunches with them.

Opening Path to Independence
The important thing about the Japanese occupation, in the eyes of many Vietnamese, was that it raised the possibility of throwing off Western colonial rule for good.

While Vietnam, though under the Japanese yoke, was free of French colonial administration for the first time in a century, the Vietminh came into being, with stirring songs of independence, a red flag with golden star and, incidentally, Communist ideology. Even Vietnamese officials who had spent their lives working in the French civil service were deeply stirred.

Mrs. T.'s husband was such an official, working as an administrator under a French province chief before the war. Mr. T. chose not to join the Vietminh because his suspicions had been aroused by the overbearing ways of some of the local leaders, but he strongly supported the cause of independence.

A family living in the house next door—a house smaller than that of the T. family—embraced the Vietminh completely. It happened that the head of this family, Mr. N., was an enemy of Mr. T. because of quarrels over property boundaries, an old financial dispute and a certain amount of jealousy.

Such quarrels between neighbors, taken for granted in peaceful nations, have tended to become blood feuds in Vietnam, spurred to violence by civil war.

After World War II the Vietminh ruled the Mekong Delta until the French finally came back in strength to drive them underground again. Before the French returned, Mr. T.'s hostile neighbor suddenly emerged as a provincial commissar, with the power of life and death.

Among his first acts was to denounce Mr. T. before a session of the provincial people's tribunal as a French stooge and spy. Vietminh soldiers arrested Mr. T., released him some weeks later and then rearrested him. His family never saw him again and has assumed that he was among the thousands of civil servants executed by the Communists.

The family—mother, two daughters and five sons—dedicated itself to the lifelong cause of destroying Communists, although none had a clear idea then of what Communism was supposed to be.

The following years, particularly the early nineteen-fifties, were hard for both the T. family and its enemy, the N. family, which had gone underground.

Mrs. T. had received a modest pension from the

French, paid in opium, which at the time was regarded as a much more stable medium of exchange than paper currency. Using the opium she purchased a few acres of rice land in the delta and sent several of her older children to France, where they subsequently worked their way to college degrees.

A Nation Polarized

Mr. N., for his part, had taken his sons into the underground to join the growing corps of guerrillas dedicated to the destruction of "foreign imperialism."

The war for independence was on, and the nation was becoming polarized, not only by political ideologies but by blood debts and the hatred they engendered. Most Vietnamese

accepted the need to gamble their lives on a struggle to throw out the French, whose army was equipped with the latest American weapons.

The first Indochina war probably cost the Vietnamese people a million lives, but it ended in victory in 1954. With peace and the division of Vietnam along the 17th Parallel, the people had to decide whether to cast their futures with the Communist-led North or the anti-Communist South.

In Saigon a new Government came to power under Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic, who was installed through United States influence largely because of his strongly anti-Communist convictions.

His Government became predominantly Catholic in an overwhelmingly Buddhist country. Because of the new influence of Catholics—an influence that often discriminated against non-Catholics in assigning contracts and jobs—there was a wave of nominal conversions to Catholicism.

The conversions deeply split the T. family. Buddhists charged their Catholic brothers with being mercenary traitors to their faith; to this day the family remains divided.

No such division affected the N. family, which had dedicated itself to the Communist-led apparatus that succeeded the Vietminh in South Vietnam. Mr. N., head of the family, died of tuberculosis, but he had extracted pledges from his sons and daughters to continue the fight. Among the children too young to participate in the pledge was Lang, who ended up on the other side.

Some North, Some South


Some of the N. family went north, to join the new Hanoi Government. Some remained in the South to join the clandestine organization called Mat Tran Giai Phong, or National Liberation Front. Later, when the Saigon Government came to realize the gravity of the threat posed by the front, it devised the supposedly insulting sobriquet Vietcong to describe it.

Under the 1954 Geneva accords ending the Indochina war—both the United States and the Diem Government refused to sign them—Vietnam was to be unified and to hold

been decisive, but in a negative rather than a positive sense. It has not prevented the communists from running a guerrilla campaign for as long as they chose. But it has denied them the opportunity of inflicting an irreversible defeat on their opponent in the open field of battle. And, unless that happens, by General Giap's own analysis of revolutionary war, military victory has not been achieved. Long after the ceasefire, air power will go on having a potent influence on military and political calculations in Vietnam. The Americans will continue to station bombers in Thailand and aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. They will remind General Giap how difficult it is to move from phase II to phase III in a "people's war" to secure a "people's victory."


VIETCONG ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Civilians killed or abducted since 1966. Source: U.S. Defense Department)



SAIGON GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIAN VIETCONG

(Those killed, jailed or induced to back Saigon under U.S.-supported Phoenix program. Source: U.S. Agency for International Development)



The New York Times/Jan. 27, 1973

general elections within two years. After President Diem refused to participate in such elections, the second Indochina war began.

Among the first moves by the Vietcong was to carry out a sweeping land-reform program in the Mekong Delta, effectively blocking the half-hearted reform attempted later by the Diem Government. The land seized by National Liberation Front guerrillas included Mrs. T's plot, which she has never been able to visit since. Despite that, the Saigon Government continued collecting land taxes from her on pain of criminal prosecution.

Initially the war involved political underground work on the part of the Vietcong. Members of the T. family were constantly being stopped at roadblocks and asked to listen to lectures or to give small donations.

In the villages, the Vietcong sometimes employed terror but generally sought to ingratiate themselves by being helpful

with farming chores, health and education. The guerrillas also sometimes sought to protect villages against the excesses of the Saigon Government's militia, which often acted like simple bandits.

Meanwhile, the war began to become more noticeable as military cemeteries filled and terrorists' bombs exploded not only in the provincial towns but in Saigon.

Great Flood of Americans

Then the Americans began coming, almost imperceptibly at first, but later in a great flood. With them came post exchanges, the black market, television (for the Vietnamese as well as the foreigners) hundreds of thousands of jobs, more money than anyone had known existed and the demon of rising expectations.

For the most dedicated nationalists, non-Communist as well as Communist, things began to look too much like colonial times. In the cities Vietna-

me could no longer persuade taxi drivers to stop since the Americans were able to pay more. There were too many "big nose" soldiers walking around with too many Vietnamese girls.

Most South Vietnamese accepted the American presence, although few of them really liked it.

In 1963 the whole nation passed through the worst crisis since independence, when the non-Communist opposition to Mr. Diem's increasingly repressive Government suddenly coalesced behind the leadership of a group of Buddhist monks, several of whom had committed suicide by immolating themselves.

In many parts of the country the Vietcong were achieving smashing victories, and it seemed that the country was dissolving. In the midst of it all, a group of generals led by Duong Van Minh united to stage a coup d'état, overthrowing and murdering Mr. Diem and his brother and close adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

The unstable mix of religion and politics was in turmoil again, splitting Mrs. T's family into Catholic and Buddhist factions.

But the heaviest blow to Mrs. T. that year was the announcement from her favorite son that he intended to marry his childhood neighbor, Lang—daughter of the man who had ordered his father's death.

Spectacular Attacks Staged

By Tet in February of 1965 it seemed apparent that the Vietcong would win in a matter of weeks. A spectacular series of Communist attacks on Feb. 7 prompted the first landing of American combat troops and the first sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

The American presence rose to over half a million men over the next four years and North and South Vietnam were carpeted by the heaviest rain of bombs the world had ever seen.

As the Vietnamese were mobilized, all of Mrs. T's sons were finally drafted, most as officers because they held college degrees. The loss of the civilian jobs they had held, coupled with growing families, imposed desperately heavy financial strains on all of them.

For the first time in their recent history the Vietnamese were no longer growing enough rice to feed themselves and were dependent on American charity. The price of everything, including rice, rose rapidly while soldier pay remained small.

On the other side of the war, the late Mr. N's family was fighting hard. His sister had lost a leg in an American air raid, but as late as July, 1972, she was still believed to be leading a Vietcong district combat unit in action in the delta. Some of Mr. N's sons were also active in the Vietcong, one serving as a field doctor.

The new soldier-husband of their sister Lang was assigned by the Saigon Government in 1966 to fight in exactly that part of the Mekong Delta where his brothers-in-law were on the other side. He was killed

a few weeks after Tet.

The conflict wore on. President Nixon changed the U.S. stance and the Americans began to leave in large numbers. They will be remembered among other things, for the window they provided on the world. The military forces and civilian contractors built tens of thousands of miles of roads and made it possible for many Vietnamese to see their country for the first time—at least for a while.

American and Vietnamese economists decided in the late nineteen-sixties that there was too much money floating around in the superheated wartime economy. To soak some of it up Saigon agreed to relax the import duty on motorcycles. The result was a flood of Japanese-built vehicles that have changed the social structure.

Even the peasant families of poor soldiers could often afford the new Hondas and Yamahas, and a family too poor to afford one was subjected to a certain amount of snobbery and even derision.

Those who could not afford them took to stealing them. The police attached little serious interest to the resulting crime wave, devoting most of their energies to political arrests.

Another aspect of the American impact was television, at first broadcast from airplanes that circled major cities for hours at a time. It has also given the Vietnamese a broader view of the world, in addition to strong social pressure to own television sets.

"Our Vietnamese women are among the greatest materialists in the world," a Saigon sociologist said. "Vietnam has always had a semimatriarchal society, and now, with so many men dead or economically disabled by being in the army, the women have all the real power, and when a woman demands that her husband get a television set or Honda, he is under the heaviest pressure to do so."

"In my opinion, this is one of the chief reasons for the incredible amount of corruption and theft we have in Vietnam at every level of existence. We are to blame, but you Americans certainly have not helped."

Now the city jobs are drying up, and the easy money has ceased to flow. To go on living the South Vietnamese will have to return to the rice fields. There is general agreement it will be a traumatic experience.

As for the Communists, their approach to communities occupied since their spring offensive has been to confiscate most of the new American gadgets, especially the motorcycles.

In the course of the long war, and particularly since 1965, the population has been turned upside down. Since April alone there have been roughly a million refugees. Entire provinces, Quang Tri among them, have been stripped of population.

Cities have grown to the bursting point with refugees or people interested in making more money than they could as

NEW YORK TIMES.
26 January 1973

Saigon Is Over-Equipped in Planes

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 25—Racing against the time when a cease-fire goes into effect, the United States has swamped the South Vietnamese Air Force with hundreds of warplanes it can neither fly nor maintain.

The new planes and thousands of tons of supplies and equipment started flowing into South Vietnam late last year after American military officers learned that the draft cease-fire agreement stipulated that the replacement of war materiel after a formal cessation of combat would be on an item-for-item basis.

Anticipating that the final agreement would contain the same stipulation—and it does—the United States has sent South Vietnam 350 new fighter-bombers and transport planes.

Most of the new aircraft are in storage hangars, and some South Vietnamese officers say that it may take as long as two years to recruit and train enough pilots and ground technicians to put all of the planes into full operation.

Expansion Accelerated

The United States had accelerated its program to expand the South Vietnamese Air Force as American troops were being rapidly sent home in 1971 and 1972.

By the end of last summer the air force had reached the size that the United States had expected it to be by 1974. The air force had 50,000 men and 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft—a combination of propeller and jet bombers, propeller and jet-assisted transports and roughly 500 helicopters.

One well-placed South Vietnamese officer said that in order to handle the latest aircraft and supplies—as well as some additional planes that are expected to be turned over by departing American units—the air force will need a 30 per cent increase in personnel—to about 65,000 men.

The officer said that 1,000 pilots were needed immediately and that several thousand men must undergo basic and advanced training in maintenance and supply-handling techniques.

Most of the training is now done in the United States. It takes a minimum of 14 months for the basic jet fighter program for pilots and nine to 10 months to learn to fly a heli-

copter. Technicians and mechanics must spend nearly a year in school.

There are only a couple of hundred South Vietnamese airmen training in the United States now. Training programs in South Vietnam are being stepped up, but even so, the air force seems unlikely to meet its immediate manpower needs.

To fill the gap, American civilian technicians have been hired by the United States Government and groups of about 500 are believed to have been assigned to the principal bases in South Vietnam.

Some of the civilians are running classes in aircraft maintenance while others are carrying out complicated repairs themselves and also assembling the new aircraft that have recently arrived.

Other American civilians have been teaching Vietnamese airmen who have experience in transport planes how to fly the larger C-130 cargo aircraft that arrived toward the end of last year.

Since the late nineteen-sixties, when the air force began growing at a spectacular rate—in 1967 it had 16,000 men and 400 aircraft—the biggest problems for the service have been getting spare parts and equipment to where they were needed and keeping the planes in flying condition.

Even with the help of the American civilians, the air force has been unable to keep up with the maintenance required for its aircraft.

A spot check one day this week showed that in about half of the squadrons in the air force only about 50 per cent of the planes assigned to the unit were operational. With a few exceptions, where as many as 75 per cent of the planes were available for use, the rest of the units reported that far fewer than half their planes were operational.

In one transport unit with 15 planes only two were fit to fly. A helicopter unit with 32 planes assigned also had only two aircraft that were operational. Another helicopter unit with the same number of aircraft assigned had four that could be used. In a fighter squadron of 20 planes, four were in safe working order.

The standard in the United States Air Force is that at least 71 per cent of the aircraft in a unit be ready for service.

"We have just been growing too fast," one South Vietnam-

ese maintenance officer said. "It's just not possible for us to do as you Americans. We do not have the manpower and we lack many skills."

One high-ranking American Air Force officer said that the problems confronting the South Vietnamese should not be a surprise to anyone.

"We are really forcing upon them in a very short period things that took us years to work out," he said. "For the South Vietnamese to have adapted as well as they have has been a fantastic phenomenon. But they've got a hell of a long way to go."

The South Vietnamese Air Force is a volunteer service and generally gets better educated men than the army. But even so the standards are much lower than in the United States, where enlisted mechanics must have high school diplomas and the pilots are college graduates. Enlisted men in the South Vietnamese Air Force must have at least nine years of schooling and officer candidates are required to have the equivalent of a high school education.

With the exception of the Chinook and Huey helicopters and the C-130 transport, the United States has given the South Vietnamese some of the most basic and easy-to-maintain aircraft in its inventory.

In the latest shipments, the South Vietnamese reportedly have received about 200 F-5 Freedom fighters and about 90 Cessna A-37's. Both are tiny compared with the American main fighter-bomber—the F-4 Phantom—or the principal Soviet attack plane that the North Vietnamese have in small numbers—the MIG-21. The F-5 and the A-37 are also much slower than the F-4 and the MIG-21, and they have no tracking radar or other complicated electronic equipment.

Many South Vietnamese pilots complain that they have been given second-rate planes to fight with, but all acknowledge that the ground crews could not cope with the F-4.

The main military reason for providing the F-5, American officers say, is that it was designed primarily as an air-defense plane. The thinking of American strategists is that after a cease-fire the South Vietnamese would be better served with a plane that could counter an enemy attack than by one that could carry a heavier bomb load for an offensive strike.

farmers. The population of Saigon, never exactly known, probably doubled to about three million.

Centuries of family tradition, often associated with the graveyards of ancestors, has been shattered. At least one of the mountain tribes of the central plateau has ceased to exist as a distinct ethnic group. The Government moved its people hundreds of miles from their homes and forced them to conform to the tribal patterns of another, larger group speaking a different language.

The dislocation of life will have such staggering effects that some political experts believe only the Communists will be able to impose order harshly enough to rebuild the nation.

Mrs. T's family, in common with most South Vietnamese, will stay, come what may.

"At this stage the Communists cannot hurt us," she said. "We are just small people. Besides, where else could we go?"

Mrs. T. and Lang picked up their cards. Neither has any political views about anything any more, and the blood feud between their families is no longer important. Life must go on.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 January 1973

Saigon Draws a Blank On Truce-Talk Photo

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 22 (UPI)—South Vietnamese newspapers are forbidden by Government order to publish the names or the pictures of North Vietnamese leaders.

So today when they placed the picture of the North Vietnamese and American delegations meeting in Paris on the first page, most cut the picture in half and printed only the half showing the Americans.

Dai Dan Toc, a pro-Government newspaper, ran the entire picture on Page 1 but blanked out the pictures of the North Vietnamese with white ink. As a result the Americans seemed to be sitting down to the negotiating table with a collection of ghosts in white sheets.

LONDON OBSERVER
28 January 1973

What the war was about

THE IMMEDIATE beneficiaries of the ceasefire in Vietnam are most of the Vietnamese people, as well as the remaining American and other foreign soldiers directly involved in the war. A terrible burden is lifted from them all.

But the end of the war and the kind of peace to which it may lead will inevitably have repercussions far beyond the borders of Indo-China. For, internationally, Vietnam has become, in however confusing a way, a symbol of ideas and ideologies in conflict. The war has also been an obstacle to continuing the attempts to build a more rational world system based on peaceful co-existence in which rival ideologies and interests may compete without military conflict.

Domestically, in the United States the war diverted thought, energy and resources away from internal problems of race, poverty and modern urban distress. It burned up the radical minority and broke the hearts of the 'silent majority.' It weakened America's reputation among her allies in Europe—but those in Asia may have been encouraged by America's prodigal fulfilment of her commitments to Saigon.

In a world in which colonialism, militant Communism and Great Power conflict—which provide the mixed origins of the Vietnam conflict—were elsewhere all apparently on the wane, the continuation of the war began to appear increasingly as a horrible nightmare. Yet because of its complex origins the war was for long one which honest men on both sides could consider as being fought in a good cause. For the war developed as a tragic conflict between two right ideas, which local conditions and the timing of history turned into half-truths.

On the one side was a Vietnamese struggle to free their land of foreign control, perhaps the most heroic episode in the great twentieth-century revolution against colonialism and imperialism. On the other side was the resolve of the US to apply another great twentieth-century lesson: that the prevention of world war depends on the readiness of nations to organise and operate collective security against aggression. It was the failure to do just this in the twenties and thirties, first in Manchuria, then Abyssinia, the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania, that led directly to the colossal tragedy of the Second World War. This was the principle that the US applied in placing obstacles to further Soviet advance in Europe; they applied it successfully in Korea; they believed they were applying it in Vietnam.

What turned sound principles into

shaky half-truths in Vietnam was the accidental confusion of nationalism and anti-imperialism with Communism in this case. The main leadership of the Vietnamese independence struggle against the French was Communist. This not only split the Vietnamese nationalist movement along ideological lines. It also later encouraged the US to identify the Vietnamese Communist-nationalists with what most European and Asian States saw as an expanding militarist movement directed from Moscow. This movement had been held at bay half-way across Europe, with notable difficulty at Berlin. It had already shown in Korea that it was prepared for war where it thought it could win, just as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia it was to demonstrate its readiness to crush any nationalist revolution in its own imperial orbit, by force where necessary.

So, eventually, the Vietnam war contained three elements: a drive for national liberation from foreign control; a conflict between the Vietnamese themselves about the kind of regime they wanted; and the American pursuit of the Korea-like aim of holding the frontier of a threatened State (South Vietnam) against aggression (the North Vietnamese troops sent into the South to help the Vietcong being regarded as aggressors).

Any peace settlement thus had to fulfil three conditions. It had to lead to the withdrawal of foreign troops. It had to produce some agreement among the people of South Vietnam, divided between Communists, anti-Communists and those in between, about what kind of regime they would live under—even if they could only agree on different areas coming under different regimes, so that South Vietnam was for a time a motley confusion with two Governments. It had finally to promote negotiations between North and South Vietnam, even though the North wants a united Vietnam and the non-Communists in the South do not. The framework for this kind of prolonged Vietnamese argument had to be the neutrality of all the Indo-China States, which means a commitment of non-interference by the Great Powers.

The ceasefire agreement signed yesterday settles at least one point. The American troops and bases will be withdrawn, and for the first time for over a century Vietnam will be without foreign forces. There is agreement on non-interference in Vietnam's internal affairs. The proposed international conference, to be held within the next month, will presumably endorse the principle of a neutral Indo-China. The very first article of the ceasefire docu-

ment proclaims the principle of a united Vietnam, and later articles provide for reunification to be negotiated between North and South by stages.

But all this really turns on the ability of the rival parties within South Vietnam to work out some kind of political arrangement between themselves. Here is the hard core of the problem. The prospects are not bright and the temptations to resort to arms again will be great. For as Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator, said, it cannot be denied that there now exist in South Vietnam 'no administrations, two armies, two areas of control and three political forces.'

settlement will depend now on the ability of these Vietnamese factions to find a way of living together. The military forces of the chief rivals are roughly similar. This could incite them to resort to more fighting or it could deter them from doing so. One new factor which might encourage them not to fight immediately is that all the major Powers closely concerned—America, Russia and China—clearly want peace.

What lessons can be learned from the Vietnam tragedy? This will be argued for years. One is, certainly, the importance of appreciating the tenacious force of national liberation movements. Another may be the growing diversity of Communist movements. There will be other opportunities for repeating—or avoiding—the mistaken analysis of Vietnam. There are already other national liberation movements, fighting or preparing to fight, for instance in Southern Africa. And it is more than likely that Communists of one sort or other will be involved in their leadership. They may also turn to Russia and China for help. What should we do? Certainly not repeat the same mistake.

But another and equally important conclusion must be drawn. America's mistake in Vietnam does not invalidate the vital principle that countries invaded by their neighbours should be assured of international help. The more certain it can be made that such help will be instantly forthcoming, the less likely is it that recognised frontiers will be crossed. Successive American Presidents thought that in Vietnam they were upholding this basic principle of world order. The United States has now withdrawn from the disastrous consequences of making a political misjudgment. It would be an even greater disaster if the US were now to conclude that the principle itself was foolish. For without American active participation there can be no solution to the greatest political problem of all: how to build an effective system for keeping world peace.

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH reports from Saigon on the grim post-cease-fire problems, administrative and political

THE cease-fire due to begin early next Sunday morning throughout North and South Vietnam may provide the respite which is essential to enable these war-weary countries to negotiate a lasting peace. But the omens are not auspicious, and, according to local tradition throughout Eastern Asia, the year which opens at Tet (Feb. 3) passes in the mood of its beginning.

The mood here now is generally one of bitterness and pessimism in which few people believe that the peace will endure for more than a year or two at most.

Fifteen North Vietnamese and two Viet Cong Communist divisions could physically stay within South Vietnam. It is, however, certain that Gen. Giap, the North Vietnamese Minister of Defence, will need to bring some troops home for military reasons—the morale of the population—as well as to assist with the work of reconstruction. Yet it is reasonable to assume that the majority, say around 80,000 soldiers from the North, will be deployed indefinitely in the South. And the long-term objectives of this force will be not only to reunite Vietnam but to establish a Communist régime throughout the country.

During the next 24 hours these "main" North Vietnamese forces are expected to make attempts to improve their positions and extend their terrain. But when the cease-fire comes into force it will be observed, except on the village and hamlet level where old political and military scores are likely to be paid off during the 60-day period while the Americans and the two Korean divisions are withdrawn and prisoners of war returned.

Unwelcome to both

But the workings of the "two-party Joint Military Commission" described in the agreement on ending the war are unlikely to be smooth. According to one general it would be like trying to arrange for the administration of the Midlands from London if all the motorways were open during daylight but subjected to harassment from villages on either side which were frequently in enemy hands and supported from large enemy bases in the Welsh mountains, Malvern Hills and the Norfolk Broads.

Further, the four-party Joint Military International Commission of control and supervision of the cease-fire, composed of 1,160 Canadians, Poles, Indonesians and Hungarians, will not be effective in the eyes of the Saigon Government and all neutral military experts. Certainly they will be unwelcome on both sides.

The Control Commission will be hampered by a rapidly increasing anti-foreign atmosphere in South Vietnam throughout urban areas but especially in the Forces. Basically it arises from a belief that the Americans have let them down, but the antipathy has grown to include Japanese and other Asians.

Obviously the Control Commis-

The challenge in Vietnam now

sion which was established after the 1954 Geneva conference which terminated the war between France and the Viet Minh—which is still in theory in existence—set failure as a precedent.

Saigon recognises the "South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government," of which Mme Binh is Foreign Secretary, only as the National Liberation Front—just another political party in South Vietnam.

President Thieu is willing to negotiate with the NLF, which controls two well-trained divisions as well as hundreds of small units on a regional and village level, for, among other major issues, the release of prisoners. The Communists claim the Saigon Government is holding around 150,000 political, military and guerrilla prisoners, but the real figure is likely to be just under 100,000. The Viet Cong hold 108 Americans and unknown numbers of Vietnamese.

In the past, President Thieu has said the only elections he would allow were for a new President. But now his Government is willing to consider "village" and "legislative" elections if they can be negotiated with the NLF. Although few observers believe elections as envisaged in the agreement will take place in three months, President Thieu is vigorously preparing for them.

It is not quite true that he insists on a one-party State for he will, after all, be negotiating with the Communists in the NLF. But he does not want to see the formation of a second non-Communist party which could rival his own Democratic party.

Further, it is becoming more necessary to join Thieu's Democratic party not only for men who want to advance in Government service but for those who merely wish to retain a modest job in the Civil Service. Thus, as in Communist and other semi-dictatorial countries, the party as well as the administration controls the masses and hands out the favours. In view of the truly immense amounts of aid in cash and kind which are expected here for reconstruction work in the immediate future, there is every incentive for Vietnamese to join the Democratic party.

The three million Roman Catholics fear Communism but are unable to satisfy the requirements demanded by the present Government to form a recognised political party.

President Thieu is far more secure in his position than he would appear from outside South Vietnam. Although he has deeply disappointed many American dip-

lomats and soldiers by turning from the path of true democracy, he has the vital support of the Forces. The desertion rate is high but this is largely because men feel the war is over and they want to go back to the paddy field. There is no general or young colonel preparing for a coup d'état.

The South Vietnamese officer class will be useful on internal security duties whether or not they are transferred to the police.

Outside pressure?

Despite the obvious problems of maintaining a cease-fire under present military conditions in Vietnam, there are some reasons for slight optimism that a peace treaty may eventually be negotiated. The Chinese Government wants the war to end and is doubtless putting pressure on the Politburo in Hanoi.

Further, once the fighting has ended, the Northern Communists—other than the military units who remain in the South—will be wholly occupied for the next year or two in rebuilding their ruined towns and restoring the ravaged countryside. Hanoi, like Saigon, expects massive economic aid—and financial problems which may well cause a dramatic drop in the value of the currency (a factor more important in capitalist Saigon than the Communist North).

Even Communist children will rebel at having their lessons in dug-outs when the fighting is over and the pressure to rebuild houses, hospitals, bridges and roads will be difficult to resist.

The burning question of the rival South Vietnamese Governments—that of President Thieu and the NLF—remains the most difficult to overcome.

Optimistic officials suggest that the vague wording of the agreement, which has already been interpreted differently by Saigon and Hanoi Radio, may provide flexibility as well as difficulties.

President Thieu has demonstrated that he alone can lead the country to an election. He is determined to survive longer.

Despite the American protests that they will not interfere on the ground that they are providing economic aid, the men around Thieu fear future Washington pressure. Indeed, after a briefing at the Foreign Office here on the agreement, those few diplomats who came out believing in a peace that will last for several years were those who thought that, at the international conference which is envisaged, China would pressurise Hanoi and Washington Saigon.

BALTIMORE SUN
30 January 1973

International parley on truce has vague role

By SCOTT SULLIVAN
Paris Bureau of The Sun

Paris—Among the vaguest clauses in a Vietnam cease-fire agreement shot through with intentional ambiguities is Article 19, which calls for "the convening of an international conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement."

The purposes of the conference, the article says, are:

"To acknowledge the signed agreements, to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina."

Conference members

The agreement names the conference members as: North and South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, Hungary, Poland, Canada and Indonesia (the last four being members of the postwar peace-keeping commission) and Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations.

The conference is mentioned—significantly, if only apparently in passing—in Article 18. This is the context:

"Until the international conference . . . makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties [in some instances, to the two South Vietnamese parties in other cases] on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of . . . provisions of this agreement."

Beyond these few lines, the agreement itself remains mute. Thus, any prediction of the real weight and importance of the coming conference can be based only on the previous statements of both sides, observation and inference.

Taken extremely seriously

One inference is extremely easy to draw—that the international conference, and the guarantees it will produce, are taken extremely seriously by all parties to the agreement.

Provisions for such a conference—usually described as covering Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam—appeared in virtually identical language in one peace plan after another from both sides of the bargaining table.

Whatever else it may have been, the Vietnam conflict was incontestably an arena of proxy combat between the U.S., on the one hand, and China and the Soviet Union, on the other.

Tentative detente

Without the colossal contribution of arms, supplies and men provided by the superpowers to their allies or clients, neither the Saigon government nor the "liberation forces" could conceivably have carried on the conflict on the scale to which it ultimately developed.

And, as in 1954, it would be inconceivable to expect the conflict to die out without the agreement, implicit or explicit, of those same competing giants.

No serious observer contests the theory that the chances for peace suddenly developed after President Nixon achieved his tentative detente with Moscow and Peking, nor that the decision by the two Communist superpowers to liquidate the war contributed directly to the willingness of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to accept a less-than-victorious cease-fire.

The primary goal of the international conference then will be for the major world powers, together with Britain and France, to stand up publicly and pledge themselves to do what they can to avoid a new outbreak of the war on an international scale.

What form those pledges will take is not now clear, but they will no doubt follow generally the lines of similar engagements taken by the powers in the 1954 Geneva accords which ended French colonial rule in Indochina.

Tighter language

American officials hope the language will be even tighter than 1954, with specific pledges to limit aid to the two Vietnams to purely economic support and to the strict replacement of wornout war material as outlined in the terms of the agreement.

The second chief goal of the conference will be to "cap" the complicated peace-keeping machinery that already involves the four-nation international commission, the two-party military commission and the four-party military commission.

Under the terms of the cease-fire agreement, these groups, in effect, report to one another, with the two South

Vietnamese parties—the Saigon government and the Viet Cong—acting ultimately as the real guarantors of the peace.

The international conference will examine this machinery, and may revise it, creating a permanent body with international status to rule on treaty violations. Even if such a move is blocked by one or both of the South Vietnamese parties, the conference will at least give international sanctions to the machinery that exists.

Coordinate economic aid

A third objective of the conference, alluded to in the agreement itself, will be to mobilize and coordinate economic aid to the two halves of the country.

The model for the whole affair is clearly the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, which sought to settle the affairs of Vietnam and Laos.

But there will be some significant differences with the 1954 model—not least of all, the sincere hope that 1973 will prove more effective than its two predecessors.

The coming conference will be more limited in scope. Though the agreement speaks of guaranteeing "peace in Indochina," Le Duc Tho, the chief North Vietnamese architect of the cease-fire, stated categorically last Wednesday that it will deal exclusively with the Vietnam situation.

American officials obviously hope that cease-fires will intervene in Laos and Cambodia before the 30-day period for the conference's convocation

is up, so that the powers may at least take the situation in those countries into account.

Vietnamese Communist officials, in public as in private, have expressed considerable skepticism on this point.

The new conference is also expected to be considerably shorter than the 1954 affair, which lasted from May 8 to July 21. In 1954, it was the conference itself that worked out the peace terms after another long and complicated war.

Vienna or Paris

A final question mark hovers over the conference site.

Although observers had long assumed that Paris would be the city chosen for the conference, as it had been for the negotiations, very high French diplomatic officials told newsmen Tuesday that the parties had decided on Vienna instead.

The U.S. had opposed Paris from the first, feeling that French policy leaned somewhat in favor of the Communist side. North Vietnam also developed some strong anti-French sentiment in December when President Georges Pompidou did not speak out publicly against the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Since Tuesday, however, the Parisian candidacy seems to have re-emerged.

Both Mr. Tho and Henry A. Kissinger, his American negotiating partner, said Wednesday that a site has not been set. Meantime, Maurice Schumann, the French foreign minister, has held meetings with representatives of all the interested parties and has reportedly argued strongly the case for the French capital.

WASHINGTON POST
5 February, 1973

Maneuvers Hit

TOKYO—Radio Pyongyang reported the North Korean government has called on the United States and South Korea to cancel their combined maneuvers scheduled off the coasts of the Korean peninsula later this month. North Korea branded the maneuvers "bellicose and imperialistic."

War Leaves Deep Mark on U.S.

By JAMES RESTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23—America is moving out of Vietnam after the longest and most divisive conflict since the War Between the States. But Vietnam is not moving out of America, for the impact of the war there is likely to influence American life for many years to come.

News Analysis

Though it is probably too early to distinguish between the temporary and the enduring consequences, one thing is fairly clear: There has been a sharp decline in respect for authority in the United States as a result of the war—a decline in respect not only for the civil authority of government but also for the moral authority of the schools, the universities, the press, the church and even the family.

There was no cease-fire on this front. Vietnam did not start the challenge to authority, but it weakened respect for the executives who got the nation involved in the war in the first place, for the Congress that let it go on for more than a decade and for the democratic process of debate, which failed to influence the course of battle for years and which finally declined into physical combat and sporadic anarchy.

Even after a cease-fire, there will still be considerable contention in the country over whether the challenges to authority are good or bad.

Many Americans have maintained that it was precisely the dissent and the defiance that forced social reform at home and a settlement abroad.

Others have argued that the war produced a whole new revolutionary climate in America, which encouraged the Communists to prolong the conflict and disrupted the nation's unity and the previously accepted attitudes, standards and restraints in American public and private conduct. But few Americans challenge the proposition that for good or bad, something has happened to American life—something not yet understood or agreed upon, something that is different, important and probably enduring.

Even at the moment of the Vietnamese compromise, for example, there was a rash of teacher strikes in several of the great cities of the nation; one-time members of the Central Intelligence Agency, some of them former White House consultants, were confessing in court

that they had been involved in a conspiracy to spy on the Democratic party and its leaders during the 1972 Presidential election campaign; and there was a controversy at Madison Square Garden over the playing of the national anthem before major sports events.

The direct costs of the war to the United States are easier to estimate than the indirect. Vietnam cost 46,000 American lives and, at a minimum, \$110-billion. That does not take into account long-range obligations to veterans, which may add up to \$50-billion more, nor does it include the costs of the fighting in Laos and Cambodia and the continuing military establishment in Thailand.

Nor does it take into account the cost to the peoples of Indochina in dead, wounded, maimed and homeless, and in the destruction of their lands, which are almost beyond accurate calculation.

Significant Imponderables

The imponderables—the changes in attitudes and assumptions, for example, and the decline in truthfulness and self-confidence—promised to be even more significant for the future than the financial strain.

Among other things, Vietnam changed the nation's way of looking at itself and the world, reduced its willingness to get involved in distant continental land wars for ambiguous reasons, and envenomed the relations between the political parties and between the President and Congress.

The American people seem less confident about many things they took for granted. They are not so sure, for example, that the United States always prevails in foreign conflicts, that big guys always lick little guys, that money and machines are decisive in war, and that small states would rather surrender than risk American military might.

Even the two World Wars of this century did not have quite the same effect on American society. They divided Western civilization, destroyed its old empires, broke its domination over world politics, and changed the lives of Britain and Germany, but they did not challenge quite so many assumptions of American life as the long struggle in Vietnam.

In 1937 Munich became a symbol of appeasement and the dangers of nonintervention, dangers that, in turn, encouraged more overseas commitments by the United States than by any other nation. In the nineteen-seventies, on the other hand, Vietnam became a symbol of the dangers of intervention and led to American withdrawal and even to fears of American isolation.

The tone of President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in 1961 at the beginning of the

deep involvement in Vietnam, and the tone of President Nixon's second inaugural during the last phase of the cease-fire negotiations illustrate the change in the American mood and commitment.

Prudent Pledge by Nixon

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill," Mr. Kennedy said in his oft-quoted promise, "that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge—and more."

After the disappointments and disillusion of the ensuing 12 years, President Nixon was more prudent and modest in pledging what the American people would do.

"We shall do our share in defending peace and freedom in the world," he said. "But we shall expect others to do their share. The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell other nations how to manage their own affairs."

Moreover, the disillusionments of Vietnam not only led to a more modest estimate of what the United States could or should do to help maintain freedom and order in the world, but they also seemed to encourage a downward reappraisal of what government could do to maintain the health and welfare of the poor at home.

Yesterday, when former President Lyndon B. Johnson died, with the Vietnam peace agreement near completion in Paris, the heroic themes of his Administration—his Great Society, his war on poverty, his bills on civil rights and voting rights—were very much in the news. But by this time the emphasis if not the direction of American policy at home was undergoing a marked change.

"A person can be expected to act responsibly only if he has responsibility," President Nixon said at his second inaugural. "So let us encourage individuals at home and nations abroad to do more for themselves. Let us measure what we will do for others by what they will do for themselves."

In short, after Vietnam the emphasis is not on what government can do but on what it cannot and should not do; not on welfare but on work; not on a compassionate society but on a competitive society in which the comfortable majority will pay less in taxes and everyone will rely more on himself and less on the Federal Government.

Perhaps these are merely changes in style and rhetoric, due more to Mr. Nixon's philosophy than to the experiences of Vietnam; but particularly in the field of foreign affairs America after Vietnam is likely to regard the world as a much more complicated and diverse place than

it did in the fifties and sixties.

For most of the last decade this country has been preoccupied with Vietnam on the assumption that the 2 per cent of Asia's population that live there were critical to the worldwide struggle between the irreconcilable forces of darkness and light. This and many other illusions have been modified if not rejected.

It was widely believed, for example, that Communism was a monolithic force working on a vast and centrally controlled strategy to change the balance of power in the world and threaten the vital security and commercial interests of the United States.

Reshaping Foreign Policy

The Communist threat to Greece and Turkey in the late forties, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, the blare of Communist pronouncements and the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence all encouraged the belief—which persisted even after the Chinese-Soviet split—that the United States was confronted

by a vast conspiracy that could be turned back only by its power and countermeasures.

Furthermore it was widely believed in the fifties and sixties that the system of collective-security alliances that had helped preserve and reconstruct the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe could be adapted to primitive societies lacking in industrial and political tradition. Part of this popular belief was that if American commitments were not met in one place—say, Vietnam—they could be regarded as worthless in other critical areas—say, Europe—and that if Vietnam fell other nations would fall—"like dominoes," as the popular saying of the day went.

Even before the cease-fire agreement drew near, President Nixon had begun to question those assumptions and shape foreign policy to the changing situation. The split between Moscow and Peking and the need in both China and the Soviet Union for surplus grain and modern technology gave him the opportunity to renew diplomatic contact with Peking, and, despite Vietnam, to negotiate new agreements with Moscow on trade and arms control.

The likelihood is that the trend toward limited cooperation between the major powers will be even more marked with the final withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam.

Thus the United States, the Soviet Union and China all seem to have learned some of the lessons of the Vietnam war, limited their use of power and avoided a direct military confrontation.

Role of Public Opinion

A major question here is whether the Russians will again be tempted to assist in another "war of national liberation" in the belief that Vietnam was so painful for the United States that no President of the Vietnam generation

NEW YORK TIMES
31 January 1973

Reconstruction Days

By David E. Lilienthal

would be tempted to intervene.

The experts in Washington are divided on the question, but a majority seem to believe that for the foreseeable future Peking and Moscow will decide that they have more to gain by cooperating with the United States than in risking another confrontation.

It is less clear that the lessons of the war have been learned in Washington. President Nixon has clearly reduced overseas commitments and tempered the cold-war rhetoric, but the habit of centralizing foreign-policy decisions in the White House, where so many of the Vietnam blunders were made, is persisting, as is the heavy influence of the military on foreign policy.

Charles W. Yost, one of the nation's most experienced diplomats, observes in his book "The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs" (Random House, 1972) that in the first three years of the Vietnam war American public opinion did not exercise either a stimulating or an inhibiting effect on United States leaders, but that Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Johnson and, at first, Mr. Nixon were so afraid of what public opinion might do if they "lost" the war that they misjudged both the problem in Vietnam and attitudes at home.

"There are many depressing examples of international conflicts," he writes, "in which leaders have first aroused their own people against a neighbor and then discovered to their chagrin that even when they judged the time had come to move toward peace, they were prisoners of the popular passions they had stimulated."

President Nixon's argument that the United States had to keep following his policy or look like "a pitiful, helpless giant" is only one of many illustrations to be found in Vietnam policy; but the chances are that this sort of thing will not be heard again for some time.

Meanwhile, Mr. Nixon does have to deal with the consequences of the war at home: with a kind of spiritual malaise, with the continuing opposition to his theme that the end of the war will not release additional funds for social reconstruction at home; with the resentment of policies reached in secret and not explained to Congress or the people; with the dangers of returning soldiers facing unemployment and exhortations to be self-reliant; and with an American conscience troubled over the bloodshed and sorrow.

The guess here is that it will take some time to restore the self-confidence of the pre-Vietnam years, but it may be that the destruction of many popular misconceptions in Vietnam will produce a more mature, if sadder, nation.

PRINCETON, N. J.—Perhaps for the very first time after any major war the factual and technical groundwork for an immediate start on the task of reconstruction and development has already been prepared in advance of the end of a war. In published form, the study is known as "The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam." (1970)

The decision to proceed with a postwar development strategy was made in the very midst of hostilities. In 1966, President Johnson, with the Premier of Vietnam, directed the writer and his colleagues of Development and Resources Corporation—an American private company—jointly with a large group of nongovernmental Vietnamese, to spend three years preparing for the day of reconstruction and development, now at hand. It was the late President's hope that this might avoid a repetition of the chaos and confusion of the postwar period in Korea, in Europe and in Japan.

The report ranges from fiscal policy and taxation to an over-all proposed growth pattern for the postwar economy.

Neither the fantastic bombing since 1970 nor the use of defoliants has permanently impaired the potential of the land for the growing of crops; in a tropical country nature soon heals such scars.

In sum, the physical destruction and tragic human suffering since the publication of the report in 1970 do not materially change the basic economic premise: that though very hard days lie immediately ahead, in a decade or less South Vietnam can be economically stable and self-supporting.

The fundamental question is whether as a people we feel a strong sense of responsibility to ourselves, a recommitment to our historic and, I believe, unimpaired traditions of compassion to those who suffer the consequences of war, and a concern for those who suffer the wretchedness of poverty, homelessness, sickness and despair.

Many specific questions for American decision are raised by the report which I delivered to President Nixon and to President Thieu. How much should nations other than the United States—especially Japan—contribute? Should North Vietnam be included in the design—as President Nixon has suggested and as I believe?

Who will administer the program? Since the World Bank is under some handicaps for such a task, should a special reconstruction and development corporation be organized, on an international basis, but one free of the incredible bureaucratic inertia of the United Nations Organization? Or should the enterprise be operated by a Japanese-oriented Asian development bank? Or should there be created an

international consortium of distinguished public-spirited private citizens?

What should be the first things undertaken? Should it be the relief of the refugees, the immediate repair of war damage, or restoration of communication and mail between South and North Vietnam?

The greatest single, specific opportunity is development of the majestic Mekong River. Its more than 2,000-mile course flows through several nations; its source is in the mountain gorges of the People's Republic of China. Of the hydrology of this great stream, the Development and Resources Corporation's technical staff developed new knowledge and concepts. But more than hydrology is involved: Can the Mekong be made to serve as a unifying political mechanism for gradual political and joint action in that region?

But all questions are subordinate to the main one for Americans: Why? Why support reconstruction of a part of the world that has already cost us such agonies? What possible motivation have we?

I suggest that we participate and contribute to reconstruction and rehabilitation because we are a moral and humanitarian people. I believe the American people will respond to this impulse so deeply ingrained in our history and traditions to heal, to rebuild, to develop, after the end of this war.

I say this even of a war about which there has been and still is such bitter division, such an outpouring of almost hysterical self-denigration of America, such mutual enmity and vilification of Americans by Americans—even of two Presidents of the Republic and some of the most dedicated public servants of our time. Before we continue mutual recrimination over Vietnam we should be warned by the sordid story of Civil War reconstruction days, when for many years America punished and vilified and penalized fellow Americans of the South to the injury of the whole nation's values.

In the great task of reconstruction that lies immediately ahead there is an opportunity to join all Americans in a common task of mercy, creative effort, an opportunity not for revenge and fault-finding of those with whom we have differed, but for reconciliation. This could serve as an example and an inspiration for the Vietnamese, North and South. And without their reconciliation "the end of the war" in which we now rejoice might well turn out to be fragile and temporary, a peace that is no peace.

David E. Lilienthal is chairman and president of the Development and Resources Corporation, formerly chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the Atomic Energy Commission.

VIETNAM: A LONG WAY FROM PEACE

By Frances FitzGerald

Miss FitzGerald's book on the Vietnam war, "Fire in the Lake," was published last year. This article was written for Newsday.

LAST WEDNESDAY Dr. Henry Kissinger took two hours on national television to explain the document known as the "Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam." In those two hours of explication, clarification and detailed textual analysis, two questions remained unasked and unanswered: Is the Vietnam war over, and if so, who has won it?

The questions were perhaps too dangerous. For as Kissinger spoke, it became evident that the changes that he had negotiated between October and January had all been designed for the purpose of avoiding a U.S. commitment on the central issue of the war. The "clarifications" he sought and obtained were in fact more perfect ambiguities—phrases cut and polished to complete opacity.

If the agreement is meant to end the war, then the great victory of the United States is to have denied all responsibility for its outcome. The United States will have left the war as it entered it, closing the circle of deception around its stated aim of "self-determination for the Vietnamese." If the administration wants peace, it will slowly allow that phrase to become the truth. Meanwhile, it is impossible to tell what the United States will do, for the intentions of the administration remain buried within the deception.

In principle, at least, the Paris agreement opens up a wide and clear path to peace. The first sentence reads: "The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam." Subsequent articles state that the "South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections," and that the reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful negotiations between North and South.

These sentences would seem to indicate that the United States had agreed to the main principles of the Geneva agreement that it refused to sign in 1954—thus repudiating two decades of U.S. policy in Vietnam and removing the major cause of the war. The records, however, do not guarantee this. According to the text, the principal signatories undertake responsibility only for the military aspect of the settlement; the United States and North Vietnam agree merely to cease hostilities and to implement a cease-fire in place between two nameless "South Vietnamese parties."

A Brief, Fragile Truce

WHILE THE AGREEMENT represents an advance over the attempt of both sides to obliterate each other, it is a truce rather than a peace. And, as was not the case in Korea, it is a truce that by its very nature must be both fragile and short-lived. In strict military terms it is almost impossible to maintain a cease-fire along lines as numerous and as complicated as those drawn across the face of Vietnam. Then, in a war that is at base a political struggle, even a cease-fire does not constitute a standstill, for life-like politics continues even though the killing stops.

As a result, the truce in Vietnam cannot last more than a few months: It must end either with the renewal of hostilities or with the beginning of a political contest that, grounded in the realities of Vietnamese politics, can eventually lead to peace.

The choice would seem clear enough. But it is not. For in order to maintain the deception of the U.S. role, the Nixon administration has managed to make the second path as difficult as possible for the Vietnamese.

The accord it has negotiated leaves the responsibility for working out a political settlement in the South to two parties, neither of which recognizes the existence of the other and only

ne of which can possibly benefit from it.

Looked at in the abstract, the text of the accord would indicate that there are two South Vietnamese parties of relatively equal stature. But that is not the case. The "parties" differ in size, but more important, they do not even belong to a single class, like apples and oranges. They are qualitatively different, like apples and theorems. One of them, the PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government), is a political party with a relatively small military force, even including the North Vietnamese troops, but with strong roots in the countryside of the South. The other is a product of the American pacification of Vietnam, a vast military administration containing most of the draft-age men without a political direction except the vague negative of anti-communism.

Drawing all of its support from the United States, the Saigon regime has no responsibility to its own people and no coherent interest except in maintaining the flow of American aid. It occupies the country rather than governs it. And since the success of this occupation depends largely on the use of its great weaponry to keep the population concentrated in a few places and locked in a state of economic dependency on the United States, any reduction in the use of force must serve only to erode it—and by comparison, at least, to strengthen the PRG.

Fighting to Survive

SINCE THE announcement of the draft accord in October, the Thieu regime has done nothing but resist any language that would fall short of giving it complete sovereignty over South Vietnam. In the future it can be counted on to resist any and all steps that would lead the country toward a permanent end to the fighting. With the three months of grace that President Nixon allowed him, Thieu has already promulgated new laws that in effect suspend the American-style constitution of the regime and with it most of its civil liberties—including the right to buy pieces of blue cloth that might be sewn into the flag of the PRG.

Saigon has made an extensive series of arrests, filling its already crowded jails with people who might be expected to take an independent political stance. Once the cease-fire is declared, its energies will be concentrated on preventing the mass of refugees from returning to their land in the PRG-controlled zones, so long made unlivable by the bombing. Its efforts will also go into discovering, provoking or inventing cease-fire violations by the other side in an attempt to bring the United States back into the war.

Unless pressured by the United States, Saigon will refuse to make any form of political agreement that gives the PRG or any other group a share of power; it will resist the demobilization of its troops, and it will oppose every single provision for the achievement of "national reconciliation" contained in the accord. And it will do so not for

mysterious Oriental reasons—not irrationally—but because its very survival depends on maintaining the state of hostility. Without that one unifying principle, the regime would burst open like a ripe fruit, releasing people of every political group from Catholics to Cao Daists to Buddhists—but mainly a mass of uncommitted people who might provide recruits to the PRG.

No Quick Takeover

THE PRG CAN BE expected to take the opposite stance for similarly practical reasons. Its line—already announced to the Vietnamese—is that it favors reconciliation and concord, that it has worked for peace (alongside North Vietnam) while the Thieu government has resisted it. In the next three months it will certainly press for a restitution of all those freedoms spelled out in the accord, most particularly freedom of movement from zone to zone and freedom for political prisoners (the vast majority of whom are held by the Saigon regime). It will press for demobilization and the holding of elections within the framework of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

Contrary to the fears expressed by U.S. officials, both the PRG and Hanoi will do their best to prevent truce violations by their own forces. In fact, since the United States can blame any truce violation on them in the expectation of credence by the American public, they will attempt even to obscure minor violations by the troops of the Saigon government. The PRG will do so because, as a political organization

with a relatively small military force, the transition from a military to a political conflict can only favor their cause, even if it means confusion and the emergence of new political parties in the short run.

In the near future—that is, for the next several years—the aim of the PRG is not, as Americans and Saigonese officials claim, to replace the Thieu regime and take over the government of the South. As Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese prime minister, said in a recent interview: "The political situation in the South is such that one must have a government that reflects the realities. You must realize that war in the South has meant that an entire generation has known no other way of life. There has been terrible suffering in every family. No one has been spared. Families are divided, father on one side, son on the other. Those are the realities. One must now try to abolish those divisions and not by imposing our will. That's why national reconciliation is paramount."

An Ungovernable Country

TO BELIEVE Pham Van Dong it is not necessary to believe that the PRG and the North Vietnamese are more humanitarian than any other group in their country. It is merely to believe that they understand their country. After 13 years of a major war, South Vietnam has become ungovernable—a mass of refugees, an ecological disaster and a catalog of social and economic ills. Those who pushed—or are pushed—into taking responsibility for this anarchy are bound to be repu-

diated in the long run, be they as wise and well-intentioned as the angel Gabriel. At the moment, therefore, the PRG wishes merely to call into question the dominance of the Thieu regime and to set into motion the political process which, as Marxists, they are confident will end with the victory of their particular revolution.

Since Hanoi will back the PRG in this endeavor, there remains only one party to the accord whose intentions are not entirely predictable, and that is the United States government. What does Mr. Nixon want?

The answer to that question may not be known for certain for several months. If Mr. Nixon wants a continuation of the war, that is easy: He need only accuse the PRG or Hanoi of a violation of the accords and resume the American bombardment of Vietnam—a move that no International Control Commission in this world can prevent. Alternatively, he has the option to declare the "truce violations" a matter for settlement between the two "South Vietnamese parties" and continue to fuel the conflict with American aid while disassociating himself from the results of the struggle.

But if Mr. Nixon wants peace—peace with honor or peace with mustard or just plain peace—he has to force the Thieu regime step by step, all the way down the road toward its own dissolution. For only its dissolution will provide the condition for a peaceful settlement and restore meaning to that long ill-used phrase, "self-determination for the South Vietnamese."

BALTIMORE SUN
25 January 1973

The Cease-Fire Agreement

From Americans the cease-fire agreement now ready for signature in Paris on Saturday draws a sigh of profound relief. It is not a feeling of exaltation. This war has been too long, and too mean, and too dubious in its purposes, and too wearing on mind and spirit, for its end to arouse any such emotion. And of course it is ending, for us, as none of our wars has ever ended before, not in jubilant victory but in cautious compromise. But there remain, in American terms, the great facts that this country is to be no longer involved in direct military action in Indochina, that American prisoners of war are to be returned and that those missing in action are to be accounted for, when possible.

As President Nixon said, the agreement is designed to create a peace that heals, a peace, in Dr. Kissinger's elaboration, which it is hoped will move the participating parties from hostility to normalization and from normalization to reconciliation. They were talking of

the broad scene, but still as to America we in this country need a special healing of the domestic wounds the Indochina war has inflicted on our body politic, a closing of the divisive schisms it has created and a repair of the doubts it has raised about our very national character.

That is as to America alone; but except as we chose to make it so the Indochina war has not been an American war. Physically, in death and devastation, our sufferings have been as nothing beside the sufferings of the people of Indochina itself. Then too, our actual sentiments of hostility have been mild in comparison with those of the antagonists in the region. Americans can, perhaps, forgive and forget—though to forget the real lessons of our part in this fantastic war would be to leave us open for similar error later, and with worse results—but the Indochinese cannot forgive so easily.

The cease-fire agreement, if adhered to by the Vietnamese signers on both sides, may help, though of

course the purpose of each was to gain as much advantage as possible for the period after the firing ceased. Both did gain some points. South Vietnam, with the assistance of the United States, firmed up its status as in fact a country, for now. And, North Vietnam secured the long-term designation of Vietnam as united, and to press home its definition of unity managed to prevent a stipulation that North Vietnamese troops in the South be withdrawn. This may well be what Le Duc Tho is talking about when he calls the agreement "a great victory for the Vietnamese people."

Much depends, for Vietnam's future, on how the agreement works out there, on the scene; how firmly the cease-fire holds, how well the erstwhile combatants on the joint committee to arrange elections cooperate, and how directly developments in Indochina lead toward the projected international conference. It is all extraordinarily chancy.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

26 January 1973

Can the peace spread to Cambodia

Next week Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia publishes a book giving his side of the events that led to his overthrow by a military coup in 1970. Wilfred Burchett, co-author of the book—'My War with the CIA,' Allen Lane, £1.60—has had close contacts with Sihanouk before and after his flight to Peking. Here he puts the new Vietnam peace treaty into the context of the continuing Cambodian civil war—as seen from Sihanouk's camp.

WHERE DOES a Vietnam peace agreement leave Cambodia? They are unrelated questions at least as far as a ceasefire in South Vietnam applying to Cambodia is concerned—according to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who heads the Peking wing of the Royal Government of National Union. This was set up six weeks after Sihanouk was deposed as Head of State, in March 1970.

Together with the National United Front which he heads it directs the resistance struggle against the Phnom Penh regime of Marshal Lon Nol. "Armed struggle will continue," Sihanouk told me recently, "until the Lon Nol regime and whatever is left of its armed forces have been completely crushed. There is no question of a ceasefire or negotiations with them. If President Nixon insists on saving Lon Nol and the handful of traitors who still support him, then he can send a plane and fly them into exile. If they fall into our hands, they will suffer the fate of the Quislings and Laval after World War II."

Sihanouk claims that the resistance forces now control 90 per cent of the territory and over 5 million of Cambodia's seven million inhabitants and that, were it not for US air strikes and the continued presence of Saigon troops, the Lon Nol regime would have been crushed long ago. Any attempt to equate the activities of Saigon troops and the US air force with the presence of North Vietnamese troops is vigorously denied by Sihanouk and the leaders of the resistance struggle inside the country. Apart from instructors sent by North Vietnamese at the personal request of Sihanouk to Premier Pham Van Dong and General Giap, the only North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia have been in the remote and sparsely-populated North-eastern border areas where the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" enters South Vietnam from Laos, according to Sihanouk, who says that the instructors were all withdrawn within one year, by which time their training rôle was completed and the resistance forces were organised into a regular army of battalion-sized units plus regional troops and village self-defence guerrillas. This three-layer structure is identical with that adopted by the Vietcong across the border in South Vietnam.

Sihanouk puts the strength of his regular army at 72,000, supplemented by several hundred thousand irregular troops of both sexes on the regional and guerrilla units. The latter represent a virtually inexhaustible reserve for the regular units with a constant movement upwards from guerrillas to regional units to the regular forces. The B52s are the best recruiting agents for the self-defence guerrillas, according to Sihanouk. Every time they cut a swathe through the rural areas, there are hundreds of angry volunteers who demand guns and a chance for revenge.

Opposed to these are the US-financed troops of Lon Nol. Officially they amount to 200,000, but Sihanouk's staff officers say this is a payroll figure a more accurate estimate would be about 160,000. The dollar paychecks for the 40,000 "phantoms" are said

to go into the pockets of a few divisional commanders and bureaucrats at headquarters. The Lon Nol troops are well-equipped but have notoriously low morale and would be utterly useless without massive US air support. They have not, in fact, won a single battle since the fighting started but have scored up some notable defeats.

No-one denies that there are many Vietnamese in the ranks of the resistance forces, but these have been recruited from the approximately 600,000-strong Vietnamese residents in Cambodia—most of them there for several generations. By his savage massacres and persecution of the Vietnamese, in the first days after seizing power, Lon Nol left them with little choice. Either wait to be shot down in cold blood or be deported as cannon-fodder for the Saigon army—or take to the jungle and join the resistance forces.

If the B52s were the best recruiting agents for the Cambodian peasants, Lon Nol and his even more bloodily-minded younger brother, Colonel Lon Non, were the best recruiting agents for the Vietnamese community. Upwards of 90 per cent of them sympathised with the Vietcong in any case and from the start of the fighting in South Vietnam, there was a steady flow of volunteers for the resistance forces from the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. After the Lon Nol coup and massacres, many of them had what they term "blood debts" to settle with the Phnom Penh regime and very quickly developed the fighting qualities that have earned their compatriots in South Vietnam the reputation of the world's finest guerrilla fighters.

As to how the resistance forces so quickly became an effective fighting organisation with modern weapons at their disposal, there were several reasons. For years prior to the Lon Nol coup, embryo resistance bases had been set up in half a dozen strategic areas in Cambodia's jungles and mountains. More correctly, old resistance bases, set up during the resistance war against the French were reactivated. As far back as 1963, but especially from 1966 onwards there had been a steady trickle of young people, mostly intellectuals at odds with the regime, moving out of Phnom Penh and other cities, to these bases. Immediately after the Lon Nol coup on March 18, 1970 and Sihanouk's appeal for armed resistance five days later, it was assumed by the NFL that there would be a drive by the US-Saigon forces in cooperation with Lon Nol's army into the frontier areas to wipe out the NFL bases there. So there started a massive distribution of arms to the rapidly-developing Cambodian resistance forces from the huge stocks in the frontier bases. By the time the Americans arrived six weeks later the "cupboard was bare."

"We got away to a good start," Sihanouk told me later. "Unlike our Vietnamese brothers who had to use hoes and clubs to wrest arms from the enemy when they started their resistance struggle, we had ample quantities of modern arms from the beginning—not to mention the example and experience of the Vietnamese and the magnificent instructors that Giap sent

us."

As the armed forces expanded, Chinese arms began to arrive, the Vietnamese diverting supplies intended for them from the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" pipeline. Many American weapons were captured from the Lon Nol and Saigon troops. Another vital source of supply was revealed by Sihanouk to a recent visitor to his Peking headquarters with his characteristic candour, namely the purchase of arms on the spot. The Chinese provided \$2 millions for this purpose in 1970 and 1971, 10 million in 1972, and Sihanouk said he expected about \$15 millions for 1973.

"Apart from helicopters—for the time being—we can supply you with anything you want, for cash in dollars," Sihanouk quoted one of his main arms suppliers in Phnom Penh as saying some months ago. Sihanouk added: "And he insisted that 'for the time being' was the operative phrase as far as helicopters were concerned. Obviously it is a great relief to the transport system to provide dollars on the spot rather than to send quantities of arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And for the American arms we buy, we have vast quantities of captured ammunition."

This original type of military logistics was not new to Sihanouk. In the years prior to the Lon Nol coup, he had been supplying large quantities of rice and medical supplies to the Vietcong, paid for at world market prices, in dollars, by the Chinese!

The situation in the regions controlled by Sihanouk's partisans is quite different to that of the areas controlled by the NLF in South Vietnam. Vast areas to the north and north-east of the capital, well over half the territory of Cambodia, are completely in the hands of the resistance forces, including the provincial and district capitals. In these areas there is no trace of the Lon Nol administration. In other provinces Lon Nol holds the provincial capitals, the rest including the district centres are held by Sihanouk's forces. Phnom Penh itself is surrounded, with each of the seven highways and the railway into the capital either firmly controlled by the resistance forces or, as is the case of Highway No. 1, leading to Saigon, cuttable at will. Sufficient food supplies are allowed into the capital to avoid undue hardships for the population, swollen by almost three times by refugees from the bombings.

The resistance government is organised in a highly original form. For every Minister in Peking, there is a Vice-Minister in the jungle headquarters; for every Minister in the jungle headquarters there is a Vice-Minister in Peking. For the three key Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, and Information, the Ministers are on the spot, directing the resistance struggle. Khieu Samphan as Minister for Defence, Hu Nim and Hou Yoon for the other two Ministries, are French-educated left-wing intellectuals—the only left-wingers elected at the legislative elections in 1966, the last to be held under Sihanouk. They were among those who left for the resistance bases in the 1966-7 period.

These three, together with Ieng Sary,

who had left for the embryo resistance bases as early as 1963, and who now serves as a liaison between the jungle bases and, Sihanouk at the Peking headquarters, form the hard core of the resistance leadership. They are among those with whom Sihanouk had his differences in the past, but who never wavered in their belief that Sihanouk was a true patriot devoted to preserving the independence of his country.

They supported his foreign policy of neutrality as the best means of keeping the war in South Vietnam from overflowing into Cambodia and his general line of friendship with the Socialist world and support for the resistance struggle in South Vietnam. When Sihanouk appealed for the formation of a National United Front and armed resistance to the Lon Nol regime five days after his overthrow, differences on internal policies were buried and a remarkable form of national unity from peasantry to the monarchy was very rapidly forged.

Sihanouk has explained this as largely due to the fact that historically, Cambodia has had to unite and struggle to survive as a nation, jammed in, as it is, between two more powerful nations and traditional enemies—Vietnam and Thailand. Cambodia's history has mainly been a fight for survival, with princes and Buddhist monks at various times directing armed struggle supported by the peasantry. Sihanouk claims there is plenty of evidence to prove that US plans for Cambodia include dividing the country up, with Thailand taking everything to the west of the Mekong river, South Vietnam everything to the east, and that had the Cambodian people not launched a vigorous and successful armed struggle this would already have taken place.

Ideological questions are of infinitely less importance to him than the question of national survival. This is the meeting of the minds between what are roughly known as the "Khmers Rouges" (Red Cambodians) and the Sihanoukists. Sihanouk is very philosophical about this.

In a recent interview with Irwin Silber, executive editor of the American Guardian (a small radical New York weekly) he said: "Some Western friends who came here to see me asked me why in my Government I have so few Sihanoukists and so many Marxist Cambodians—so many Reds and so few Sihanoukists. For instance, among the 11 members of my Government inside Cambodia in the liberated zone there are 10 Communists and one Sihanoukist, my cousin Prince Norodom Phoum Sana [for several years prior to the March 1970 coup, Cambodia's Foreign Minister]. "The most distinguished Sihanoukists are Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, those who betrayed me . . . I proposed that they be neutralist, progressive, but they preferred to be reactionary and to be pro-American, to be capitalist, to be very bourgeois. They do not like revolution. They do not like

progressivism. . . .

"The Cambodian Communists first, are very patriotic. They are Cambodians and they refuse to be named 'Communists.' They say they are progressive, they are Marxists. They like the theories of Karl Marx and want to have a good socialism for the people in order to wipe out social injustice, to have a strong, independent economy. Sihanouk for them means independence and neutrality, non-alignment for Cambodia. And they know that I have always fought for the independence of my country. I am a nationalist.

"The title of our state—republic or kingdom—is not important. What is important is the substance. The royal regime in the liberated zones is very democratic, very popular. In fact, no prince rules the liberated zone, only the people rule."

This is a rare public statement of what I know, from many private conversations on the subject, to be Sihanouk's inner thinking on his relations with the Left. Patriotism for him is everything. For many years he identified support for the monarchy with patriotism. If Lon Nol, in charge of internal as well as external security in the old days could fabricate evidence that the Left was turning against the monarchy, then Sihanouk turned against the left. Now he sees things differently.

"The future is not with me," he once told me. "It is certainly not with Lon Nol and his clique of traitors either. It is with our young Leftists. They are pure and patriotic." He was explaining at that time why he would go into retirement after the victory of the resistance struggle—a victory of which he has remained absolutely certain. For a considerable period, he rejected that idea of remaining Head of State. It was only when Ieng Sary arrived from the jungle headquarters late in 1971 and persuaded him that it was the unanimous desire of the resistance leadership that he continue as Head of State after victory that he accepted.

Contrasted to the degree of national unity—rare for any country—achieved within the resistance government is the disunity in the ranks of the Lon Nol regime. No matter what merits apologists for Lon Nol find in his regime, they cannot deny that it has been riven by dissensions at the top from the first months of the seizure of power. Sirik Matak, who co-authored the plot with Lon Nol and became Prime Minister, was soon dumped. Cheng Heng, former governor of Phnom Penh's central prison chosen by Lon Nol to succeed Sihanouk as Head of State is also in disgrace. Son Ngoc Thanh, head of the CIA-financed "Khmer Serei" who provided the shock troops for the March 18 coup and who aspired to be Head of State, was cast aside after a brief period as Prime Minister. In Tam who succeeded Cheng Heng as president of the National Assembly, now in open opposition to the regime. The heads of

rival clans have been at each other's throats throughout the three years since Sihanouk was overthrown.

The coup against Sihanouk was ostensibly because he had allowed the Vietcong to enter the frontier areas. It was the main charge at the trial "in absentia" at which the former Head of State was sentenced to death. But within six weeks, Cambodia was invaded by tens of thousands of Saigon troops, looting, raping, killing and destroying in order to maintain Lon Nol in power. Sihanouk was accused of having permitted the Vietcong or Vietminh to entrench themselves in bases along the frontier regions.

But Lon Nol has ceded, or at least not resisted the takeover, large areas in Svey Rieng and Prey Veng provinces to the Saigon regime, which are now included in South Vietnam's postal districts. The South Vietnamese base at Neak Luong, some 40 miles east of Phnom Penh is now known as Little Saigon. No Cambodians can enter the area.

It is with the certainty that he has the whole country behind him and that the Lon Nol regime cannot survive without foreign intervention that Sihanouk rejects any proposals for a ceasefire in Cambodia or negotiations with Lon Nol.

In Section 7 of the Draft Agreement finalised between Dr Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on October 17, 1972, and which presumably remains the basis for whatever new agreement has been negotiated, it is stated that:

"Foreign countries will cease all military activities in Laos and Cambodia, will withdraw from these two countries all their troops, their military advisers and military personnel, all arms, munitions and war material and will refrain from reintroducing them. The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos will be settled by their respective peoples without foreign interference." The final agreement, published on Wednesday, is in the same terms.

If outside military aid for the Lon Nol regime ends, it cannot survive, nor does it deserve to survive. The Royal Government of National Union, on the other hand will not only survive but will flourish once the bombings are halted and life in the rural areas returns to normal. The fable that the Khmer resistance movement is a "North Vietnamese invasion force" will be exposed for what it is worth. It is because of this that President Thieu in Saigon on Lon Nol's behalf has protested so strongly at the provisions of the Draft Agreement concerning Laos and Cambodia. As Thieu knows only too well, a regime propped up by foreign arms and dollars, inevitably falls once the supports are pulled out from under.

It is doubtful that an agreement contains anything which can provide much comfort for Lon Nol and his collaborators at the top in Phnom Penh.

WASHINGTON POST 6 February, 1973 *Secrecy Shrouds Laos Air War*

United Press International

A Pentagon spokesman said yesterday new Defense Secretary Elliot L. Richardson is still trying to find out why the air war in Laos should be kept so secret.

Spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said policy on the air war in Laos trans-

cends this building," indicating that the State Department and the White House are involved in the matter.

Friedheim said B-52 bombers and tactical aircraft have continued their strikes in Laos every day since the Vietnam ceasefire Jan. 27. Day by day, announcements of the strike are all that the Pentagon will make public.

What War Has Meant to Saigon

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 30—What did more than a decade of war accomplish for South Vietnam?

North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho has already called the Paris "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" a victory.

President Nixon called it peace with honor and asserted that "the people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future without outside interference."

Whatever the ultimate verdict of history, it seems evident that the prolonged conflict really changed very little in Vietnam.

The catalyst of war, of course, did bring many subtle changes and some major changes to South Vietnam and South Vietnamese society. It is easy to cite just a few.

Vast numbers of people moved into Saigon and other cities and towns. Large parts of rural Vietnam became sparsely populated and a largely peasant society became increasingly urban.

Armed Forces Multiply

The South Vietnamese armed forces grew vastly in size until today about one in every 17 South Vietnamese carries a gun for the Government—a staggering mobilization of military manpower.

A whole generation of non-Communist members of the social élite entered public life or the army, were discredited and discarded. Vietnam seems to have more retired generals and politicians per capita than any other country.

The years also brought a degradation of the quality of the Vietcong opposition. Although directed by Hanoi and ideologically loyal to it, the early insurgents were almost wholly indigenous to the South. Although few in numbers, they were impressively motivated, well led and subtle.

Today the leadership is heavily Northern, more brutal and less effective politically, many here believe.

Comparison of Assets

A scoreboard of tangible assets enjoyed by the competing Vietnamese factions is somewhat difficult to make—and, more important, tends to be misleading.

South Vietnam's armed forces now total about 1.1 million men, including 525,000 regular troops and 294,000 fairly well-trained Regional Force units. The United States estimates that 145,000 regular North Vietnamese troops are in the South, but Saigon says the number is about 300,000. There is a higher percentage of fighting riflemen among the Communist forces.

In any case, one lesson of the war was that numerical superiority meant little. Neither side has been able to achieve decisive results.

The Saigon army and paramilitary forces are much better equipped than in the past. This does not mean that they are significantly better led or better motivated. The collapse of some large units during last year's enemy offensive illustrated that old problems remain.

One thing that has seen astonishingly little change is the attitude of the South Vietnamese élite—the upper middle class that monopolizes power and privilege.

Before his death last year, an able American adviser, John Paul Vann, remarked to a friend, "The South Vietnamese are paying a price for years of stupidity. Some of them don't seem to learn."

The bourgeoisie, after having lived through years of "revolutionary" or political warfare, gives virtually no sign that it has recognized the need to make, or will make, any significant social reforms.

A modest land-reform program has been pushed, but one reason for this is that urban economic opportunity, war-born corruption and other privileges have made land less important to the ruling élite.

Their attitudes toward education, authority and privilege seem unchanged. The old American advice to "win hearts and minds" is hardly even given lip service anymore. South Vietnam remains what it was in the late nineteen-fifties, an inequitable society that functions poorly.

One weakness of the Ngo Dinh Diem Government was that it had no coherent ideology except a Confucian attitude that authority should be respected and an impenetrably complex philosophy called "personalism," which the public did not understand.

All these years later, the Government still does not have, or even claim to have, any ideology, except anti-Communism.

This will be a matter of major importance in the political struggle that will follow the cease-fire.


It is widely believed that non-Communists and anti-Communists made up a large majority of the South Vietnamese a decade ago and that this is just as true today. However, this seems to grow out of Vietnamese attitudes toward property, toward the intrusion of coercive authority and a general peasant conservatism.

That such attitudes can be changed under the impact of political indoctrination has been shown in many Communist states, such as North Vietnam, and in parts of South Vietnam as well.

One really major change in South Vietnam during the war has been the gravitation of a large majority of the popula-

REFUGEES FROM INDOCHINA WAR

(Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development, for figures on South Vietnam and Laos; Cambodian Government, for Cambodian figures.)



Cumulative Totals:

South-Vietnam—More than 6.5 million officially listed by U.S. Agency for International Development since 1964. U.S. Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees says 2 million more should be added to this.

Cambodia—More than 2 million (a "very conservative" figure, says Senate subcommittee)

Laos—More than 1 million.

The New York Times/Jan. 31, 1973

tion into areas of "relative security" under some measure of Government control.

If the terms of the cease-fire are honored, the Vietcong side will have a small population under its direct influence and will have to resort to clandestine activity in areas preponderantly controlled by the Government to achieve political conversions.

There is a great question, however, whether the South Vietnamese Government will be able to exploit its advantages. It has never shown an ability—or a recognition of the need—to respond to popular aspirations.

Like the late President Diem, President Nguyen Van Thieu

has placed a premium that amounts to a priority on loyalty to the presidential palace in selecting military and civil administrators. (Many of the provincial administrators are military anyway.) This has led to great attrition among officials but not to any notable improvement in the quality of government. The Vietcong political structure also does not seem to function well and has lost much of its old élan.

As an informed American said some years ago, "This is not a service Government—it doesn't see its role as doing things for people."

South Vietnam's enemies have not done well either in the last decade. The Communists won a great psychological victory in their 1968 offensive,

NEW YORK TIMES
26 January 1973

The South Vietnamese Economy: Depression and Joblessness Ahead

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

seriously eroding American support for the war. But they have never won a single strategic military victory, and relatively few tactical ones. One of their worst failures was that they could not prevent the slow drift of population away from areas they held. That many people moved out of fear, of allied bombs and firepower was true, but does not reduce the Communists' problem.

The amount of territory "held" by either side has gone up and down like a fever chart. Right now the amount of countryside not under Government control is quite large. All of this has a special relevance because of the cease-fire provisions, which essentially forbid further seizures of land.

The relevance of control is limited, however, because of factors that much of the world's public has never clearly understood.

There has always been a necessity during the war for troops to pull into tight defensive perimeters at night. They cannot occupy a "line" as in wars with fronts. There has also been a need in many insecure areas to patrol or move in large units. The result is that in large areas "control" has a limited definition.

If the cease-fire provision prohibiting all armed patrolling is honored, it will make it difficult to detect, much less deter, clandestine movements.

The most significant part of the agreement is the provision that the two South Vietnamese parties should agree to general elections to be conducted by a National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord.

There are so many dangers in this procedure for both sides that it seems difficult to believe that such an agreement will ever be reached.

As long as the elections can be delayed, the Government's police forces may well be strong enough to prevent serious political gains and subversion by the Communists. But the Government's position seems to political observers less strong if the elections are scheduled. Presumably, no agreement would be made by the Vietcong unless the agreement abolished those restrictions written into South Vietnamese election laws that tightly limit competition among South Vietnamese factions.

In a free atmosphere, the Communists would stand united and the non-Communists would probably split into many relatively weak parties. And, if the elections are intolerably delayed or evaded, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would have an excuse to resort to war again.

After a long war, South Vietnam is in some ways stronger than it was in late 1961 when American advisers and helicopters began arriving. Despite great losses and a resulting loss in the quality of personnel, the Vietcong have been heavily reinforced by North Vietnam, and are also strong.

The second Indochina war, therefore, cost much blood and suffering but settled almost nothing.

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 25—The peace agreement between North Vietnam and the United States has one provision that stood out as improbable when the Communists broadcast it in October. "Peace and national independence must be closely linked with the exercise of broad democratic freedoms," the Hanoi radio said, "including guarantees for the right to private ownership and for freedom of enterprise, as provided for in the said agreement."

Communist broadcasts do not often include such thoughts.

Thus the economy of South Vietnam will apparently be allowed to function in peace as it has been during the war — a concession that, on closer examination, seems as full of pitfalls as the peace agreement itself.

For most of the last decade, South Vietnam has been on a war economy. This has not meant price controls, constraints and shortages for anyone except the poor and propertyless, for, buoyed by large amounts of American aid, military spending and free-wheeling currency inflation, South Vietnamese and American entrepreneurs have made a great deal of money.

U.S. Money Withdrawn

As American troops and American money have been withdrawn over the years, however, the Government has been hard put to find new sources of money for investment or industrial development, and the prospects for either of these will remain dim for at least as long as South Vietnam's political future is doubtful.

The economy was dealt a severe blow when the North Vietnamese offensive began last April. Since then, despite a number of economic reforms begun in the last part of 1971, local businessmen and investors have held onto their money, done little building and laid off large numbers of factory workers while presumably waiting to see how things turn out. A million refugees, driven from their homes by the fighting, went on the dole.

Saigon is in what can only be called a depression, with many people out of work and short of money.

Prices have continued to rise at an annual rate of 23 per cent and most incomes have not risen correspondingly.

The outlook is that the economy will remain rather unhealthy, though not in danger of collapse.

Defense Spending Is Heavy

Why is this? First and most important, the national budget is heavily weighted to defense spending. Next year's budget of 436.5 billion piasters, or about \$1.6-billion, includes 324 billion piasters for defense, according

to official Government figures.

According to South Vietnamese officials, the Government does not plan to scale down its military establishment until at least another year has gone by. With 500,000 men in the regular army and more than a million carrying arms, the effects of sudden demobilization of large numbers of men for whom there are no jobs would be catastrophic.

A second reason for pessimism about the economic future is that, the budget deficit this year, was \$400-million and Government economists figure that it will be almost \$600-million, next year. American aid has made up the difference in the past and presumably will have to continue to fill the gap between the Government's tax collections and its expenditures.

In 1971, when there were hundreds of thousands of American soldiers here, they spent \$400-million at one time. There were 140,000 Vietnamese employed by Americans in jobs from laundresses and chauffeurs to interpreters, clerks, and office managers. Now about 50,000 are on American payrolls.

Troop Withdrawal Continuing

The Vietnamese have been adjusting to the gradual withdrawals of the last three years, however, and American officials here do not expect the catastrophic results from the withdrawal of the 23,700 American servicemen who are still in Vietnam.

Until alternative sources of income can be found, American aid will have to continue to make up the difference, according to officials here. "It is the responsibility of the United States Congress to do that much if they vote to ratify this settlement," said one, speaking of the peace agreement.

What about foreign investment? This has been courted by the South Vietnamese Government for the last few years, but so far the biggest potential investor — Japan — has not risked anything substantial.

The Japanese Honda motorcycles that clog Saigon's streets were imported not by Japanese entrepreneurs but by American and Vietnamese economic officials who needed them to soak up the floods of piasters that were being printed by the Government to finance the war during the peak years of the late nineteen-sixties. Now no Hondas are being imported.

Japanese newsmen and Japanese Embassy officials here were agreed that their Government would take a hand in providing aid after a cease-fire,

but all doubt that businessmen would join in with private investments until much later.

"The economy will follow, not lead, political and military events," one American official said. "Businessmen will wait and see, make a judgment on what's going to happen before they risk capital."

Before the war, South Vietnam's principal exports used to be rice and rubber. There is little international market for rice any more because other countries can grow enough of their own. In any case, because the war has driven so many people from the countryside into the cities, this country does not even produce enough for itself now.

The rubber plantations have been theaters of war this year — notably around An Loc, about 80 miles north of here, which used to be a rubber-processing town and is now in ruins — and in any case they provide only \$7-million to \$8-million in exports even before the war expanded in 1972.

So the postwar economy of South Vietnam is likely, for a while, to be more or less what it is now — an economy of subsistence, of small markets in the towns, of transportation of rice, vegetables, pork and fish, from the rural hamlets into the population centers, with a return flow of piasters and light manufactured goods back to the countryside.

Unforeseeable Factor

The unforeseeable factor in the future is this: With a cease-fire in place, will the flow be allowed to continue from, say, towns under Government control to villages under Communist control? This worries Government officers with responsibility for economic matters.

"What do we do about all these leopard spots?" one Vietnamese economist asked. "Even with the war this year, anywhere a commercial truck could go, the economy carried on more or less normally. What happens if the other side institutes its own currency in the areas it controls?"

"We've just begun to think about things like that," he added.

Probably even that would not be insurmountable for the Vietnamese, who have been trading through currency barriers for years along the Cambodian border — trading goods, piasters and rials without any great difficulty.

"We hope to be ready by the time the cease-fire takes effect," one Cabinet minister said not long ago. "I doubt if we'll make it."

WASHINGTON STAR

31 January 1973

SMITH HEMPSTONE

The Peace of Paris Is a Second-Hand Edsel

Knocking the Peace of Paris, which will extricate the United States from Vietnam and secure the release of the American prisoners of war, affords no pleasure.

And yet when one reads the fine print in the agreement and its four attached protocols, and studies the transcript of Henry Kissinger's marathon briefing of the press, one can only come to the conclusion that President Nixon and the good doctor have produced a peace which passeth all understanding, that they are peddling a second-hand Edsel as a Rolls-Royce.

One understands Nixon's predicament. He has said repeatedly that he will not be the first American president to "lose" a war, that he will not settle for anything short of an "honorable" peace. Therefore it follows that any Nixon peace is "honorable" by definition, that the Vietnam war has not been "lost."

Yet the Peace of Paris of

1973 bears an alarming resemblance to those earlier protocols on Indochina, the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, both of which were violated by the Communists virtually before the ink of the signatures was dry.

Aside from the unworkable monstrosity called the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord (in which each side will have a veto over the other and which can confidently be expected to produce neither reconciliation nor concord), there are two aspects of the agreement that really rankle.

One is the minor oversight in which no mention is made of the presence of 145,000 North Vietnamese regular troops within South Vietnam and hence no requirement is made for their withdrawal. Kissinger shrugged this off by saying that since the presence of foreign troops is forbidden in Laos and Cambodia and military movement across the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Viet-

nam is not allowed, "there is no way North Vietnam can live up to that agreement without there being a reduction of the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam."

Well and good. But who is going to see to it that these troops are not reinforced, re-equipped and resupplied in violation of the agreement? There will be a grand total of 48 Canadians, Hungarians, Poles and Indonesians to supervise the thousands of miles of the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia. There will be another 12 to oversee the DMZ. Hardly an airtight arrangement, which perhaps is why Kissinger laid such emphasis on "the spirit" with which the provisions must be implemented if they are to be successful.

The truth is, of course, that diplomacy can do more than reflect conditions on the ground. Since we and the South Vietnamese were unable to force the North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam militarily, there was no way

we could do it diplomatically. But that doesn't mean their presence increases the chances of peace.

The second point upon which one gags is Article 21 of Chapter VIII: "In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction" of North Vietnam. This danegeld reportedly will amount to \$2.5 billion over a five-year period, although Kissinger maintains that "the definition of any particular sum" has not been arrived at.

This means that part of the federal income tax of Nav. Lt. Everett Alvarez Jr., who for more than eight years refused to give the North Vietnamese more than his name, rank and serial number, will be earmarked for the rebuilding of his captors' country, a country against which 46,000 other Americans died fighting.

The situation is not analogous to those which obtained in post-World War II Germany and Japan. These nations had surrendered to us unconditionally and we were directly responsible for their economic, social and political well-being. For a parallel, one has to go back in American history to the years 1795-1801, when a weak and newly independent United States paid large sums of protection money to the Barbary pirates in a vain effort to safeguard our shipping in the Mediterranean, a situation which led an exasperated Charles Pinckney to exclaim, "Millions for defense, but not a damned penny for tribute!"

The terms which Nixon and Kissinger obtained probably were the best that were to be had, if only because the war had been lost politically here at home long ago, if not on the battlefields of Indochina. We can be grateful, then, that our prisoners are coming home and that America is finally extricated from a war she lacked the will to win.

The Geneva accords of 1954 ended France's eight-year struggle against communism in Indochina. The Paris agreement of 1973 ends the 10-year American involvement. Now the South Vietnamese are going to have to hack it themselves. But to pretend that the Peace of Paris is "honorable" or that it is likely to end the fighting in Indochina is, well, stretching things a bit.

LONDON TIMES

13 Jan. 1973

American fuel oil found insufficient for peak bombing of N Vietnam

From Ian McDonald
Washington, Jan 12

One factor prompting President Nixon to halt the intensive bombing of North Vietnam above the twentieth parallel, it was learnt here today, was the strain the offensive was throwing on the already severe shortage of fuel oil in the United States.

The Administration had estimated that it would be necessary to make an initial purchase of between four million and 4.5 million barrels of fuel for the Air Force to maintain an all-out offensive against North Vietnam. To continue the offensive until March, it was calculated, would require a total of between seven million and 7.5 million barrels.

Because of the already drastic shortages of fuel oil in the United States, however, the Administration found it could only be assured of an initial supply of some 800,000 barrels, less than sufficient to keep the air war at its peak level.

The strain that the Vietnam war has thrown on fuel reserves in the United States has been one of the less appreciated side-effects of the conflict. It reached a peak this winter because a wave of unusually cold weather has prevailed throughout much of the country, sending the domestic demand for fuel oil soaring.

In New York recently three major airlines had to curtail operations because of shortages of fuel and the Middle West has been badly affected by restrictions on the supply of fuel oil for homes.

President Nixon's forthcoming message on energy resources will, it is reported, recommend that many of the nation's electric power plants should be converted from oil to coal burning.

This, coupled with the "selective and temporary relaxation" of some air pollution standards, could result in a saving of some 2.2 million barrels of oil a day by 1980, according to an estimate of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Peter Hazelhurst writes from Saigon: After employing their giant B52 bombers on raids over North Vietnam in recent weeks, the Americans have suddenly been forced to divert most of them on to targets only 30 miles away from Saigon.

A spokesman for the United States Command announced today that the majority of the available B52 bomber force was yesterday engaged in dropping an estimated 1,250 tons of bombs over communist advance positions in five square miles of jungle 30 miles north-north-west of Saigon. Against these targets in Binh Duong province 14 missions were flown from the B52

bases in Guam and Thailand. (A mission consists of three B52s, each capable of carrying 30 tons of bombs.)

This announcement coincides with reports that the South Vietnamese expect a communist offensive in the area and from the adjoining province of Tay Ninh before a ceasefire comes into force. Both provinces adjoin the border of Cambodia.

The spokesman said that the remainder of the B52 force available in South-East Asia flew 12 missions over targets in North Vietnam and another seven over other areas of South Vietnam.

Richard Wigg writes from Paris: Another marathon session lasting six hours was held today by Dr Henry Kissinger and Mr Le Duc Tho, in their search for a ceasefire agreement in Vietnam.

The optimism sensed after yesterday's six hour meeting was further encouraged today by a visible welcome from a North Vietnamese official when Dr Kissinger and his team arrived for today's session. The chief negotiators have now negotiated for more than 27 hours since they resumed contacts on Monday after the American bombing of North Vietnam.

There will be no weekend break and the two men are to meet again tomorrow.

WASHINGTON POST
1 February, 1973
Victor Zorza

... And an Imbalance of Power?

WITH VIETNAM out of the way, the Nixon administration has embarked on the slow and intricate task of building the world balance of power that is to preserve the peace "for a generation and more," as Mr. Nixon hopes.

The balance, to be made up of the world's five major powers—the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and Europe—is, at best, an uncertain and unstable thing and, at worst, in the view of the administration's critics, downright dangerous. The mutual interdependence of the five powers could, in the event of a breakdown in the balance between any two of them, cause the trouble to spread throughout the whole international system like wildfire, more rapidly, more uncontrollably than ever.

Mr. Nixon's answer to "those who scoff at balance of power diplomacy" is simple. "The only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance." Speaking with the end of the war in Vietnam in sight, he explained recently that the rare opportunity to create an international system of stability and lasting peace arose from "precisely the fact that the elements of balance now exist."

But what are these elements? The few remarks that Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have allowed themselves to make on the most important subject of international politics are so brief, so uninformative, as to defy intelligent discussion. If serious students "scoff" at the administration's grand notions, it is because they are allowed to see only the shadow and not the substance.

The secrecy which might have been justifiable in the case of Kissinger's

trips to Peking and to Moscow, and in the Paris negotiations, has been stretched to cover the broad concepts of foreign policy which ought to be, in a democracy, open to public debate and challenge. It is becoming almost as difficult to analyze the administration's thinking as the Kremlin's—which may be fun for Kremlinologists, but is hardly conducive to the shaping of sound policies.

The "elements of balance" about which Mr. Nixon is so reticent are to be found in the belief of administration officials that the Vietnam settle-

"What the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy did... was not to balance Russia and China, but to play them off against each other."

ment was made possible by China's fear of Russia. Kissinger's closest associate in the Paris talks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, believes that Peking promoted a settlement because it feared that Indochina might come to be dominated by Hanoi and susceptible to Moscow. He omitted to add that Russia promoted a settlement for precisely the opposite reason, out of fear that China might come to dominate the area.

What the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy did, with consummate skill, was not to balance the two, but to play them off against each other. Is this the pattern for the "balance of power diplomacy" in the world at large of which Mr. Nixon speaks? Before his visits to Moscow and Peking, he sought to reassure

his hosts by declaring that he did not want to set them at each other's throats.

The fact remains that their mutual hostility was the most important factor in making both his visits a success. The United States is hardly likely to forego the opportunity to exploit their enmity so long as it continues. The "structure of peace" between the Communist powers and the United States in the post-Vietnam world rests in the shaky foundations of the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

The balance between the five great powers is often viewed as a state of equilibrium in which their previously conflicting interests have been brought into correspondence. But the classical notion of the balance of power involves a dynamic relationship between three countries of varying strength. Where one power strives for supremacy, and looks like achieving it, the second power, the third power, adds its own weight to that of the weaker country, in order to prevent a dangerous accumulation of strength in the hands of the first. This is, by its very nature, a constantly changing and shifting relationship, which is made much more changeable by the rapid pace of economic and technological growth in the modern world.

So the first condition for the manipulation by the United States of the world balance of power is the maintenance of imbalance. This is what the other four powers, including Japan and Europe, will increasingly suspect, with distrust rising to hostility, unless the United States offers soon a detailed explanation of its thinking in support of its claims that such suspicions are groundless.

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NEW YORK TIMES
26 January 1973

Vietnam Aftermath

It's over. Or at least it is supposed to be tomorrow; completion and announcement of agreement between the United States and North Vietnam did not deter final, senseless acts of combat just before the cease-fire is to take effect.

The very notion of an end to the Vietnam war is hard to comprehend in the abstract, so accustomed have we all become to the outpouring of spirit, wealth and manhood which the decade past has demanded of us.

This Republic has learned much about itself, about its leaders, about the world and the meaning of power from the ordeal it suffered in mountains and rice paddies halfway around the globe. Not all the lessons are comforting—in fact few of them are.

If Vietnam is to have any meaning at all, these lessons must be defined and absorbed by a coming generation just as the problems of the war dominated the sensitivities of the generation now maturing. "No More Vietnams" has already become a sort of national battle cry. It is now the country's great task to ensure that this expression of hope will be turned into reality.

Vietnam spanned the era of American foreign policy after World War II, from the epoch when the prime objective was "containment" of international Communism, to the present day when co-existence with Com-

munist is seen as possible, necessary and desirable—for mutual benefit and survival. The Communist world, too, has evolved. The United States might not have gone into Vietnam had the depth of schism between the Soviet Union and China been clearly perceived; it could not have come out safely if this schism had not become the dominant reality to both Moscow and Peking. Some will argue that America's firmness in Vietnam has hastened the growth of a less overtly menacing form of national Communism; it certainly did not retard this evolution, as pessimistic Americans feared it would.

When President Kennedy led the nation into what became an open-ended military commitment to a struggling small state, the United States Government was confident in its own power and skill, and it enjoyed the confidence of the American people. As President Nixon succeeds finally in extracting the nation, poorer and wiser, from the commitment, confidence is not a sentiment in surplus across the land.

Americans today have learned to distrust the notion of a war to end wars. Yet it is possible to retain a certain faith. It may not be empty rhetoric to believe that the scars of Vietnam can bring new strength as they heal, strength gathered in a clearer definition of the priorities for the use of national power. Strength can come from a more precise evaluation of the possibilities and limitations inherent in that power. And strength can spring from understanding, from tolerance and from humility.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 February 1973
CROSBY S. NOYES

Democracy in Asia Continues Its Sad Demise

Is it an inevitable part of the American retreat from Asia that democracy in that part of the world is doomed?

There is evidence enough to support the argument. Since the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine of limited commitment, since the reduction of American military power in the Western Pacific area, since the withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of American predominance in Asia, the trend against democratic government has been impressive.

Not that there were so many democracies to begin with. In South Korea, democratic government under Syngman Rhee and his successors always has been a fragile flower and now, under President Park Chung Hee, apparently has been definitely discarded. No one could ever have accused the Nationalist Chinese bastion of Taiwan, for all its achievements, of respecting the rules of self-government.

The Philippines has had a go at it, and it has been a miserable failure. The proclamation of martial law and the assumption of one-man rule by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos are hailed by most of his countrymen as an inevitable and desirable development.

The same pattern applies to the rest of Southeast Asia. Anyone who looks forward to the development of the democratic ideal anywhere — in Indonesia, in Singapore, in Laos and Cambodia, in Thailand and Burma — probably is nourishing a dying illusion. Everywhere, it seems, the move toward totalitarianism as a defense against communism is the order of the day.

Oddly enough, the exception so far among the Southeast Asian states is South Vietnam. Listening to American liberals, one could well come to the conclusion that the Saigon regime is the least democratic in the area. But the fact is that for a nation imminently threatened in its existence, the record of the Saigon regime has been extraordinarily — in Asian terms — liberal.

In the midst of mortal war, constitutional conventions have been held, elections organized, an opposition tolerated in politics and the press. In one of the very few instances in history, the authority of a government fighting for its life has been severely circumscribed in the measures that it has been able to take in its own self-defense.

This, to be sure, may not last much longer. The departure of the American presence has been marked in Vietnam,

as elsewhere, by a move toward authoritarian government by those who are being left on their own. It is fairly predictable the government in Saigon will become increasingly centralized — and also quite possibly increasingly repressive — in the months to come. And, distressing as this may be to the liberal community in this country, it will appear as elementary common sense to the great majority of Vietnamese.

There are exceptions, to be sure. In South Vietnam, as in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere, there are some who deplore the demise of the democratic idea that flourished for a brief period of American predominance in the postwar era. There are even some who believe that the present trend toward totalitarianism is not irreversible and that the United States has an opportunity and an obligation to do something about it.

I have a letter from Kim Dae Jung, the young South Korean legislator who unsuccessfully opposed President Park in the elections of 1971; bitterly protesting Park's recent seizure of dictatorial powers and blaming American policy to a large degree.

The problem, as Kim sees it, is that Asian democracy is little more than a byproduct of

American victory in World War II and that the United States has been highly indiscriminating in backing any government which proclaims itself to be anti-Communist, regardless of how dictatorial it may be. As a result, "democratic forces in Asian countries have been attacked by communism on the left and by dictatorship on the right and were unable to take root."

The effort of the Nixon administration to normalize relations with Communist China and the withdrawal of American power from Asia have accelerated the trend toward authoritarian government. In Kim's view, this has "tended to hasten 'democratic' leaders of Asia to take drastic measures to consolidate their powers along the line of military dictatorship in dealing with Communist leaders in the course of political confrontation instead of developing the growth of democratic institutions."

In the case of South Korea, Kim is quite right. President Park's seizure of power certainly was precipitated by the uncertainties provoked by the shifting American policy and by developing contacts with the Communist North which pose a potential threat to political stability in the South. To some extent, it also is true of the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam, all of which seem headed down the path of military dictatorship.

Kim remains mildly hopeful that in time the combined influence of the United States and Japan may swing the pendulum back toward a revival of Asian democracy. The alternative, as he sees it, is that Japan itself will relapse into militaristic authoritarianism, with consequences for Asia and the rest of the world that cannot be foreseen.

WASHINGTON STAR
26 January 1973

Philippine Tragedy

The saddest thing about the death of democracy in the Philippines is that Ferdinand E. Marcos is probably right: A very great majority of his countrymen want him to run the country indefinitely as an absolute dictator.

At any rate, he has accommodated them with a vengeance. By proclamation, Marcos has now extended a national state of martial law and abolished the parliament indefinitely. Elections that were scheduled for next November will not be held. By his own order, he has assumed the offices of both president and prime minister which he proposes to exercise for at least the next seven years — or until "normalcy" is restored in the country. Martial law, says Marcos, will be maintained "only as long as necessary," which, on the record, could mean forever.

Many will say that the people of the Philippines have asked for it — Marcos, for one. He is only bowing to what he claims is the overwhelming mandate of

the people, given him under a government-organized "opinion poll" in which several million Filipinos expressed their approval by a show of hands. More total contempt for the democratic process would be hard to imagine.

To be sure, the Philippines have never been the showplace of Asian democracy that Americans have liked to think their former colony represented. Corruption in politics and in the everyday life of the country was rampant. Anarchy was the order of the day and a total disregard for the elements of law and order was more or less taken for granted.

Marcos has provided a remedy — of a sort. By suppressing every element of the press he may be able to assure effective government and even possibly bring about the new, reformed society that he has been promising. Yet Marcos himself is now the victim of the greatest corruption of all — the corruption of absolute power. And his countrymen, very surely, will suffer for it.

WASHINGTON POST
31 JANUARY 1973

Robert H. Johnson

Will 'Peace With Honor' Lead to Peace With Bombs?

"I said . . . that I did not want to speculate on North Vietnamese motives; I have too much trouble analyzing our own." — Henry Kissinger at his January 24 press conference.

From one point of view, the Vietnam cease-fire agreement is a magnificent achievement. Its bewildering array of organizations, principles and processes permits us to argue without fear of contradiction that — as the President said in his speech to the nation — the U.S. has achieved "the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor." At the same time, it allows the Communists to claim victory because it removes the U.S. from the ground in Indochina while leaving Communist political and military elements in place and offering them excellent prospects for future success.

The agreement seeks to initiate a series of processes leading eventually

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to reconciliation and peace. But it is upon cooperation between two antagonists who refuse to recognize each other's legitimacy. The prospects are that disagreements will lead to the stalling and rapid breakdown of the various joint commissions and supervisory bodies; no elections will be held; no agreed reports on cease-fire violations are likely, and so forth.

SAIGON MAY TAKE the initiative, through assassinations and other actions against Communist elements, to provoke Communist responses. The Communists, in turn, may revert to a program of assassinations of government officials and other kinds of low-level guerrilla activity. In this situation the temptation to raise the military ante will be strong, especially for Saigon which may believe that it has a temporary military advantage.

In view of U.S. responsibility for the situation in Indochina, no morally sensitive American can contemplate the likelihood of continued hostilities with equanimity. But the key question for most Americans will be whether the cease-fire agreement will end our military involvement in the struggle. For an answer, we must examine the issue Dr. Kissinger refused to address in his press conference — the question of the motivations of North Vietnam and the U.S.

WE CAN ASSERT with assurance, on the basis of history and the statements made by the North Vietnamese leaders since the announcement of the agreement, that Hanoi will not give up the struggle. Moreover, it seems genuinely to view the new context of the struggle as one promising ultimate

victory for the Communist cause. Reports indicate that Communist elements in the South have been directed to lie low for the next two to five months.

That period evidently is judged to be the interval required for the physical and the psychological disengagement of the U.S. from the war. (On the same reasoning, the Saigon government may see the two-five months as the period during which it must re-assure itself of continuing U.S. support by engaging in provocations to produce Communist "violations" of the cease-fire; violations which will be utilized to stimulate U.S. reprisals.)

As Dr. Kissinger's statement implies, there has been, and continues to be, a great deal of ambiguity as to ultimate U.S. purposes. Ever since the Nixon administration first announced its basic Vietnam policies in November 1969, there has been a serious question as to whether President Nixon gives priority to ending ALL U.S. involvement in the war or priority to ensuring the indefinite continuation of a non-Communist regime in Saigon.

IN THE U.S. government, this kind of question is seldom answered in the abstract, at least in a meaningful sense. Rather, policy-makers develop certain predispositions which become evident only when they confront concrete situations. One such concrete situation was the conclusion of a tentative agreement last October. That agreement, like the final one, suggested, if taken at face value, that the U.S. was giving priority to ending its involvement through a "soft" settlement. But it was precisely this softness that appears to have evoked the President's concern and led to the devastation bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong. Kissinger evidently had read the President's motivations somewhat inaccurately.

Reading U.S. motivations as they affect our future actions in Indochina is a science that is little more advanced than Kremlinology or the reading of tea leaves. But during the months of negotiations there have been some indicators. All tend to suggest that we take the agreement very seriously and that we can be expected to react strenuously to significant "violations" of it. Some of these indicators are these:

- One of the issues over which the tentative agreement broke down was the size and freedom of action of the

international supervisory force. The President evidently sees that force as a significant deterrent to violations and as a mechanism that will provide the rationale for U.S. unilateral enforcement action should violations occur.

- In the late fall, several hundred Foreign Service Officers with prior service in Vietnam were alerted for return to Vietnam. They were to provide the U.S. with a unilateral inspection force for the post cease-fire period. Emplacing Foreign Service officers in the countryside may make a great deal of sense if you want to cite the Communists for every violation and intend to counter, or retaliate for, such violations. It makes no sense at all if you expect an ultimate communist takeover and hope it will proceed relatively quietly and unnoticed.

- It was reported in the fall that the U.S. would put its substantial military advisory group into civilian clothing and leave it in Vietnam, thus bypassing in a formal sense the requirement for removal of all U.S. military personnel. This tactic has been employed in Laos and it offers the same prospect for continuing U.S. engagement in Vietnam as it did in Laos.

- It was reported last week that substantial American air forces will be retained in the Indochina area for the indefinite future, thus assuring us the means for military retaliation for violations of the agreement.

These actions suggest that the cease-fire agreement is not intended as a veil behind which we will quietly stave away with our POW's, but as a seriously enforceable arrangement which could ensure the peace of Indochina and offer very substantial hope for the survival of a non-Communist government in Saigon.

If this is an accurate conclusion — and if, as it appears, Mr. Nixon is very sensitive to the possibility that the adverse actions of others constitute personal and national challenges of will — then the continuation of the military and political conflict in the three Indochinese states will mean a very high likelihood of U.S. military re-involvement. We shall be bombing to keep the peace.

It could be argued that the cease-fire agreement and the rhetoric that has accompanied its publication have shifted public opinion in a way that restricts presidential freedom of action. But can one be sure of a negative public response to a presidential appeal that bombing or other military action is essential "to preserve the peace" that the cease-fire agreement had supposedly achieved? Perhaps the most powerful deterrent to U.S. military re-involvement is the certainty that renewed bombing would produce new American POW's whom we would have to extricate through new negotiations and new agreements.

Outlook for S. Vietnamese Elections Is

Dubious

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, Jan. 26 — Free elections are supposed to provide South Vietnam with stable and lasting institutions. But there is good reason to believe that meaningful elections of any kind will not take place for a long time, if ever.

The timing and type of elections are left up to the two rival South Vietnamese administrations to settle by "unanimity."

The body designated to organize elections, the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, is supposed to include equal numbers of Saigon, Vietcong and neutralist members. But, both South Vietnamese sides have reiterated their seemingly irreconcilable views on what kinds of elections they want.

Presidential Vote

Saigon Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam again this week announced that his government favors presidential elections within three months. This is a natural enough option since President Thieu figures that the Vietcong could not manage to win such a contest so soon after the cease-fire.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) foreign minister said she favors elections for a constituent assembly. That implies lengthy haggling to

write a new constitution before further elections to give the country lasting institutions.

Although she was careful not to spell out her reasons, they are evident. The Vietcong knows that it may take

News Analysis

years for it to win free elections and thus would prefer a parliamentary regime, in which its voice could be heard, to a presidential system in which an anti-Communist leader could rule much as he pleased. Furthermore, by dragging out the whole institutional process the Vietcong obviously hopes to increase its control in the countryside and — thanks to the cease-fire — organize effectively in the cities for the first time.

With rival, zones controlled by the two administrations, there is likely to be serious economic dislocation. Anti-Communist economists for years have favored quick elections in which U.S. aid money could help keep alive the impression of relative prosperity. If elections are delayed, the economists reasoned, the Thieu government and anti-Communist neutralists would have a hard time maintaining this.

Meanwhile, for an open-ended period, the Vietcong is unlikely to insist on im-

portant posts in the transition machinery. Given the seeming built-in paralysis of any transition government, the Vietcong would probably prefer to pose as defenders of law, order and efficient administration and criticize those in power with an eye to winning over the still-suspicious population.

Judging from the disgruntled neutralist exiles here, this scenario has been unfolding at an increasingly rapid pace since the false hopes of peace in October.

The three-month delay in signing the cease-fire agreement may indeed have been justified in the eyes of Presidents Thieu and Nixon, but the neutralists do not share this view. The two presidents used the time to prepare the army and administration psychologically for the end of the American military presence, to flood the country with military equipment and to prove U.S. seriousness in guaranteeing the agreement by giving Hanoi a violent taste of this determination with the December bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

For the neutralists, the delay has meant the tightening up of President Thieu's already considerable "full powers" shoved through a reluctant Parliament in June.

Among the principal victims of Thieu's stepped up police activities have been key neutralists who had a

potentially large political following after a cease-fire. The agreement leaves the release of all political detainees up to the two rival administrations all giving Thieu a veto over their fate.

In view of their past performance, neither the Vietcong nor the Thieu government can be expected to apply to the letter the agreement's Article 11 enjoining them to "insure" freedom of the press, speech, meeting, organization, political activity, residence, etc.

As time goes on, there should be no surprise if more and more previously uncommitted Vietnamese side with the Vietcong. The Vietcong can be expected to exploit their frustration to the fullest by wooing the uncommitted to isolate the Thieu government.

A prominent neutralist exile in Paris who had planned on returning to Saigon immediately after the cease-fire to serve on the national council this week had second thoughts.

"I suppose I should have been wiser after so many disappointments," he said when it became clear the neutralists were being eliminated from serious consideration. "I should have known that a dirty war would only end in a dirty peace, if you can call a cease-fire peace."

NEW YORK TIMES
31 January 1973

Truce but No Truce...

The Vietnam tragedy pursues its course. Casualty rolls, American and Vietnamese, cannot yet be closed after all. Political machinery for cease-fire supervision, so intricately elaborated in advance, seems clogged with feuds over credentials, landing permits and protocol. The governments say cease-fire but the fighting sputters on.

No one expected the Vietnam war to end tidily. As long as the cease-fire documents did not draw a specific map of on-the-ground control—and the circumstances would not permit such a delineation—last-minute grabs for position across South Vietnam were fully expected. But the intensity of small-unit fighting these last two days stretches the anticipated untidiness to the limit.

Just five years ago the Vietnamese Communists launched their epic Tet offensive. Already Tet has assumed the stature of turning point in the Second Indochina War, as the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu was in the first. The parallels between these two prolonged battles are far from exact; indeed, Tet marked as much a collapse of North Vietnam's expectations as it did those of the United States. In Tet of 1968, both sides could have seen that their military pretensions were unrealistic, that neither side could win a military victory. It took five years less two days for that realization to be embodied in truce. But the futility of military action seems still to be eluding those on the battlefield.

The coming days are a moment of acute danger for the United States Government, both for the policy-makers of the executive branch and for the Congress. In a dozen actions and small decisions, the future relationship between the United States and South Vietnam is now being defined. How responsible is Washington to be for enforcing the truce if the international machinery cannot function? Can Saigon expect American support in maintaining or regaining positions threatened by assault after the cease-fire?

Has the United States removed itself from the Vietnam power struggle, or not? It was ominous Sunday to hear the American negotiator, William H. Sullivan, stress that this country is under "no inhibitions" if the truce breaks down or fails to catch. He cited the American air units in Thailand and the Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast as implicit warning to North Vietnam.

It is imperative that the future American role and responsibility in South Vietnam be defined clearly and deliberately by the nation's top political leadership. Otherwise a series of individual de facto decisions, some at a low level, could create a new relationship that may not be fully intended. The State Department spokesman has admitted that "everything is new—solutions to problems, if any, will have to be worked out on the ground." To avoid getting caught up in commitments creeping steadily upwards—it has happened before in Vietnam—the President might take Congress and the public into his confidence for a change, and state what this country's future role in Vietnam is to be.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 January 1973

The Cease-Fire Accords and Beyond: Some

Questions and Answers

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25—The cease-fire agreement between Hanoi and Washington, which President Nixon has said will "end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," will be signed in Paris Saturday and go into effect that evening.

Following is an assessment, in question and answer form, of the agreement and the current situation in Southeast Asia:

Q. What does the agreement add up to?

A. In essence, it provides for a halt in the Vietnam fighting on Saturday, and for the withdrawal of the remaining 23,700-man American force and the release of about 600 American prisoners, both within 60 days. A host of provisions have been agreed upon to carry out these moves and an intricate political machinery has been established to bring about a reconciliation of the Communist and anti-Communist Vietnamese.

Q. What about the prisoners? Does the release of the approximately 600 American prisoners have anything to do with the release of the thousands of political prisoners in South Vietnamese jails?

A. No, the North Vietnamese at one point in the negotiations apparently sought such a linkage, but the final agreement provides for the release of American prisoners over a 60-day period parallel only with the withdrawal of American forces. The release of Vietnamese civilian prisoners will be negotiated between the Vietcong and Saigon over a 90-day period. It is believed, however, that Washington will use its influence on Saigon to release at least some of these prisoners.

Q. Will American civilian workers remain in South Vietnam, and how many?

A. Economic advisers and noncombat civilian military technicians may remain, such as aviation mechanics. Some estimates have ranged as high as 5,000 to 10,000 men.

Q. Will the military aspects be carried out as scheduled? That is, will a cease-fire actually go into effect, and will the troops and prisoners come home?

A. All signs suggest that the cease-fire will last at least for a few months and there seems no reason to doubt that the Americans will be leaving South Vietnam.

Q. What about the political provisions? Can the Vietcong and the Saigon Government actually resolve their differences?

A. Leading Washington experts on Vietnam have been debating those questions in recent days. Some believe it is out of the question to expect any reconciliation. Others believe that both sides, at least at first, will make a major show of

amity, so that if the truce collapses, the other side will be blamed.

Q. The United States and North Vietnam have been holding negotiations for nearly five years. How did the agreement come about, and why now?

A. Basically, the agreement came about because both Washington and Hanoi decided that more was to be gained from a negotiated settlement than from continuing the war and pressing for demands that were unacceptable to the other side. As a result, both sides made significant concessions, which opened the door to an eventual settlement. In addition, there were other factors, such as recognition of the military stalemate, pressure from other world powers, and a growing fatigue with the war in both countries.

Q. What concessions were made by the two sides?

A. The chief American concession was the decision in October, 1970, by Mr. Nixon to drop the long-standing American demand for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam at the same time American forces were pulled out. Hanoi's chief concession came last October in Paris when Le Duc Tho informed Henry A. Kissinger that North Vietnam was no longer insisting on the creation of a coalition government, including Communists, before a cease-fire in South Vietnam.

Q. What was the significance of those moves?

A. By ending its insistence on a mutual withdrawal of forces, Washington signaled Hanoi that it was willing to accept a settlement in which the Vietcong, protected by North Vietnamese troops, would be able to claim part of South Vietnam for itself. Last October, North Vietnam acknowledged that it would no longer hold out for an agreement in which the future government of South Vietnam would be settled ahead of time in a way favorable to the Communists. In other words, both sides were accepting an accord with no guarantee for the future.

Q. What about other factors, such as the influence of other powers?

A. Both Washington and Hanoi were under pressure from other countries to end the Vietnam war. Administration officials here believe that both the Soviet Union and China exerted their influence to persuade Hanoi to switch the war from the military to the political field and relax the tensions in the area. Likewise, as the result of the settlement, Washington expects to improve its ties with Peking and Moscow, which had been somewhat strained—particularly in Peking's case—by their support for Hanoi. American relations with some allies had also been damaged by the war and may now be repaired.

Q. Does this mean that Peking and Moscow will now join with Washington in "keeping the peace" in Indochina?

A. Mr. Nixon would certainly like some kind of tacit understanding from the two Communist powers to limit arms shipments into the area, but it is probably too early to tell if this will happen. Neither Moscow nor Peking in the past has wanted to appear to be letting Hanoi down. And North Vietnam undoubtedly will be making requests for military equipment to replenish what was lost in the heavy fighting last year.

Q. Hanoi said the agreement was "a victory" for its side; Mr. Nixon said the accord meets all his goals, and President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, who publicly opposed an agreement, says it is to his advantage in some respects. Who actually benefits the most from the agreement?

A. The main achievement of the negotiators was in securing an agreement that was ambiguous enough for each side to find grounds to assert that it got what it wanted.

Q. Such as?

A. The agreement provides for example, the recognition of the demilitarized zone, along the border of the two Vietnams, as a temporary dividing line. This satisfies Hanoi's claim that Vietnam should be unified, presumably under Hanoi's direction. But the accord also says that unity can be achieved only by political means, not military, and since Saigon will not agree to unity with Hanoi, the "temporary" demilitarized zone could turn out to be permanent.

Q. But what if a Communist Government took power in Saigon and chose unification with Hanoi? Is this possible? What would the United States do?

A. Under agreement, it is theoretically possible for elections to be held and for Vietcong supporters to ride to power, but since Mr. Thieu's army controls the cities and most other populated areas, the chances that Communists would win an election seem remote. What is more likely is a period of political maneuvering and subversion of established organizations by Vietcong agents, seeking to put in power a "neutralist" group that would be open to Communists takeover. The American view at the moment is that the agreement gives Mr. Thieu and other anti-Communists a good chance of surviving,

and if they can't do it, they have no justification for seeking American military intervention.

Q. What about the agreement? Could it have been achieved four years ago, when Mr. Nixon first took office?

A. Not in its present form. At that time, Hanoi was pressing very hard for political concessions that would give it power, in return for the release of American prisoners and an end to the fighting.

Q. Why did Hanoi make its apparent compromise offer in October, which led to the nine-point draft agreement?

A. No one here seems to know with certainty. But the guessing at the White House is that the "dove" faction in the Hanoi Politburo prevailed with the argument that a military stalemate had developed, and that Mr. Nixon would be easy to deal with on the eve of the elections last November.

Q. Why did not the United States actually sign the nine-point draft by Oct. 31?

A. Mr. Kissinger said that certain modifications were needed to remove any possible ambiguities.

Q. Is the agreement that was made public yesterday much different from the October draft?

A. Its basic provisions are the same, but it does contain some alterations that Mr. Kissinger says were "substantially" what

he sought in October. Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's negotiator, said that the agreement was "basically the same" as that reached in October.

Q. Assuming that Mr. Kissinger is accurate, why did it take three months to negotiate only modifications?

A. There are two different interpretations: one from Washington and the other from Hanoi. The United States says that after Mr. Nixon sought modifications, the "hawks" in Hanoi probably suspected a trick and ordered Mr. Tho to delay signing any agreement and to argue strongly against any proposals made by the United States. Hanoi says that Washington, acting for Mr. Thieu, sought language which would have worked to the advantage of Saigon and against the Vietcong.

In any event, with mutual recriminations, the talks broke down on Dec. 13, and Mr. Nixon ordered heavy bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong from Dec. 18 to 29. The talks resumed on Jan. 8 and a settlement was quickly achieved.

Q. This chronology could suggest that the bombing led to Hanoi's virtual capitulation and the quick nego-

The Political Struggle

By Anthony Lewis

AT HOME ABROAD

tiation of an agreement. Is that, in fact, what happened?

A. It is hard to tell from the information available. Mr. Kissinger himself declined, at his conference, to draw such a conclusion, but other Administration officials believe that Mr. Nixon's show of strength did convince Hanoi that it would gain nothing by holding out.

What is missing from the story is a detailed analysis of what proposals were on the negotiating table before Dec. 13, when the talks broke down, and when the talks resumed on Jan. 8. It has not been disclosed, for example, if the United States softened its position in January, or otherwise compromised in a way that accelerated an accord.

Q. Are there any policing mechanisms in the agreement to make sure that it is carried out?

A. The accord sets up three commissions, including a 1,160-man force of Canadians, Hungarians, Indonesians and Poles, to observe that the provisions are carried out.

Q. But what happens if violations are found?

A. The violators can be publicly identified, but there are no punitive provisions in the agreement. Obviously, it can only remain in effect so long as it meets the interests of the various parties.

Q. What if, after a while, Hanoi violates the accord and sends men and supplies to the South? Will the war start all over again?

A. It is possible, and Mr. Nixon said this was "a fragile" agreement. The United States, however, is hoping that Saigon will be better able this time to defend itself from the North and will not need to turn to the United States again. Also, there is an expectation that Russia and China will discourage Hanoi from taking such a course of action.

Q. Does Washington have any direct influence on Hanoi as the result of this agreement?

A. At least indirectly, it does. For instance, Hanoi is aware that the United States will maintain air bases in Thailand and naval and air forces off the coast aboard Seventh Fleet ships. In case of an all-out Hanoi attack against South Vietnam, Mr. Nixon might order air attacks against the north.

To balance this potential "stick," the United States has pledged to spend about \$7.5-billion over the next five years in Southeast Asia, of which up to \$2.5-billion would be spent in North Vietnam. This is the "carrot" of American policy, and officials here are hoping that this combination of threat and enticement will help persuade North Vietnam to abide by the cease-fire.

Q. The accord allows North Vietnam, however, to keep 145,000 troops in South Vietnam. Do they not form a dangerous threat to the Saigon Gov-

PARIS—In thinking about the cease-fire in Vietnam, Americans quite naturally wonder whether the enforcement apparatus will be swift and effective enough to stop Communist violations. But it is important to recognize that the other side has its own interest in enforcement of the Paris agreement.

The truce was made possible by a Hanoi decision to move essentially from a military to a political contest in the South. But the North Vietnamese are acutely aware of what happened the last time they trusted to a political campaign in the South—after the Geneva agreement of 1954. Ngo Dinh Diem repressed the opposition and arrested the Communists, and mutual violence grew.

Henry Kissinger always understood that the peace terms would have to deal with this concern. He wrote in 1969 that Hanoi could not be asked to leave her southern allies. "to the mercy of Saigon."

A revealing insight into Hanoi's current view of the problem was provided in a talk here with Dr. Nguyen Khac Vien, a leading North Vietnamese intellectual. Dr. Vien is editor of a historical series, Vietnamese Studies. He came to Paris just after the Christmas bombing of Hanoi to help edit a French film on the history of the war and to do some research of his own in French archives.

Dr. Vien was optimistic about the chance for real peace now, and confident of his side's political prospects in the South. He based that confidence on three factors: his estimate of popular feeling in South Vietnam, the strength of the "revolutionary army," and the role of the international truce observers and world opinion generally.

"Every family in South Vietnam has a political prisoner under [President] Thieu," he said, "even the functionaries. The family has seen its village destroyed, its daughters living an American way of life. During the war they were too frightened to do anything about these things. But there will be a change in the climate now."

"Thieu will oppose many things in the accords, for example the provision for free movement between the two zones in the South. But people will really want that; it is essential to normal life. So resentment could build, a popular feeling to make Thieu carry out the accords."

"And there may be people inside Thieu's Government who want to carry them out."

Dr. Vien emphasized that things were different now from 1954.

"This time, unlike then," he said, "there are a revolutionary army and

political movement in the South. The Americans tried in the Paris talks to have the South divided and the two armies regrouped. We wanted a cease-fire in place, leaving bits of the army everywhere to protect the population.

"There will be incidents. If people demand their right to move freely, province chiefs may order the police to fire on them. But the revolutionary army will never be far away, and that will be a constraint."

He saw a particular responsibility on world opinion to protect Saigon's political prisoners and enforce the Paris agreement's call for their release. He expressed concern for their safety after all American and other military prisoners are supposed to have been released, sixty days from now.

"It will be extremely dangerous for the political prisoners then," he said. "Some will be liquidated, or hidden, or falsely charged with common crimes such as robbery. Thieu has arrested many more in the last few days, including Catholic priests."

As is the case with the Vietnamese Communists, there was a certain ironic serenity in his political view of the future, the more striking because few of the rest of us can have confidence about anything in Vietnam.

"The old class structure in the South has already been destroyed," Dr. Vien said. "In the village there used to be proprietors and peasants. Now the village is abandoned. Everyone has fled to the town and become equal. The line is now between those who benefited from the war and those who did not. The South has been swept clean. In a way you have to thank the Americans."

In a column last week I disputed the argument that American bombing of Hanoi could be justified by the precedents of Dresden and Hiroshima. "Britain and the United States were both attacked first in World War II," I wrote, "Britain savagely bombed and the United States hit without warning at Pearl Harbor," and even in a war for survival, the bombing of Dresden and Hiroshima was widely criticized.

Readers have pointed out that Britain declared war when Poland was invaded, before she herself was attacked. It remains the case that Dresden was bombed long after the savage German air assault on British cities. But in terms of the declaration of war, the statement was of course in error.

ernment?

A. Mr. Thieu says they do, but the United States says that the troops will be needed to defend the Vietcong enclaves against possible attack from Mr. Thieu's forces. Moreover, Mr. Kissinger likes to point out that the accord bars the North Vietnamese from rotating or replacing those forces, and limits the arms supply to a

one-for-one replacement.

This means that if the accord is carried out, the North Vietnamese forces cannot seriously pose a threat to Mr. Thieu's million-man army. If Hanoi does try to send more men and supplies to the south, it would be violating the accord, and the intricately worked-out arrangements would be in danger of collapsing.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1973

The Last Tango

By Anthony Lewis

PARIS—The second Indochina war is ending as it began, in obscurity and contradiction. It is like a Pirandello play, confounding appearance and reality. But as in Pirandello, there is a profound theme to be found amid the confusion.

The incongruities are glaring. The very text of the "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam" is a diplomatic curiosity, a document that calls on the parties to settle the fundamental questions now. It is an agreement to begin negotiating an agreement.

Le Duc Tho hailed the result as "a very great victory." Yet North Vietnam had abandoned, in the settlement, its long insistence on a negotiated end to the Government of Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon.

Militarily, the end was at least as unsatisfactory for the United States. After all those years of punishing war, it was having to concede the presence of 145,000 North Vietnamese troops in the South—which is approximately 145,000 more than when the American intervention began.

President Nixon said the agreement offered not just a cease-fire but a chance for lasting peace, "peace with honor." But the man for whom he fought, General Thieu, treated the accord with unconcealed contempt. A Thieu spokesman indicated that, in explicit contradiction of the agreed terms, Saigon would not agree to early elections, would not open the political process to anti-Thieu forces and would not allow movement between the two zones in the South—even to let refugees go home.

And so it is easy for anyone, critic or supporter of the war, to criticize the Paris agreement. But to do so because of its ironies and confusions is to miss the point that they were inevitable in any negotiated settlement that achieved the one fundamental aim shared by the principal opposing parties.

That aim was to get the United States out of the Vietnam war, and the Paris agreement has achieved it. No matter how many imperfections appear, the nearly five years of talks in Paris will have been amply justified in their result if that accomplishment sticks.

Withdrawal has been essential to American society for many years, for reasons of the spirit that do not need to be argued any longer. They were manifest in the relief of both hawks and doves at the news from Paris.

Even if the worst happens and repression and guerrilla warfare flicker on in South Vietnam, the level of violence will be reduced by the end of the American role. The ordinary people of Vietnam will endure less destruction.

A last and certainly not least significant reason for welcoming the U.S. withdrawal is that it will free American diplomacy from its obsession with a peripheral interest. Prof. Ernest R. May of Harvard was surely right when he wrote for The Washington Star-

ABROAD AT HOME

News that future Americans will look back on this adventure with the same amazement that Frenchmen regard the intervention by Napoleon III in Mexico in the 1860's. There is more than enough of vital interest to the United States in her relations with her allies and her great-power competitors to occupy President Nixon and Henry Kissinger for the next four years.

At this fragile end of so much destruction that accomplished so little for anyone, it is worth recalling the far-sighted warning of one of the earliest and most committed critics of American intervention in Vietnam.

He spoke of American "illusions about the use of force" leading to "increasingly extensive escalation . . . increasingly censured by numerous peoples." He said friends of America had until now thought of her as she

thought of herself, "championing the concept that we must allow people to determine their own destiny in their own way."

"If it is unthinkable that the American war apparatus will be annihilated on the spot," he said, "there is on the other hand no chance that the peoples of Asia will subject themselves to the law of the foreigner who comes from the other shores of the Pacific, whatever his intentions, however powerful his weapons. . . ."

"In view of the power, wealth and influence at present attained by the United States, the act of renouncing . . . a distant expedition once it appears unprofitable and unjustifiable . . . will not, in the final analysis, involve anything that could injure its pride, interfere with its ideals and jeopardize its interests. On the contrary . . . what an audience would the United States recapture from one end of the world to another, and what an opportunity would peace find on the scene and everywhere else."

That was not a carping partisan talking, or a moralizing amateur. It was Charles de Gaulle, speaking in Phnom Penh on Sept. 1, 1966.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 January 1973

Voices of Conscience

Throughout the long years of America's ill-fated involvement in the war in Indochina, the peace symbol remained a persistent expression of determination and hope. As time went on and the yearning for an end to the bloodshed grew in intensity, that symbol's message became emblazoned in the minds and hearts of millions. It formed a nonpartisan bond for many who agreed on little else.

Now that the official protocols at last give hope that the killing and suffering may indeed come to an end, it would be an ungrateful act of instant historical revisionism to fail to note the contribution of the peace movement. That movement gave expression to a facet of the American character which ought not be forgotten at the very moment when its prayers appear—at least temporarily—to have been answered and its goals approached. Few nations have managed in time of war to keep the voices of peace so compellingly raised. Few nations would, under similar circumstances, have allowed those voices to be so clearly heard.

Occasionally there were excesses and abuses. The sign of peace, like any symbol, was at times defiled by small bands of those who tried to exploit the protest and the anguish for their own less honorable purposes and politics. But for the most part the movement remained simply the conscience of a coalition: young and old, religious leaders and veteran politicians, idealists and pragmatists worked and marched under its banner.

It in no way belittles the tough efforts of the skillful negotiators who eventually hammered out the agreements to give recognition now to those who doggedly kept pointing and pushing toward peace. Many—particularly the young—never faltered in their conviction that peace was too serious a matter to be left to Government. Their faith would be ill served if those often unpopular but never despairing efforts were now to be allowed to fade unrecognized from memory.

WASHINGTON STAR
31 January 1973

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

At Last, a Bit of Candor on Vietnam

By FRANK GETLEIN

By and large, the documents signed Saturday in Paris were Pickwickian fantasies. Former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge correctly characterized what Henry Kissinger did there as "a great performance," which it was and which is substantially different from a great or, indeed, any achievement.

In essence, the painfully created documents provided the legal papers for the American adoption of the strategy devised so long ago by Sen. George Aiken, R-Vt., namely, to declare we have won and to get the hell out.

As Kissinger went through the chapters of the agreement, it became ever clearer that the Aiken decampment is exactly what is taking place.

If any doubts lingered, they were settled by the swiftly erupting fire fights that took place all over South Vietnam between the initialing and the signing of the alleged agreements.

All the same, in the whole elaborate charade — participated in by Sen. Hubert Humphrey, Dean Rusk and even the dead body of former President Lyndon Johnson — there suddenly and surprisingly glimmered one spark of common sense, realism and what may be the beginning of official American wisdom about Vietnam.

In the course of his punctilious explication of the documents — itself no mean performance — Kissinger, with the air of the Wizard of Oz coming out from behind the colored steam and the giant mask of omniscience to reveal himself as plain old Frank Morgan, abruptly said, almost offhandedly, "That, of course, is what the civil war there is all about."

As far as equally offhand memory serves, this is the first time an American government official has referred in public to the war in Vietnam as a "civil war," a war, that is, within a single country among several factions, each of which hopes to control the entire, single country.

If it was not merely a slip of the tongue to be corrected by Herbert Klein or by White House plugola watcher Clay Whitehead, this simple statement of an obvious truth immediately distinguishes Kissinger from his predecessors — various Bundys, McNamara, assorted Rostows, Rusk and the rest — as well as from his own associates — Laird, Rogers and so on, including his present master, Richard Nix-

on, and his future putative one, Spiro Agnew.

Of all those White House and Pentagon types involved in Vietnam, only Kissinger has had the wit to see and the honesty to admit that the war there is and has been a civil war.

Until that throwaway, taken-for-granted line, official U.S. policy had been that the war in Vietnam was overt aggression by one independent state, North Vietnam, against its independent neighbor, South Vietnam. Kissinger has put this folly behind us at a stroke and we may go on to other no less profitable and no less painful truths about the war out there.

The next important perception for all of us to make — led, perhaps, by Kissinger — is that the cause of freedom has had nothing to do with our presence there, let alone, in Sen. Humphrey's recent reformulation, the purpose of insuring that aggression shall not triumph.

Kissinger already has eliminated aggression as one of the things we fought against by admitting that the conflict is a civil war.

Aggression and military violence, of course, were present in Vietnam, but they were introduced there, in modern times, by our gallant, freedom-loving allies, the French. The French did this not to preserve the cause of freedom or even to oppose the cause of communism, but simply because the French had invaded Vietnam, as well as the rest of Indochina, militarily, exploited it economically and intended to go on doing both forever.

The Vietnamese, led chiefly, as it happened, by Communists, decided to throw the French out and, in the years after World War II, proceeded to do just that, finally defeating the foreign invader and aggressor nation, the French, at Dienbienphu.

Had the United States given a fig about the abstract cause of freedom and self-determination in that part of the world, and had we, moreover, early adopted our present methods of defending those virtues, obviously we would have been bombing Paris 20 years ago, reserving Christmas Eve to knock off Notre Dame while aiming at the militarily important bridges over the Seine.

The mere suggestion is absurd, however logical, and no less absurd is the assumption that we have been fighting for freedom and self-determination. We were fighting

out of a tragically mistaken, paranoid notion about communism.

These are a few of the truths about Vietnam we must learn if we are not to return there in arms or go elsewhere in arms as the anti-Communist devil theory directs, Kissinger, to his credit, has given us the beginning of wisdom.

BALTIMORE SUN
31 January 1973

Foreign Service pays tribute to 'China hands'

By JAMES S. KEAT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The United States Foreign Service paid a sentimental tribute yesterday to some of its most maligned alumni, the "old China hands" of the 1940's who were fired for being right.

About 300 State Department officials, plus a sprinkling of political figures and journalists, attended a luncheon in the department's ceremonial hall. The guest of honor, representing the China experts drummed out of the corps, was John Stewart Service.

The unusual luncheon was highly symbolic. The sponsor was the American Foreign Service Association, the professional group that represents the career diplomats, and the meeting was devoted to discussion of the tribulations of officers who insist on reporting information that does not suit their superiors' convenience or preconceptions.

Only Mr. Service voiced what might have been in the minds of some of the career men at the luncheon or the several hundred more who heard the speeches on closed circuit television in a department auditorium: The parallel between the officers penalized for reporting unfashionable truths in China after World War II and those who performed similar roles in Vietnam during the middle 1960's.

Among those present were U. Alexis Johnson, the senior officer in the career service, who is stepping down as under secretary of state for political affairs, and Marshall Green, the assistant secretary of state

for East Asia. William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, did not attend.

Barbara Tuchman, the historian and author of two books on China, referred to Mr. Service as a man "whom history has recognized as having been right." He predicted the decay of the Nationalist government and the eventual victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949.

Not an isolated case

Mr. Service was fired during the McCarthy security investigations in 1951 by Dean Acheson, who was the late President Truman's Secretary of State. His discharge was reversed by the Supreme Court six years later, but he resigned from the department in disillusionment early in the Kennedy administration.

Mrs. Tuchman reminded the diplomats that dispelling preconceptions among presidents and other political leaders did not originate in postwar China. She cited incidents involving Presidents' McKinley, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, she said, used to inveigh against the "typical State Department striped-pants mentality."

Sounding a similar note, Mr. Service recalled pointedly that some career officers had suffered for reporting unpopular facts in addition to the old China hands. He cited the case of one officer, Samuel Sokobin, whose career, he said, was blighted because he debunked reports that Chinese guerrillas were scoring spectacular successes against the Japanese in 1938.

Reconciliation...

At the close of his extraordinary televised press conference explaining the terms of the Vietnam settlement last week, Henry Kissinger concluded his statement with a fervent expression of hope and determination that could not have failed to move his listeners, regardless of their position during the long, divisive conflict that now finally appears to be ended. It was a sentiment that the President himself would have done well to voice.

"Together with healing the wounds in Indochina," Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy aide said, "we can begin to heal the wounds in America."

That is what America needs to hear. Although the United States has hardly experienced hatred and bitterness of a magnitude comparable to that which divides the Vietnamese after a generation of fratricidal strife, the emotional wounds of war cut deep here too. Although American cities and the countryside have not been devastated by bombs and shells and chemical weapons, as in Vietnam, they bear the heavy scars of neglect, caused at least in part by diversion of the attention and energies of the country to the demands of the Vietnam war. Although there were no direct civilian war casualties in the United States, there are Americans living today in urban and rural ghettos who have been experiencing agony and frustration even comparable to that of the refugees of Indochina.

Ending the war will not of itself resolve the conflicts in American society nor assure the rehabilitation of wasted lives and cities. It has long been evident that there will be no lavish peace dividend of surplus funds to ease the tasks of domestic reconstruction.

But peace can offer a more precious dividend—a change of heart, a rebirth of the spirit that once made this country the hope and envy of mankind. Americans now must create at home what Mr. Kissinger has said the peace agreement attempts to build in Indochina: "a framework where . . . the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past and where the debates concern differences of opinion as to how to achieve positive goals."

Having extricated the United States from this agonizing conflict and paved the way for possible peace among the Vietnamese, there is no more urgent task for the President than to rally the nation to reconciliation and healing at home. If Mr. Nixon takes up the challenge his chief foreign policy adviser has sounded, he can be con-

fident that the American people will respond with their traditional enthusiasm and resilience.

...and Reconstruction

An American commitment in the agreement signed yesterday to "contribute to . . . postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina" could play a vital role in transforming a cease-fire into an enduring peace.

President Johnson first proposed a multibillion-dollar program of economic assistance for Indochina, including North Vietnam, in his Johns Hopkins speech of 1965. Mr. Johnson was disappointed and puzzled when Hanoi spurned this generous offer, according to his former press secretary, Bill Moyers. It is just as futile now as then to imagine that peace on American terms can be bought with a mere outlay of cash, no matter how lavish.

However, within the context of the fragile compromise agreement that has now been negotiated after nearly eight more years of exhausting conflict, the proposed reconstruction program could make a critical difference. It could, as Henry Kissinger has suggested, "absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction rather than in tasks of destruction," thus helping to turn them away from the animosities of a war that has lasted a full generation.

Although the extent of American assistance is not specified in the peace accord, President Nixon in the past has mentioned a figure of \$7.5 billion, including \$2.5 billion for North Vietnam, over a five-year period. This is not an unreasonable figure, especially in light of the enormous American outlays for destruction in both parts of Indochina, which rose as high as \$30 billion a year during the peak of fighting. The annual aid expenditure would be substantially less than the incremental costs of the heavy bombing of North Vietnam which resumed last spring and not a great deal more than current assistance to this country's allies in the Indochina fighting.

Even if postwar economic assistance were not a treaty requirement and a pragmatic step toward peace, the United States would be under moral obligation to help repair the terrible havoc its overwhelming weaponry has inflicted upon an already impoverished region during the past decade. Helping to heal the wounds of Indochina would be an act of moral regeneration that could contribute to healing at home as well, by helping to restore national self-respect and the international reputation of the United States.

BALTIMORE SUN
1 FEBRUARY 1973

China Hands, and Others

The ghosts of the late Joe McCarthy, the late Pat Hürley and a good many others must have gazed astonished at a large luncheon, testimonial in nature, laid out Tuesday in the ceremonial hall of the Department of State. Sponsored by the American Foreign Service Association and attended by some 300 State Department officials, the occasion was to honor those who, to put it briefly, were right about China in the 1940s and were severely penalized personally and in their careers for having been right.

The guest of honor, representing many others, was John Stewart Service, who with characteristic straightforwardness made

the Foreign Service officers penalized for reporting unfashionable truths in China after World War II and those who performed similar roles in Vietnam in the middle 1960s; and by extension to direct attention even more generally to the tribulations of officers who, as James S. Keat put it in his account in *The Sun*, "insist on reporting information that does not suit their superiors' convenience or preconceptions."

It has been happening for a long time, and still happens; and those who undergo the tribulations are in most instances among our best men abroad. At the lower level, any experienced foreign correspondent can cite cases where the reports of junior officers in the field, if paid

attention to, would distinctly have affected policy, in giving the policy-makers a more accurate basis on which to make their decisions. Above that, the best ambassadors ordinarily do listen to their juniors—and then their own recommendations are ignored in the Secretary's office, or are passed on and then shoved aside by the Secretary's own superior, for considerations he believes to be higher.

This is to say (1) that our excellent Foreign Service has through the years not been made full and proper use of, and (2) that for long-term diplomatic effectiveness more power of decision should be placed in the hands of the Secretary of State than has always been the case.

End and Beginning

By Tom Wicker

President Johnson died at about the moment the cease-fire agreement was being initiated in Paris, giving at least a symbolic relation to the two events. And as President Nixon announced the cease-fire, I could not help remembering—as perhaps some other listeners did—what Faulkner had told Dilsey say of the Compson family: "I seed de first en de last."

Mr. Nixon said he had gained a "peace with honor" that Mr. Johnson would have welcomed. Others may believe, with President Thieu of South Vietnam, that the agreement is more nearly for a cease-fire that permits American ground forces and the captives to be extricated from an incomplete Indochinese war. Either way, peace would not have had to be sought nor Americans extricated if the war had not been started.

This is not the moment for recriminations, or even for retracing the history of a conflict that has been so much a part of the lives of all Americans for seven years. The nation well may honor Lyndon Johnson for his domestic aims and achievements, and historians may dispute for years whether President Kennedy left him any choice but to send American bombers over North Vietnam and American troops into South Vietnam.

But those things happened. At one time over half a million American soldiers were in Vietnam; 46,000 died there. The destruction of life and landscape wrought by the contending forces beggars description; and at the pace he set for himself, it took Mr. Nixon four years, as long as our own Civil War, to wind up the American involvement in the fighting. The damage done in American life, the changes wrought in the world, cannot yet be calculated or fully understood.

And in the end, there was neither victory nor defeat but "peace with honor," alternatively "the right kind of peace." Thus did Mr. Nixon, right into the last Presidential statement of the war, maintain the debasement of

IN THE NATION

language and the distortion of meaning which were not the least of its casualties—as if "protective reaction" could make a bombing strike other than a bombing strike, or any amount of explanation by Dr. Kissinger make "peace with honor" more than a peace of exhaustion and compromise and necessity.

It now seems apparent, moreover, that the North Vietnamese spring offensive of 1972 was designed to sweep aside the three-year results of Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization program, then

The Reason Why

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Jan. 21—If history confirms its promise, the most important sentence in President Nixon's second inaugural will have been this one:

"The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs."

The President would naturally resist any suggestion that this new doctrine bears on Vietnam. But others will view it as a reflection of the tragic American involvement there, as the beginning of a lesson bitterly learned.

The war is ending. At last there is reason for hope. But for Americans the fundamental questions remain: In a political and a moral sense, has it been a legitimate war? Does the end now taking shape justify the means that we have used?

The case for the affirmative has been made most strongly in the Economist of London, one of the last wholehearted supporters of the American intervention in Vietnam and of the means employed. Thus in a recent issue the editors, examining the bombing of Hanoi over Christmas, expressed some doubts about the use of B-52's but in general continued to find the American war justified.

In World War II, the Economist said, British bombers caused terrible destruction in Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities; American nuclear bombs obliterated two cities in Japan. Those who still consider that bombing justified, the paper argued, cannot object to what has happened in Vietnam—unless they are sure the bombs have been ineffective or do not believe North Vietnam's aims worth opposing.

But the position of Britain and the United States in World War II was enormously different, morally and politically, from the American posture in the Vietnam war. To understand that difference is to see what has gone wrong in Vietnam.

Britain and the U. S. were both attacked first in World War II, Britain savagely bombed and the United States hit without warning at Pearl Harbor. For the British the war was literally a struggle for survival; it was never quite that for Americans, but it was a fight against powers whose victory

to force a negotiated settlement on Hanoi's terms. The first objective was achieved, but Mr. Nixon restored the battlefield stalemate with his own violent measures of airpower. The ensuing negotiations reflected the deadlock, until the election and the final vicious round of bombing at the turn of the year apparently convinced the North Vietnamese that Mr. Nixon was under no restraint, either political or constitutional, in his ability to carry the war to their vitals for as long as he wished.

So, on both sides, it is a peace of violent compulsion, too, in which each adversary pounded his opponent into reluctant acquiescence in a compromise each had hoped to make a vic-

AT HOME ABROAD

would have meant a world turned against us.

Even under those extreme circumstances, many thoughtful people have condemned what was done to Dresden and Hiroshima—have denied that the undoubtedly legitimate end of the Allies' war justified those means. And the circumstances were not at all of the same kind in Vietnam.

Not one North Vietnamese bomb or shell has ever landed in American territory, or ever could. No one but a fantasist could suggest that the United States was fighting for its own survival. Since the Nixon trips to Peking and Moscow, no one can argue seriously that America has fought in Vietnam to stop a "world Communist movement" from enslaving humanity as Hitler would have. No, this was an argument between Vietnamese, and the U. S. intervened from half a world away.

Those who support intervention would still say that it was justified, because the Communist side of the Vietnamese argument was trying to impose its view by force and we acted to preserve the freedom of the others.

That would be a fair argument if we had ever offered the people of South Vietnam a choice. To do so we would have had to put to them, in the early 1960's, a question like this:

The United States is ready to help South Vietnam stay out of Communist control. If it does, it will have to drop several million tons of bombs on your country. Nearly half your population will become refugees, and it will change from a land of villages to one of shantytown cities. We shall have to spray poisonous chemicals on five million acres of your land, bulldoze almost another million acres, destroy half your hardwood forests and much of your mangrove. Nearly two million South Vietnamese will be killed or wounded. And at the end your country will be divided again, between two dictatorial regimes. Would you like us to help?

That question was never asked. The national election that should have been held under the Geneva agreement of 1954 was never held, because it appeared that Ho Chi Minh would win. With an ill-defined end, and by the most terrible means, we arrogantly made Vietnam's conflict our own.

If that is how honor is gained, men hold it too dear; but of course the price is always exacted from the dead.

Nevertheless, Mr. Nixon said that what has been achieved "contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world," and maybe it does. Indochina may be at least briefly peaceful, and if any future fighting there can be confined to the contending forces among the Vietnamese people, Mr. Nixon's goal of a three-power balance in the world may be enhanced. The nation may even be able to turn somewhat more of its attention and resources to its own society, rather than to problems elsewhere.

But this opens up a distasteful line

NEW YORK TIMES
30 January 1973

Lodge Says He Saw Little Hope of Truce

By JAMES T. WOOTEN
Special to The New York Times

of argument—that, somehow, it was all worthwhile, that something really was achieved, that the world is a better place and its peoples more secure because of Hamburger Hill and Khe Sanh and the Tet offensive and the Christmas bombings and the pulverizing of Quang Tri.

Lyndon Johnson would have welcomed the end of the war, had he lived to see it, and he may have gone into the last night in the belief that he had no choice but to do what he did; but I, for one, doubt that in his heart he ever believed the world would be a better place for it. If he chose, he chose the lesser of evils, as he saw them, not some positive good; if he deluded himself, it was as to the necessity for the choice, not as to the benefits of war and destruction.

So if "the first step toward building the peace" has been taken, it was, as Mr. Nixon said, in "ending the war," not in fighting it. Which will be something to remember if Americans, including their Presidents, really want to "make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last."

BALTIMORE SUN
26 January 1973

It's a Paris ceremony a la Rube Goldberg

Paris Bureau of The Sun

Paris—How do you sign a peace treaty with an enemy "government" whose existence you do not recognize and whose name you cannot abide to pronounce?

You put your John Hancock to a separate but identical document, and you pretend you do not know what the other half of the country is up to.

"So-called name"

That momentous question and that Rube Goldberg solution occupied the very last sessions in the long search for a South Vietnamese cease-fire.

Tran Van Lam, the South Vietnamese foreign minister, put the long-standing position of his government in crude but understandable terms last weekend when he said that his government "will never sign a piece of paper to which the Viet Cong puts its so-called name or Provisional Revolutionary Government"

Naturally enough, Nguyen Thi Binh, the Provisional Revolutionary Government's foreign minister, insisted on signing the cease-fire by her proper title.

At the same time, both Mrs. Binh and Mr. Lam confessed they were ready to sign the document, and the South Vietnamese foreign minister told reporters with a broad wink that he expected the American and North Vietnamese negotiators would somehow find a gimmick.

The gimmick lengthens the various parts of the accord by a total of 16 pages.

Each instrument has a separate preface and conclusion for the version that is to be signed by William P. Rogers, the American Secretary of State, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, Hanoi's foreign minister.

Then come separate prefaces and conclusions for the versions to be signed, separately, by Mr. Rogers and Mr. Lam, and by Mr. Trinh and Mrs. Binh.

The full version of the texts do not mention the Provisional Revolutionary Government, but then, they do not mention the Saigon government either. The two warring factions are referred to throughout as "the South Vietnamese parties."

first as Ambassador to South Vietnam and a part of this country's prosecution of the war, and then as the head of the United States delegation to the Paris peace talks in 1969, where he became a part of attempts to end it.

Served Twice in Saigon

Moreover, the tall, deep voiced former Senator from Massachusetts has had broad relationships in the United States government. In his bid for re-election to the Senate in 1952 he was defeated by John F. Kennedy. Until 1960 he served president Dwight D. Eisenhower as the United States representative at the United Nations and in that year's election he was Richard M. Nixon's running mate.

In 1963, President Kennedy asked him to go to Saigon. He came home a year later and in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson asked him to go back. He stayed until 1966. In 1969, President Nixon sent him to Paris.

Mr. Lodge's conversation covered a variety of subjects and included praise for the role of the White House in the peace agreement as well as his version of the role of the White House in the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem 10 years ago.

"Our position, contrary to what The New York Times story said this morning, was that we would not thwart the coup," Mr. Lodge said. "That is substantially different from taking a supportive role in the coup."

The Times, in a chronology of the war in Sunday's issue, described the overthrow of President Diem in November, 1963, as having had "tacit support" from the United States.

Disagreement Suggested

Mr. Lodge also said that soon after he went to Saigon he concluded that South Vietnam's problems could not be solved militarily and he suggested that he disagreed with the policies of President Johnson on this point.

"But I have known my feelings through the proper channels then," he said, moving quickly to another subject.

The bulk of Mr. Lodge's discussions, however, dealt with the manner in which, he said, President Nixon, altered the circumstances of the war during his first term. This, Mr. Lodge said, proved his own lack of faith in a negotiated settlement had become outdated.

"I don't suppose a day went by that I didn't discuss with my associates in Saigon how we were going to get peace," he said. "Everybody that I can remember agreed with me that the best we could hope for was

that he war would just fade away."

Mr. Lodge said that he and other American officials in Saigon at the time "felt the hatreds were so bitter, the divisions so deep and the problems so complicated that the very that it would in time fade away."

"Of course, having it fade away was better than escalation, but it still would have resulted in a lack of specific agreements and an orderly ending of the war."

President Nixon, Mr. Lodge said, "brilliantly achieved five alterations" in the circumstances of the war during his first term.

He brought home 500,000 troops and therefore rallied the nation's support of American attempts to end the war, Mr. Lodge said. He turned the fighting over the South Vietnamese; he "successfully corralled Hanoi's allies in Peking and Moscow"; he seriously damaged the enemy's resupply and staging capabilities in Cambodia, and he helped counter the North Vietnamese invasion last year "by the bombing and mining counteroffensive," the former ambassador declared.

But paramount among the reasons for achieving a cease-fire, Mr. Lodge said, was the willingness of Hanoi's representatives in Paris to drop their demand that the current Government in Saigon be ousted. "Up until October, they were adamant on that," he said.

"That's why those who say we could have solved it in 1969 should have told us in 1969," he said, not without a trace of bitterness. "I think it's kind of funny that they should wait to tell us until 1973."

Misinformation Charged

Mr. Lodge recalled that those who were informing him about the progress of the war when he was in Saigon, namely the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency, seemed seriously uninformed, forcing him to develop his own sources of information. He also said he "thought we were being lied to" by those providing reports on the conduct and status of the hostilities.

He said the United States Government's position on the overthrow of President Diem, after having been informed of the imminence of the attempt was that nothing would be done to prevent it. "It was President Kennedy's decision on my recommendation, and I don't regret it," he said. "Hell, the only way they could get a chance in Government was with a coup."

Asked, finally, who won the Vietnam war, Mr. Lodge replied: "You can't tell if anybody did. The hand isn't played out yet."

NEW YORK TIMES
25 January 1973

Vietnam Agreement...

The Vietnam settlement, which will bring an end to American participation in a war that has wracked the United States for nearly a decade and could even conceivably bring peace to Indochina after a quarter-century of hostilities, is a diplomatic triumph that will be welcomed by the people of America and of every other nation in the civilized world.

Although, as Henry Kissinger pointed out in his remarkable television performance yesterday, the agreement is full of ambiguities, its most important aspects from the American point of view are reassuringly unambiguous. These are the sections which provide for the release of American prisoners of war throughout Indochina to United States governmental representatives in Hanoi within sixty days of the signing and for the concurrent safe withdrawal of remaining American troops from South Vietnam under an internationally supervised cease-fire. Although the number of foreign observers is to be substantially less than the United States had originally sought, their responsibilities and mode of operation have been spelled out in a manner which should at least lessen the uncertainties of a formidable task.

The achievement of these essential conditions can only earn the approval and applause of every American, to say nothing of America's many friends abroad who have long waited for this historic moment.

Beyond the immediate cease-fire and early withdrawal of United States troops and prisoners, however, the prospects for a more enduring peace in Indochina remain, in the word ascribed to President Nixon yesterday, "fragile." Ambiguity abounds in the pact's provisions for resolution of the political problem in South Vietnam, which, as Mr. Kissinger candidly observed, was "what the civil war is all about." The proposed Council of Reconciliation in South Vietnam seems more tenuous than ever; and the rule of unanimity under which it is to act bodes ill for any kind of effective political progress, much less "reconciliation."

Failure to resolve this fundamental political problem was unavoidable since, as Mr. Kissinger noted, "it is not easy to achieve through negotiations what has not been achieved on the battlefield." But there may be ground for hope that a people who have suffered through a generation of fraternal bloodletting will, when left to their own devices, at last seek a peaceful resolution of their differences. Much will depend on the willingness of the United States and other involved big powers to honor President Nixon's plea for mutual restraint.

The question will doubtless be debated for years whether the settlement that was finally hammered into completion this week could not have been achieved, at least in its essential details, four years ago—or even last October when Hanoi and Mr. Kissinger outlined an agreement that does not appear to differ in major degree from the one that was made public yesterday. There is plenty of ground for skepticism over President Nixon's assertion that this accord represents "peace with honor" in contrast to every other kind of peace that might have been achieved during the past four years, or months.

But everyone will agree that it is more honorable to end the fighting than to continue a conflict that has brought so much suffering to the people of Indochina for ill-defined purposes that have little relevance, if any, to American interests in the contemporary world. In that sense it is a "right kind of peace," deserving support

in the hope that its calculated ambiguities can be transformed in time into the reality of an enduring settlement.

... Motivations ...

An offhand quip by Mr. Kissinger at yesterday's briefing may well turn into the most revealing and provocative of all his remarks about the final phases of President Nixon's war policy in Vietnam. Asked whether twelve days of saturation bombing of North Vietnam's cities and countryside early this month provided the final impetus to the agreement, the Presidential adviser wisely declined "to speculate on North Vietnamese motives." Then he added, "I have too much trouble analyzing our own."

Mr. Kissinger is not alone in puzzling over what past weeks of delay and combat have been designed to achieve. Only a detailed parsing of the various drafts at each stage of the negotiations will prove just what was conceded by whom, and when.

Mr. Nixon errs in thinking, as he said Monday night, that the nation will now understand why the Chief Executive had to keep silent during all the weeks of final and horrendous combat. Congress and citizens alike still have the right to a fuller explanation of why this ruinous war had to be waged so long and so bitterly after peace was declared at hand.

... and the Kissinger Role

In his impressive account yesterday of how agreement was reached on the war in Vietnam, Henry A. Kissinger observed almost parenthetically that "no one in the war has had a monopoly of anguish and . . . no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight." If there was a defensive note in the comment, there need not have been; for Mr. Kissinger, emerging from his long ordeal of negotiation, clearly deserves the respect and admiration of the country.

Whatever the flaws in the agreement—and there are many—whatever the disappointments that may come—and they may be great—Mr. Kissinger must be credited not only with skill and tenacity as a negotiator but with a calm and detached perseverance under merciless cross-fire from every direction. He can say now that the North Vietnamese, when they are not disposed to settle, are "the most difficult people to negotiate with" that he has ever encountered. But he cannot yet admit to the complex pressures to which he was simultaneously subjected by Washington and Saigon, or complain publicly of the castigation that came his way at the same time from anti-war and pro-war segments of American public opinion. It is to his lasting credit that he remained steadfast "through peaks and valleys in these negotiations of extraordinary intensity."

Some Americans felt, in their deep and understandable resentment of the December bombing of North Vietnam, that Mr. Kissinger should have abandoned his mission in protest rather than appear to endorse so appalling an action. He chose to stay on and ride out that episode in the hope of returning to the negotiating table when the time was ripe. He is now entitled to the nation's gratitude for a job which few would have had the courage to undertake and none would have done better.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

16 January 1973

Hanoi appears to have made concessions over NLF prisoners held by Saigon. ALEXANDER CASELLA explains the complexities

War's prisoners without status

MOST OF THE NLF members detained by Saigon do not have PoW status. Indeed, until 1965, there was no such thing as a PoW, and NLF prisoners were considered to be common criminals.

It was only in 1966 that the Americans and South Vietnamese established a procedure to deal with Vietcong prisoners. The first step is the "collecting point," a small enclosure, generally attached to a division, to which people captured on the battlefield or during a comb-out are brought.

Here the prisoners are interrogated and classified into one of four categories—prisoners of war (PoW), civil defendants (CD), innocent, and "Hoi Chanh" (refugees).

The PoWs generally include the North Vietnamese and some of the Vietcong captured on the battlefield. The average Vietcong captured on the battlefield is generally granted PoW status after an extensive, and often brutal, interrogation.

The CD are the "terrorists," sappers, members of the infrastructure, political cadres, officials of the NLF, and opponents of the regime in general, including students. In reality the classification is purely arbitrary.

Before classification, prisoners are plain detainees. To be classified PoW they must first be interrogated. A prisoner, as long as he has not been granted PoW status, can be interrogated to any extent and has no rights.

After a first round of interrogations and a preliminary classification, most prisoners are transferred to one of five "joint interrogation centres" where many will spend several weeks or more in solitary confinement and in almost total darkness, the only break being provided by mealtimes and repeated interrogations.

Then the prisoners are reclassified. The PoWs are sent to one of the six PoW camps. The CD are sent to prison, where they often linger for years without trial, and the more important prisoners are transferred for further interrogation to the "national interrogation centre," or the "combined military interrogation centre," both in Saigon. The interrogation is handled throughout by joint American and South Vietnamese teams.

Provincial security councils, military field courts (which are not really courts), various intelligence units, and the district police are also empowered to make arrests and to order that suspects be held in prison indefinitely. In 1970, 30 per cent of the 7,000 or so prisoners of Con Son island had never

been tried or sentenced.

The detention system is complex. Besides the six PoW camps, there are four national prisons (called re-education centres), and 31 provincial prisons. There are also about 200 district prisons, an undisclosed number of detention centres for families, police station cells, military prisons, and a corps of "battle coolies" — captured deserters who do transport jobs for the army under guard.

There is a last category of prisoners called "civil suspects for security reasons." These, reportedly, are detainees who have been imprisoned under a law of February 15, 1966, stating that any person can be held without trial by administrative decision for a maximum of two years, renewable.

There is no consensus on the number of prisoners. According to Saigon, there are now 35,000 PoWs including 9,000 who are said to be North Vietnamese, and about 31,000 people in civilian prisons, including 20,000 CD.

These figures do not include the 20,000 who have been arrested during the past three months and who include students and political opponents of all creeds. Other sources claim that there are between 100,000 and 150,000 political prisoners, excluding PoWs. NLF sources, which make no distinction between PoW and political prisoners but speak of "patriots," put the number at more than 350,000.

The intervention of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which began in 1965 with the presence of US ground forces, aims only at obtaining an improvement in the conditions of detention while ignoring the problem of whether the reasons for detention are justified or not.

In 1965, the ICRC set up a permanent delegation in Saigon whose task was to visit detention centres. The staff was composed of permanent ICRC personnel and delegates hired on a temporary basis. The staff turnover was considerable; in 1965, there were five successive chiefs of delegation.

After inspecting the camp and talking to some of the prisoners through the interpreter, the ICRC delegate makes a verbal report to the camp commander and then sends a written report to the Geneva headquarters, which forwards it to the Saigon Government.

In a "conventional" war between two States, the ICRC report is sent both to the detaining power and to the power from which the prisoners originate. As the ICRC is expected to visit prisoners on both sides, each belligerent is thus informed on how the

enemy treats its prisoners.

In the case of South Vietnam, the ICRC is physically present on one side only. Its reports on PoW camps, which are confidential, are transmitted to Saigon and Washington only.

ICRC rules prevent it from making its reports public, which means that if delegates find that conditions in a prison camp are not what they should be, all the Red Cross can do is point this out to the detaining authorities and suggest improvements. If Saigon and the US do not follow these suggestions, there is nothing the ICRC can do about it.

While PoW camps can be regularly visited by the ICRC, the situation is different for civilian prisons. Since 1965, the ICRC has repeatedly asked to be allowed to inspect prisons and to interview the prisoners in private. With a few exceptions, this request has been systematically denied by the Saigon Government on the grounds that prisoners held in prisons and classified as CD are not PoWs. This not only means that political prisoners are denied contact with the ICRC — useless as this contact may be — but also that all it takes to deny even a bona fide PoW protection by the Geneva Conventions is to classify him as CD, or not to classify him at all.

The inability of the Geneva Conventions to adjust to the Vietnamese environment was equalled only by the ICRC's failure to establish a dialogue with the Indo-Chinese revolutionaries. This has meant that the NLF not only questions the effectiveness of the ICRC presence in South Vietnam but has refused to receive help from the Red Cross.

The failure of the ICRC in Indo-China is not an indictment of the whole organisation. Indo-China, however, proved too much of a challenge, and the ICRC was never able to bridge the cultural and ideological gaps that separated it from the participants in this Asian drama.

This failure is due to general outlook and to individuals, and to an unusually difficult context. One of the principles of the ICRC is that it is a neutral organisation. It does not pass judgment and its purpose is not to uphold international morality, but only to be an intermediary or a mediator.

Hanoi and the NLF, however, expected that the ICRC would condemn the American bombings and ensure that all prisoners, irrespective of their classification, would be well treated. But the ICRC felt that it was not its task to condemn the bombings, and that it was not in a position to guarantee that all prisoners held by Saigon would be treated humanely. Ultimately the ICRC had nothing to offer the Vietnamese revolutionaries.

Nevertheless, the ICRC could have negotiated its presence in South Vietnam by making it contingent on free access to all prisoners. It does not appear that the Red Cross ever envisaged such a policy.

Thus the ICRC was content to act within the narrow limits of the Geneva Conventions and does not appear to have been aware that the revolutionary context of the Vietnamese war demanded a new, and bolder, approach to the prisoner problem.

Had the ICRC adopted a bolder approach, it would have run the risk of being expelled from South Vietnam. But it appears doubtful whether the US Government, especially at the height of the American involvement, would ever have taken such a decision, which would have provoked an outcry of world opinion.

The end of the Vietnam war will no doubt be a relief for the ICRC. It should provide a good opportunity for the Committee to assess its position and to determine whether the Red Cross, which has had honorable achievements in conventional conflicts can, or cannot, do as well in the context of revolutionary war.

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WASHINGTON POST

5 February, 1973

Kissinger Trip

PEKING—Diplomats here said U.S. presidential adviser Henry Kissinger may obtain the release of two American pilots when he visits Peking next week. The pilots are Air Force Maj. Philip Smith and Navy Lt. Cmdr. Robert Flynn, both of whom overflew Chinese territory during the Vietnamese war.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
26 JANUARY 1973

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

U.S. Policy On Russia: Idea Exchange

HIS FIRST-TERM success in dealing with Moscow has brought Mr. Nixon to the brink of a major and largely unexplored irony, if not an outright contradiction, which could well become more obvious, perhaps even troublesome, as his second term unfolds.

He declared in his inaugural address last Saturday that Americans can no longer "presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs." Plainly, his statement expressed a post-Vietnam policy bent and a popular consensus shaped in reaction to the excessive interventionism we have practiced since World War II.

But a principal thrust of Mr. Nixon's Soviet policy, now that a framework and momentum for negotiation of formal agreements has been established, comes close — closer than most Americans, official and otherwise, acknowledge — to telling the people of the Soviet Union (and East Europe) how to manage their internal affairs.

I refer to the "development of human contacts," a far-reaching item which Washington and its allies and friends are now trying (at Helsinki) to inscribe on the agenda of the European security conference proposed for later this year. The Western intent is to negotiate guarantees for people, communications and ideas to move back and forth between East and West without the tight controls and absolute restrictions which have marked Soviet conduct for 50 years. Even at a time of supposed detente, these controls make the "Iron Curtain" not a metaphor but a reality for all but a small privileged minority of those who live behind it.

For the West to demand broad negotiated "human contacts"—as the West has just said it will in what The Post's John Goshko aptly terms "a remarkable display of unity"—is virtually certain to produce major friction, if not an impasse, at any security conference to come.

This is so because the Soviet leadership does not believe it could control its people if they were routinely exposed to the choices and liberties which the West takes for granted. By seeking expanded "human contacts" the West is asking to transform, at least to ease, the means by which the Kremlin rules the Soviet people in the absence of their given consent.

Until now, such Western efforts were confined by the Kremlin to certain limited and organized spheres of "cultural exchange." Warning the pop-

ulace against being subverted, the Kremlin has treated these efforts as ideological warfare. Only because "cultural exchange" had use as a political symbol and lubricant and as a way to hitchhike on Western technology, did the Soviet leadership permit it at all.

But now the West, certainly and particularly Mr. Nixon, has detached "exchange" from Western liberals' running concern with fostering Soviet human rights, and from Western cold warriors' running concern with fostering Soviet internal discord. The cause has been elevated from peripheral political form to central political substance.

The apparent rationale is that it is well and necessary to take measures to cope with Soviet missiles and troops but any serious quest for permanent mutual security must address the basic issue of differences in values. Americans fear the Soviet Union not only or not so much for its power as for the fact that Soviet power is at the service of values other than our own. Hence an attempt to alter Soviet values, to change the internal nature of Soviet

society, by making expanded "human contacts" the price Moscow must pay for its goals of expanded trade, technology, detente, respectability, and legitimization of the postwar territorial status quo.

The effort is a bold one: it will take years to play out. Moscow can be counted on to drag, protest, obfuscate. Tactically, the Kremlin has already begun trying to divide the West on the issue. (And not without some success: Le Monde reported after President Pompidou's recent trip to Russia that he "recognized the legitimacy [sic] of well-known Soviet preoccupations when he conceded that it would be an unhappy development if a 'permanent propaganda war' were to be engaged in under the guise of cultural exchange.")

So the idea that real security lies not only in a strategic balance and in mutual political and economic benefit but in opening up Soviet society to make it more like Western society is not everywhere shared and similarly interpreted. Time will test the devotion of the West to the concept, and the validity of the concept itself.

LE SOIR, Brussels
3 January 1973

Cibles de virulentes attaques soviétiques

Trois brillants journalistes limogés à Belgrade

Ils formaient, au mois de juin 1971, le trio le plus brillant de la presse yougoslave; un an et demi plus tard, ils ont disparu de leur rédactions respectives.

L'aventure commence le 9 juin 1971, lorsque Miograd Marovitch, envoyé spécial à Moscou de Politika, grand quotidien de Belgrade, dénonce une virulente campagne anti-yougoslave déclenchée en U.R.S.S. par les anciens « conformistes », c'est-à-dire les pro-staliniens émigrés en Union soviétique après la rupture entre Tito et Staline. Le journaliste a mis en cause les autorités soviétiques sans l'autorisation desquelles une manifestation anti-titiste à Moscou était évidemment exclue.

Alexandre Nenadovitch, à l'époque rédacteur en chef de Politika et patron de Marovitch, ajouta un éditorial au rapport de son correspondant, révélant que M. Tepavatch, alors ministre yougoslave des Affaires étrangères, avait transmis aux autorités russes une vigoureuse protestation contre les activités des émigrés à Moscou.

Quelques jours plus tard, le troisième personnage entre en scène. Il s'agit de Frane Barbieri, enfant terrible de la presse de Belgrade, à l'époque rédacteur en chef de l'hebdomadaire Nin. Barbieri publie un commentaire dans lequel il démontre que Moscou tolère les activités anti-titistes afin de provoquer des remous intérieurs en Yougoslavie et de compromettre le système d'autogestion jugé dangereux et révisionniste par le Kremlin.

La presse soviétique ne réagit que quelques jours plus tard. Les Izvestia accusent Marovitch de tous les crimes professionnels possibles : « insinuations dangereuses, men songes malveillants, calomnies et tendance anti-soviétique ». Poli-

tika répond immédiatement et prend la défense de son correspondant; elle invoque sa vocation professionnelle, son obligation d'informer l'opinion et ajoute que les Izvestia ont été incapables d'apporter la moindre preuve des fautes qu'aurait commises le journaliste yougoslave.

A Moscou, c'est le silence; pas de réaction dans la presse. Mais le 21 juin, Marovitch est obligé de quitter l'U.R.S.S. De retour à Belgrade, en signe de solidarité il est nommé rédacteur en chef de l'Express, édition vespérale de Politika.

Un an et demi après ces événements, aucun des « héros » de juin 1971 n'est plus en place; ni les trois journalistes, ni l'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères n'ont survécu à la purge des « anarchistes-libéraux » qui a frappé le parti communiste de Serbie.

Le départ des trois brillants journalistes s'inscrit naturellement dans le cadre de la « mini-révolution culturelle » entreprise par Tito pour reprendre son pays en main. Aux amis étrangers qui expriment leurs inquiétudes quant au développement de la situation et quant à la direction que pourrait prendre la diplomatie de Belgrade, le Maréchal a répondu dernièrement en leur donnant l'assurance que « la Yougoslavie ne va nulle part » et que, surtout, elle ne retournera pas « sous l'aile de l'Union soviétique ».

Si telle est la vérité, on comprend cependant mal les raisons du limogage de MM. Marovitch, Nenadovitch et Barbieri, car c'est précisément cette position non engagée de la Yougoslavie que Tito vient encore d'exalter que tous trois ont toujours défendue.

P. M.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE/JANUARY 21, 1973

Linkage and roulette; and a textbook case of preventive secret diplomacy in Cuba in the fall of 1970

Nixon's way with the Russians

By Henry Brandon

When Richard Nixon accepted his nomination at the 1968 Republican Convention in Miami and said that he would move from confrontation to negotiation with the Soviet Union, it seemed to many that this was the best promise he could make. Yet, even though some of those close to him suggested to me then that it was less close to his political instincts than to his political calculations, and even though it was one of those vague generalities that are the stuff of convention and campaign speechmaking, now, as he begins his second term, it can be said that he lived up to it more than anybody expected—most of all, perhaps, Nixon himself.

The last thing Nixon would want is to go down in history as having retreated before Russian or any other Communist power. And if anybody had impeccable anti-Communist credentials, it was Richard Nixon. He had exploited them adroitly. In the 1968 Presidential campaign, for instance, he hammered home the fact that he, an avowed anti-Communist, had a better chance than any Democrat of getting the United States public to accept conciliatory moves toward Communist countries. President Johnson was uncertain in his attitude to the Russians, though he always had the notion that he could make some sort of deal with them. Dean Rusk, L.B.J.'s Secretary of State, was dovish toward Moscow, but felt hawkish toward the Government in Peking; he favored a policy of containing China in collusion with the Soviet Union. Nixon rejected this approach because he thought it would be interpreted in Asia as a racist-influenced policy, and from the start prepared for an evenhanded policy, though one based on a belief that the Russians were the more dangerous because they were more likely to take military risks. Nevertheless, his Vietnam-policy decisions risked Russian defiance.

What made some sort of rapprochement with the Soviets look more hopeful than perhaps ever before was that some time in 1970, if not earlier, the Kremlin decided that it wanted to aim at a limited amount of cooperation with the United States and with Western Europe and that it wanted to reduce tension with both. This decision was reflected in Brezhnev's speech at the Communist Party Congress in March, 1971, and set the basic direction of Soviet policy. I remember how at a dinner party at the house of Gov. Averell Harriman in June of 1971, the then Polish Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski admonished everybody present to read the Brezhnev speech carefully, for it represented a very important change in Soviet policy to which, he said, the United States should respond in a conciliatory and understanding way; otherwise, an opportunity might be missed. He argued among other things that since the Russians had more or less achieved nuclear parity with the United States, they were now anxious to commit more of their economic resources to raising their people's standard of living, and he admitted that with the tense situation along the Sino-Soviet border there was a need to shift troops from Western Europe to the East. The problem for Nixon, who was quite willing to

sound out the prospects, was how to begin. He therefore set a cautious pace and a slower one than suited the Kremlin. On his European tour he reassured America's allies that he would not negotiate with the Soviet Union behind their backs.

Nixon's basic strategy was to negotiate with the Russians on a broad front of problems which would be seen to be interconnected. This idea later came to be called the "linkage" principle and was defined by William Safire in his "The New Language of Politics" as "a global negotiations strategy holding that progress on one front is necessary to, or helpful to, progress on other fronts." It was expressed by Kissinger in a background briefing on Feb. 6, 1969, in which he explained that the President would like to deal with the problem of peace on the entire front on which peace was challenged and not only on nuclear arms talks, and that a reduction of tension in one area could be achieved only if it also applied to others. It was with linkage in mind that the President sounded an early alarm about the dangers in the Middle East and Berlin. He wanted to make it clear that a *détente*, like peace itself, was indivisible.

More specifically, Nixon and Kissinger laid down, shortly after the Inauguration, a basic set of principles on handling the Russians. These were not processed through the National Security Council machinery, with the result that the council never developed a full-fledged, over-all policy paper on United States-Soviet relations, but instead continued to deal with specific problems—the Middle East, SALT, Berlin, and so on—as they came up. The Nixon-Kissinger guidelines went roughly as follows: Keep relations on an even keel, have no illusions about how much can be accomplished, and do not treat arms control as a "safety valve" (as Kissinger liked to call it) against issues fraught with danger, because it will not in itself alleviate this danger. Individual issues simply were not to be singled out; the key to a better, more stable relationship was a relaxation of tensions on all fronts. The behavioral etiquette in dealing with the Russians was to be cool, matter-of-fact, even distant. Public polemics were to be avoided, and so were negotiations that sought only to sweeten the atmosphere.

These guidelines represented a radical change, for under President Johnson the idea was that you should try to do business with Moscow whenever possible. Nixon believed that he could reach an understanding with the Russians; but since the Communists were evil, expansionist and untrustworthy, he had to insist on an over-all understanding, and retain the freedom or the willpower to use military force if necessary. He thought such a broad understanding could be arrived at by the United States' making concessions on SALT and Vietnam, and by the Russians' doing so on the Middle East; other issues would have to be resolved somehow by mutual compromise. The idea that a package deal could be nego-

tiated with the Russians on the basis of the "linkage" theory became very controversial among the experts and many of them viewed it as hopelessly unrealistic, betraying ignorance of the Russian psyche.

The late Llewellyn Thompson, twice Ambassador to Moscow and one of the most respected among the experts, was one of those who dissented. Thompson contended that "linkage" to the Russians meant negotiating from strength, a phrase that went back to John Foster Dulles, one of the many devils in the wax museum of the Soviet diplomatic mind. Because they suffered from an inferiority complex, he argued, they would object to the idea and resist it. Thompson once maintained to me that to the Russians each case for negoti-

Henry Brandon is chief American correspondent and associate editor of *The Sunday Times* of London. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, *"The Retreat of American Power."*

ation "was another throw of the roulette ball," and "every time the roulette ball spins, one has to watch how it turns and where it falls. There is no necessary connection between the throws." Thompson continued to defend the idea of simply seeking to improve the atmosphere between the two powers, because once they reciprocated, they always committed themselves a little more, assuming, however slightly, a new attitude. "It does therefore help," Thompson insisted, "to commit the Russians to a trend and direction because they lack flexibility in their propaganda, which makes it difficult for them to reverse it." Thompson developed his view once to Kissinger in the latter's office and, as it happened, the President called on the telephone during their conversation. When he heard that Thompson was in Kissinger's office, he asked both to come and see him. Thompson then explained his views to the President and left feeling that the President had agreed with his interpretation.

Gradually, as Nixon's approach to the Russians evolved, it turned into a mixture of the Kissinger and the Thompson theories, though every time the Russians did something reasonable on one front and something unreasonable on another, the cry of "linkage" was heard from the White House, which put the Kremlin on notice that this was not the way to reach an understanding. But the mixture was inevitable and Mr. Nixon slowly recognized it. It is one of his eccentricities that he likes to appear more inflexible than he really is. If necessary, though, he can be quite adroitly flexible, especially when the political stakes warrant it. For a long time, for instance, he was convinced that the Russians could help him to persuade Hanoi to make a settlement—which contributed to his slowness about starting the SALT talks—but in the end he recognized that Russian leverage with the North Vietnamese was limited for a number of complicated reasons, and that he had better not make this the stumbling block to a new understanding with the Soviets.

Kissinger, from the start, assumed supreme control over diplomatic contacts with the Russians. His first meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin occurred in New York before President Nixon's inauguration, and their meetings after a time became an accepted thing whenever some-

thing that could develop into a crisis had to be thrashed out. Dobrynin, a master of the diplomatic trade, quickly recognized the uneven balance of power between Kissinger and Rogers. Seeing where the center of power really was, he lavished attention, as ought any shrewd diplomat in Washington who had the opportunity, on Kissinger. He established easy access to him and soon found out that, for quick action, this was the place to call. Dobrynin, as ambassadors go, saw perhaps more of him than most, and soon earned in Kissinger a kind of fond respect. Here were two men who could display an extraordinary amount of charm and wit, but also vie in toughness with each other. Kissinger even had him home for negotiations—and few have seen the Kissinger household from the inside—but only after an electronic sanitizing squad had made certain that the Russians had not bugged the house in advance.

Despite the Kissinger-Dobrynin compatibility, despite the prospects for improved relations between their two countries, the progression toward serious negotiations was negotiations that sought only to sweeten the atmosphere.

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strength, a phrase that went back to John Foster Dulles, one of the many devils in the wax museum of the Soviet diplomatic mind. Because they suffered from an inferiority complex, he argued, they would object to the idea and resist it. Thompson once maintained to me that to the Russians each case for negotiation "was another throw of the roulette ball," and "every time the roulette ball spins, one has to watch how it turns and where it falls. There is no necessary connection between the throws." Thompson continued to defend the idea of simply seeking to improve the atmosphere between the two slow, and various peripheral crises interfered with it at various times. The Russians distrusted Nixon—though at the start they were willing to forget his past and judge him on performance—not only because of his reluctance actually to begin the SALT discussions but also because of his policy in Vietnam and his provocative visit to Rumania. His overtures to China, however, really shocked them: I was not surprised when in September of 1969, Georgy Arbatov, the perspicacious deputy director of the Moscow Institute for Soviet-American Affairs, said to me that this was a moment when the United States should try to inspire trust, not the opposite, and that the prospects of improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had been endangered.

But Nixon did not want to move too fast, for he was afraid Congress would otherwise have refused to approve the Safeguard legislation for a new antiballistic missile defense. He also wanted further to test the MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle), which he had no intention of banning, and to give more time to the new methodical studies of the whole disarmament problem ordered by Kissinger. John F. Kennedy made the missile gap a big issue during his Presidential campaign, but once in power he found that the situation was not so bad after all. Nixon, on the other hand, during his 1968 campaign was led to believe that the United States had a powerful advantage in missileery. Once in office, however, he found that the situation was worse than he had been led to believe and that a serious imbalance in the missile field could develop in a half-dozen years. President Johnson had decided on the evidence he was given that

the Talinn Line around Moscow was not an ABM defense and that the SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles were not equipped with maneuverable warheads. But in 1969, Kissinger's verification panel succeeded in injecting doubts into these conclusions, even though the C.I.A. continued to support the earlier ones.

Shortly thereafter, in spite of Nixon's orders for everybody to throttle down on anti-Soviet speeches and to exercise restraint, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird accused the Russians of aiming at a first-strike capability. It was the most anti-Soviet statement an American in Laird's position could have made, for it implied aggressive Kremlin intentions.

As regards trade, Nixon was again cautious and uncooperative. In his efforts to accumulate as many bargaining chips as possible, this, too, was to be husbanded for the day when it could be exchanged for something he needed. Contrary to the common assumption, Nixon was convinced that trade could only follow improvements in the political field. This, again, was different from the old theory held by Ambassador Thompson in his Moscow days. The argument then was that since the trade would not amount to very much, it would be worth making concessions as a demonstration of goodwill. But Thompson blamed American industry for its Government's reluctance, because he thought the industrialists feared Russian competition.

The Cuban Incident

Still, Nixon meant to get into serious negotiations with the Russians on a broad front of problems, even though he began to realize that he would not be able to insist on these negotiations being interrelated. He learned it the hard way. After his first disappointment of learning that the Russians could not help him in Hanoi, his second was that he could not arrive at an agreed policy with them on the Middle East. It led him to have grave doubts about Russian intentions.

They were sharply accentuated by the so-called "Cuban incident" in September, 1970, involving a Soviet submarine tender. Nixon at first did not want to disturb relations and decided to try secret diplomacy to avoid creating too much of a fuss about it, and

to make clear to the Russians that he was as determined as Kennedy to prevent their establishing an offensive military base at Cienfuegos. But the "incident" broke into the open in a column by C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times on Sept. 25. The same day, the Pentagon cautiously confirmed it, and later still the same day, Henry Kissinger at a background briefing on the President's trip to the Mediterranean issued a strong warning that the United States would consider the establishment of a Soviet strategic base in Cuba a hostile act. The State Department was at first puzzled by these warnings and some of its officials criticized them as a cold-war exercise. But the White House, though it did not want to ring the alarm bell in public, made certain that the full implications of this Russian initiative were understood at least by the press and Congress.

The reason for the American concern stemmed from the presence of the 9,000-ton Ugra-class submarine tender and two barges which, according to an expertly researched story by Benjamin Welles, also in The New York Times, had been shipped from the Soviet naval base of Polyarny, near Murmansk, to Cuba. They had no power of their own and were intended, as storage space for radioactive wastes which nuclear submarine reactors discharge from time to time.

The initial suspicions that the Russians were building up a new presence in Cuba had been aroused by photographs showing a soccer field close to new military barracks, and since it is well known that Cubans do not play soccer, but that in Russia this is a very popular sport, a warning signal went up. U-2 photo reconnaissance, which had dropped to one flight a month, was swiftly increased, and came up with proof that new communication towers, new barracks and new anti-aircraft sites were under construction, and that two barges and a tender were at anchor at Cienfuegos; it all added up to a potential nuclear-submarine base. A nuclear submarine was even identified in the vicinity, though not actually at the harbor of Cienfuegos.

One of the key questions was whether the submarine and tender would marry up, for that would have been the most conclusive evidence. They never did, though they probably would have, the experts concluded, had not the

preparations been discovered in time. Once the installations were in place, the United States would have been presented with a *fait accompli*. The Russians could have said then that because the Americans had not raised the issue, they had simply assumed it was acceptable and had gone ahead. The Soviets could have argued, too, that in exchange for a withdrawal the United States had to make a concession—say, by giving up a base in Europe.

What worried the Pentagon was that with a refueling base in Cuba, Soviet submarine strength in the area could be increased, for then the Russians could cut short their patrols and avoid the 8,000-mile round trip from their West Atlantic stations back to Polyarny. What worried the White House more, though, was the deception by the Russians just when the two sides were beginning to have serious talks. Since there was every indication that the facilities to handle nuclear submarines were being built on a crash basis—the new construction had been erected within a month—a speedy intercession with the Russians was imperative.

KISSINGER summoned Ambassador Dobrynin to his office and reminded him, after describing the American findings, that the Russian activities violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding which stipulated that the Soviet Union would not use Cuba as a base for nuclear weapons. Dobrynin at first expressed surprise but, according to a description in Kissinger's own memo of record, turned "ashen" when the full evidence was presented and the possible consequences of Soviet persistence in these activities were outlined. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962 allowed for defensive ground-based SAM and ABM missiles on Cuba, but not for servicing nuclear submarines which are offensive weapons. Dobrynin promised to give Kissinger requested assurances, but did not manage to do so before Sept. 27, when Kissinger left with the President on his second trip to Europe, designed to bolster NATO and to warn the Russians not to overplay their hand in the Mediterranean.

One of the problems at the time was to convince the American public, Congress and the press that the Cuban accusations were not an at-

tempt to "manufacture" a crisis; but a serious controversy with grave implications. The perturbations were set at rest when the Russians, after separate talks between Rogers and Gromyko at the United Nations, and Kissinger and Dobrynin in Washington, laconically reconfirmed through a Tass statement on Oct. 13 that the Soviet Union "has not been and is not building its own military base" in Cuba. In private, Dobrynin confirmed that the understanding of 1962 existed and would be upheld. Even though these Russian assurances were not all that was asked for, the State Department spokesman characterized the Soviet statement as "positive," indicating that the United States was satisfied. It was a textbook case of preventive secret diplomacy which succeeded in averting the build-up of a really serious, potentially dangerous crisis. Nevertheless, the White House privately suggested to the press that it would prefer that no victory be claimed. The case was considered closed.

Between the summer of 1970 and the autumn of 1971, United States-Soviet relations underwent important tests of strength: not only in the Cuban incident but also in Jordan and in the cease-fire confusion along the Suez Canal. In each case the United States remained firm. And there was also what one could call an internal Communist crisis, the workers' rebellion in Poland, which must have made quite an impression in the Communist Party Congress in Moscow at which Brezhnev signaled the basic decision in favor of the *détente* policy and the new approach to domestic economic development. It was a far-reaching decision and it led to increasingly more businesslike negotiations.

Kissinger meets Brezhnev

Chairman Brezhnev, for the first time, moved to the forefront as the man behind the forceful *détente* policy when he invited Chancellor Willy Brandt to the Soviet Union. It was on this occasion that Gromyko, with his sardonic humor, expressed Russia's unconcern about the Common Market by remarking to Brandt, "It is a tame animal, a dinosaur, born in captivity." Brezhnev's private exchanges with President Nixon also gained frequency and led to the first agreement in prin-

ciple on SALT and later to the clinching of the Berlin agreement. Other Russo-American bilateral interests began to be more carefully defined and worked over, as were the plans for a summit meeting which, the Russians insisted, was first suggested by President Nixon. But from the Russian viewpoint, it seemed to be a virtual must after Mr. Nixon's voyage to China, for the Russians were far too concerned about the possibility of American-Chinese collusion directed against them.

Kissinger flew to Moscow early last spring on Brezhnev's invitation to try to work out guidelines for the summit conference. Not unexpectedly, the subject of Vietnam occupied almost half the time of the discussions between Kissinger and Brezhnev, who surprised Nixon's emissary because he proved to be much smarter, much more intelligent; much better informed that he had expected from everything he had heard about him. It only went to prove that although Brezhnev is a creature of the Soviet bureaucracy, to become *primus inter pares* nevertheless requires outstanding leadership qualities. Kissinger found him tough, but capable of greater informality than he had expected, a man who needed no coaxing or coaching by aides in discussing the issues at hand and who dealt with most of them personally and knowledgeably. But in contrast to Mao's or Chou En-lai's mind, his was nonconceptual; it was also difficult to discuss internal political problems that had direct bearing on foreign affairs. For instance, during Kissinger's first stay in Peking, Chou suggested that he wanted to tell him about the cultural revolution. His enraptured guest indicated that he need not, if it were at all embarrassing to him, but the Chinese Premier simply set aside this courtesy with a wave of his hand and insisted that he wanted to explain this very significant development in Chinese history because it was essential to an understanding of Chinese policy today. With the Russians, on the other hand, when Kissinger once or twice tried to raise questions about domestic events that went back 15 to 20 years, they behaved as if they had not heard him.

Much progress was made in preparing the summit agenda. Half a dozen difficult points in the SALT agreement still were left open, but the inclusion of sea-based Polaris mis-

siles, to which the Russians had previously objected strenuously, was accepted by Brezhnev within a day after Kissinger further explained a new compromise proposal he had forwarded 10 days in advance via Ambassador Dobrynin. No decision was reached on whether to include the agreed "principles" that the Russians had originally proposed as part of the package of agreements; the problem of Vietnam also remained unresolved. The general framework for the summit, however, was agreed on, and there was a good understanding as to the emphasis to be given to various issues. A new tone for negotiations had been set, a new readiness on both sides to talk informally had been achieved that nobody had held possible.

Most disappointing, but not surprising, was the Russian refusal to stop supplying North Vietnam with more arms. But there was ample evidence that Mr. Brezhnev was unhappy about the timing and even the launching of North Vietnam's massive offensive. With the United States forces withdrawing, it seemed inevitable, at least to the Russians, that Hanoi would gain its objectives within a very few years; the enormous losses in men and matériel, therefore, seemed to them a sign of stubborn foolishness. The Russians had taken that view for a long time. As far back as the time of Kosygin's visit to London in February of 1967, when Prime Minister Harold Wilson thought he had detected a willingness on the part of the Russian Premier to intervene in Hanoi, the Russians argued that if the North Vietnamese were only smarter and not so bloodthirsty they could have conquered South Vietnam with ease.

When Kissinger was about to leave after four days of private talks with Brezhnev, he was toasted by Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov, a man of considerable charm and humor, in the name of the state of the Soviet Union. Sergei Nikolayevich Antonov, the man in charge of V.I.P. security, whose ward Kissinger was wherever he went, was pleased that everything had gone well, and also raised his glass to their American guest, toasting him in the name of the state secret police. Kuznetsov, a little surprised at Antonov's toast, asked, "Do you mean to say that the secret police is

not part of the state?" But Antonov simply repeated that he wanted to add his toast in the name of the state secret police!

The secret meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief negotiator, in Paris, shortly after his talks with Brezhnev, which the Russian leader had said could be productive, was somewhere between a fiasco and a charade. The North Vietnamese, with their military offensive in full swing, wanted to gain time for Hanoi's forces to occupy as much territory as possible before accepting anything resembling a cease-fire, and Kissinger did not want to wait for the situation on the battlefield to get worse, knowing that the President was ready to play a trump card of desperation and order the mining of Haiphong harbor. If Le Duc Tho had some concessions up his sleeve, he did not produce them at the first meeting and Kissinger did not give him a second chance.

The Haiphong gamble

Kissinger returned to Washington with the stage set for the Moscow summit, but just at that time President Nixon was facing the most daring decision he had yet taken, to mine Haiphong harbor as a counterthrust against North Vietnam's May offensive. This was a decision President Johnson had never risked taking; it was a slap in the face for the Russians and a challenge to their ideological relationship with Hanoi. It created suspense in the White House where the possibility of postponement or cancellation of the summit suddenly looked likely. It created suspense in Congress and in the press, where Mr. Nixon was widely criticized for risking a SALT agreement for the sake of an intensification of the war. It created suspense in Moscow, where the Politburo obviously saw itself confronted with an extremely embarrassing decision. But President Nixon had talked himself into white anger. The North Vietnamese offensive had upset all his calculations. It proved to pack a far greater punch than anybody in the United States Government had anticipated, thanks to the heavy and more sophisticated weapons the Soviet Union had provided—the tank and artillery strength, particularly, were well above American intelligence estimates. With-

out the enormous panoply of American air power, the South Vietnamese Army would have been destroyed.

On the old target list prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in President Johnson's days, after the bombing of Haiphong—came the mining of the harbor. President Nixon, desperate to prove that the Vietnamization he had praised so often was not a failure, decided to play the riskiest card. He hardly batted an eyelid. He had considered the consequences and was willing to accept them. His advisers were unanimous that the Russians would not go ahead with the summit as planned. Indeed, some would have welcomed a Russian postponement or a cancellation to avoid Mr. Nixon's arriving in Moscow with his position in Vietnam eroding. Serious consideration was given to an American cancellation of the summit—a speech to announce the cancellation had already been prepared—but then that idea was rejected in favor of testing the Russian "manhood" first. No doubt, if the summit had been canceled or postponed Mr. Nixon would have tried to wrap himself in the American flag and claim he had acted in the defense of American honor.

It soon became clear that there had been bitter controversy in the Kremlin, but that after several days of hard deliberations over whether to proceed with the summit, Chairman Brezhnev carried the day; to the surprise of the White House and Mr. Nixon's critics, there would be no change in the timing or in the arrangements for the visit. The last thing the President's critics had expected was to be disarmed by the Kremlin.

Several Soviet trade and maritime officials who were in Washington for negotiations at the time spent a day or two of uncertainty but then continued to smile and to negotiate. When Comrade Pyotr Y. Shelest was demoted a few days later, it became obvious that Brezhnev had made certain that he had the unanimous backing of the leadership. The lone dissenter was not allowed to disturb this unanimity. Two weeks later, Pravda went a long way toward admitting that a controversy had occurred in the Politburo: "The dialogue took place despite the complexity of the international situation and in the face of the sometimes direct opposition of those who like to

warm their hands by fanning the fires of hostility and tension." Pravda sounded like Senator Fulbright putting Senator Scoop Jackson in his place. Nikita Khrushchev had been willing to rupture relations with President Eisenhower after the U-2 incident in 1959 and had broken up the Paris summit meeting; but he knew the President had only another year in office. Brezhnev did not want to take the same risk with President Nixon. A cancellation of the summit would almost certainly have jeopardized ratification of the Soviet-West German treaties. It would, also have left the United States seemingly with better relations with China than the Soviet Union. It would have delayed prospects for trade expansion and put the question of détente with the West into question, the détente on which Brezhnev had staked his place in history. Compared with these objectives, Haiphong was only a passing incident.

Peacemaking

The validity of these considerations was confirmed in various ways by Brezhnev in his private talks with the President. Brezhnev, who is 66 but looks 55, has most likely only another five years at the top, and there were ample indications that he wanted to be remembered as neither a Stalin nor a Khrushchev, but as a peacemaker who also wanted to improve the life of his people. By remarks such as "the terrible things people say about me," he showed that he was aware of having the reputation of being crude and brutal—a reputation that seemed partly to go back to the punitive expedition into Czechoslovakia in 1968—and that he wanted to erase it. He has even gone to such extremes as shaving down his bushy eyebrows because they give him a somewhat sinister look and make him an easy target for cartoonists. He pays much attention to clothes: to the earlier Kissinger meetings he sported a light blue jacket and flamboyant tie, but for the President he preferred the sober-suited look of the trade-union boss in his Sunday best. Socially, he is surprisingly at ease. In business discussions, he exudes a dynamic bargaining technique. In various small ways during the Moscow summit he went to great lengths to show that he has good simple human qualities. Quite obviously, he is a man

with a much more balanced temperament than Khrushchev, who had he been confronted with the mining of Haiphong harbor, undoubtedly would have volleyed his shoes against the wall in anger and canceled the summit. Brezhnev, it soon became evident to the President and Kissinger, was much more deeply committed than they had assumed to a *détente* not only with the United States but also Western Europe.

The competitive feeling toward China also came out. It appeared to be conditioned by ideological and security considerations, but it also went deeper, and those who had a chance to listen to Brezhnev came away with a feeling that it might be rooted in some sort of ethnic prejudice, certain cultural inferiority complexes and possibly also a feeling of guilt about past relations with China. "For a European mind like mine," the Communist party chairman once remarked in a tone of quiet exasperation, "the Chinese are impossible to understand."

During most of the private conversations the President had with Brezhnev, no members of the Politburo were present, only Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. To the surprise of the President, Brezhnev insisted that the only interpreter allowed to be present at this talk was to be Viktor Sukhodriev, the charming and adroit Russian who can put on an American as well as an English accent. Brezhnev was obviously distrustful of an American interpreter and refused to accept one. The President had to rely on minutes dictated by a Russian. Once, in talking to Kissinger, Brezhnev seemed to share President Nixon's idea about the dispensability of foreign secretaries. "Maybe we should send Messrs. Gromyko and Rogers first to Mars to see what it's like up there," he suggested, "and if they don't come back we shouldn't go." Then he teased Kissinger about how much better university professors are treated in the Soviet Union.

Gromyko, too, showed not only his impressive qualities as a foreign-policy expert, but also his puckish sense of humor. When Kissinger wondered whether it was better for him to speak close to the orange or the apple, implying that he assumed that one or the other contained a mini-

ature microphone, Gromyko looked up to the ceiling, from where a sculpture of a heavy-bosomed woman looked down on them. He pointed at one of her breasts—word of Kissinger's interest in the ladies had obviously reached the Kremlin—and said: "No, I believe it is in there."

Brezhnev, though always appearing to be acting within the guidelines agreed on by the Politburo, clearly had a strong hand in formulating them. He also seemed to have more rapid access to information than the others; in the main negotiating sessions, Kosygin and Podgorny accompanied the chairman.

During the summit meetings last May, Brezhnev seemed much calmer and more at ease than when he met with Kissinger earlier in the spring. Then he played constantly with his watch chain, tapped the table with his cigarette holder, got up at intervals and walked around restlessly. Now he seemed jovial and in a joking mood. Several times he put his arm around Kissinger's shoulders as a kind of gesture of welcome, and proved to be an altogether more likable person than the Americans had expected. With Nixon, he kept a formal and respectful distance.

It was not only the factual negotiations or their results that mattered; above all, an American President and the Soviet leadership took full advantage of an opportunity really to discuss their mutual problems and their outlook on the world in a relaxed and informal manner. They were able to feel each other out and to lose some of those preconceived views about each other. Obviously the mountains of suspicion accumulated over two decades of cold war cannot be blasted away in one meeting; many will persist, and on the periphery of the direct bilateral interests between the United States and the Soviet Union dangerous situations will continue to exist. But what was most reassuring to the President was that the Soviet leadership had finally come to understand the full implications of nuclear war, the need for imposing controls on the arms race, for redoubling the efforts to widen those controls and to grapple with the conceptual problem — irrespective of their ideological view of the world, of which there continued to exist strong vestiges that assert themselves from time to time

—of how to live with the most powerful enemy in a way that will not jeopardize each other's and everybody else's survival; in short, how to maintain order in the world. Like everybody else, though, the leaders of the Soviet Union remain very much confused on that score.

They were most likely as much confused by Kissinger's initial euphoric statement last Oct. 26 about peace in Vietnam being at hand and by the subsequent sudden breakdown of the peace negotiations as were most Americans. The essential clue, I believe, to what had happened was that Kissinger's first and foremost aim was to end the American involvement in Vietnam on terms that would give President Thieu a reasonable enough chance to preserve the independence of South Vietnam, while President Nixon's overriding aim was a settlement that would insure South Vietnam's independence at least to the extent that he would not be embarrassed by its collapse while still in office. The usually ultrarational Kissinger, fired by finding himself on the threshold of fulfilling the greatest task he had set himself in the White House — ending the American involvement in the war—became uncharacteristically euphoric as he faced the press. It was most likely also this euphoria that led him to be overconfident in his ability to persuade Thieu to accept the terms he had negotiated. He defined them in private conversations at the time as the "best attainable." President Thieu successfully resisted them, and Mr. Nixon subsequently seemed to have reached the conclusion that better terms must be obtainable.

The savage bombing of Hanoi after the talks had been broken off aroused worldwide criticism. It also led Mr. Brezhnev to make some sharp comments. But he did not feel bitter enough to keep his children from

attending a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow given for Mr. Nixon's daughter Tricia and her husband. Bilateral interests again seem to have asserted themselves. Still, the unexpected prolongation of the war, the uncertainty about American trade policy toward the Soviet Union after the dismissal of Peter G. Peterson, who negotiated the trail-blazing trade agreements, created enough uncertainties in the Kremlin for high-level hints to be dropped that Mr. Brezhnev's spring visit would be postponed until autumn.

For Americans the *détente* with the Soviet Union was also a confusing experience. For two decades it had climbed and climbed to become the world's supreme power; it accepted responsibilities much against its traditions and habits of thinking, and with a certain amount of guilt as well as ambition. Both the political right and left were united, by the fear of communism and a missionary zeal, in their desire to bring a new deal to the many downtrodden around the world. It was the only way for a number of successive Administrations to maintain public backing for a foreign policy that was new and alien to most Americans. Now the traditions and the guilt and a reassessment of American values and a disillusionment with the results of that policy are asserting themselves, and as a consequence, the consensus that sustained it has disintegrated. The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, though it has come to recognize a certain community of interest with the United States, shows a new dynamism that animates its foreign policy and continues to propel it toward more ambitious geopolitical goals. In other words, while the Soviet Union has acquired a new zest in establishing itself as a world power more or less equal to the United States, the United States has become a reluctant world power. □

Western Europe

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

17 January 1973

After Vietnam: who will defend

Europe?

The ceasefire in Vietnam, although now highly probable, is not yet certain. And a ceasefire, while immensely welcome, is not the end of the war. The peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam may be near, but even that agreement cannot guarantee an end to conflict in Vietnam. Given an agreement, the scale of fighting, killing, and suffering may be drastically reduced. For at least a year or two a pause is likely in the conflict of Vietnamese with Vietnamese. And the deadly rain of American explosives, fire bombs, and fragmentation weapons will cease. Some thanksgiving, therefore, seems imminent. It is a thanksgiving muted both by the terrible destruction wrought in the war and by knowing that the internal struggle will continue. But at least the horror of the American overkill will end.

The people most immediately affected are the Vietnamese themselves. Those least able to express themselves—villagers and townspeople in South Vietnam—may hope to lead a less insecure life. Their country has been torn to ruin by the war. Hamlets only a few miles from Saigon have been attacked by the Vietcong, burned by American bombs, and counter-attacked by South Vietnamese forces. It has happened not once but many times over. One such hamlet, Xomsuoi, was described in yesterday's Guardian. The picture is repeated over large parts of South Vietnam, and the northern provinces nearest to the border have been almost totally devastated. Some cities—Quang Tri worst of all—have been wrecked and largely evacuated. Crops have been lost season after season. Great numbers of people are homeless or in overcrowded hospitals or, for children, separated from their families.

In the North the damage is hardly less. Civil war has not broken trade or scattered families as in the South, at least since soon after the French left 17 years ago. But American bombing and coastal shelling have disorganised transport, killed and maimed many thousands of people, and forced the country to a siege economy. Although ordinary life has been possible in parts of the Red River delta—as almost nowhere in the Mekong delta in the South—the whole effort of the North Vietnamese, willingly or compulsorily, has gone into the war and the endeavour to disrupt or change the South. That war has been neither won nor lost. It will continue, if perhaps by less direct means, after a pause.

The President alone

But while the Vietnamese are the people most immediately affected, the consequences of the war reach right round the world. Never again, at least in this century, will the Americans commit themselves to land warfare outside North America or Europe. Even the European commitment has been damaged—more so perhaps than most Europeans have yet realised. And the foundation of the North Atlantic alliance, in mutual confidence between the US and other Governments, has been severely shaken. Whatever interpretation is put on the final phase of the war, with its brutal bombing round Hanoi

and Haiphong, there is a cancer of suspicion that President Nixon consulted hardly anyone even in the White House. Are we to conclude that the American President, who commands a nuclear force now capable of destroying all civilised life, is not responsive to advice? The question is a dreadful one to ask but it will have to be asked.

Over Vietnam the President is under no compulsion to consult anyone outside the United States. But in deciding on December 16 or 17 to launch heavy bombing round Hanoi and Haiphong he seems to have consulted nobody outside the White House and not many in it. Normally the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other members of the National Security Council would be consulted. Normally, too, with a decision carrying heavy implications in foreign policy some of the senior Congressional leaders would be called in. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 President Kennedy kept the National Security Council in almost continuous session, discussing and evolving the tactics which put heavy pressure on Mr Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba but always left him a way of doing so.

Excessive force

No such consultation, so far as is known, took place in mid-December. The President decided on his own. Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently admitted last week in evidence to a Congressional committee that he was not consulted on the December decision. His evidence was given behind closed doors, but according to a Congressman present at the session Admiral Moorer said that the President simply ordered the activation of an existing contingency plan.

In justification of Mr Nixon it will be argued that his decision got results. After the bombing the North Vietnamese returned to the conference table. That they did so, however, is not necessarily because of the bombing. Each side was trying to see what terms it could extract from the other. And even if the bombing had had that consequence it still seems a vile and inhuman act. It used grossly excessive force to achieve a limited diplomatic effect.

This was not the first misuse of massive air power in the war. The American motives for going to Vietnam were honest and idealist. President Kennedy and President Johnson wanted to help prevent Communist insurgents from taking over South Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers, published last year, revealed many misjudgments and subterfuges but they did not invalidate the original American purpose. What went wrong was a failure first to realise that the social and political structure in South Vietnam was too weak—nearly always the Americans were building on sand—and secondly failure to realise that the war must be fought by a series of small actions in the swamps, jungles, and paddy fields. It could not be won by bombing and burning the country into ruins. Rather late, two years after American intervention on the ground, Mr McNamara as Defence Secretary began to understand this. He tried to restrict the excessive use of aircraft and

artillery. But from the Tet offensive of 1968 onwards the tactics again degenerated. Bombing came back as a major weapon both in the South and in the North. The cliché that parts of the country must be destroyed in order to be saved was coined.

If a ceasefire comes and if the American forces finally withdraw, that chapter will close. But, as already stated, its consequences will be felt at least for the remainder of this century. Until 1945 the American tradition was to avoid external commitments. But in 1945, with the Russians on the Elbe and in Austria, the Americans knew that they could not leave Europe. Nor, with McArthur dominating the Western Pacific, could they quickly leave Japan. A world rôle became acceptable to majority American opinion. The Korean war and its heavy casualties did not change that; Vietnam and the frustrating sense of failure there have changed it. Only in Europe can the United States be assumed now to accept a continuing defence commitment. Even there the day of departure must now be closer. While the Americans stay, questions of nuclear control will have to be reconsidered. When they go, who or what will take their place? The collective defence of Western Europe cannot be allowed to disintegrate entirely.

If the President acted alone in the December crisis could he act alone in a European crisis? Perhaps any contingency in Europe requiring urgent Presidential decision is now remote. Let us hope that it is; and let us acknowledge that, if so, Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik deserves some credit. Nevertheless it has to be remembered that the President still commands the world's most destructive nuclear arsenal and that the American nuclear guarantee underpins the whole of NATO's strategy.

So far as is known, the nuclear "fail-safe" mechanisms to prevent unauthorised use of Polaris, Poseidon, Minuteman and other weapons are designed to stop a general, admiral, airman, sailor, or silo commander mistakenly pressing a nuclear button. Whether there is a parallel "fail-safe" mechanism to prevent an impetuous Presidential decision is not known. The National Security Council is supposed to sit with the President in any major crisis, but it has no constitu-

tional or physical hold over him. The most effective preventive may be the existence of nuclear forces only a little less devastatingly powerful on the other side. The North Vietnamese had none, nor were any ever likely to be used on their behalf.

NATO's nuclear arm

Perhaps there is not much that NATO Governments can now achieve. President Nixon has isolated himself from advice. Only Chancellor Brandt among the NATO leaders made direct representation over Vietnam, and he was rebuffed. Conceivably, when American forces have been withdrawn from the Vietnamese morass, a cool reappraisal of strategy and tactics in Europe may be possible. Certainly early consultation is inevitable on the coming sequence of negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations—the second stage of SALT, the preparation of the European security conference, and the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. At present Western Governments have an incentive to say little in public about the final phase of the Vietnam war and its implications. They want to keep a common approach to East-West bargaining. They must also now have an added incentive towards seeing that that bargaining succeeds.

Meanwhile the US nuclear guarantee stands behind NATO. The conventional forces deployed in Western Europe are few—no more than a limited delaying screen. But, mercifully, although the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces have numerical preponderance there is less evidence of a readiness to use them than existed 10, 15, or 20 years ago. For Western Europe the question of creating or not creating a small nuclear deterrent will become urgent. It is a question that almost every Government would prefer not to answer. It is one that the newly enlarged European Community may be forced to face, however, reluctantly. Do we risk having no deterrent, while the Soviet nuclear threat hangs over us, or do we spend millions trying to build the small British and French nuclear forces into something more effective? To have no deterrent is the more likely answer.

Monday, Jan. 15, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Brandt Plans W. German Domestic Reforms

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service
BONN—A foreigner might

have difficulty even pronouncing such words as *Mitbestimmung*, *Vermögensbildung* and *Bodenrecht*, yet they represent concepts that are causing great controversy in West Germany.

These three words translate respectively into English as "co-determination," "wealth formation" and "land law."

Unfortunately, the literal translations don't begin to tell what the controversy is all about.

Essentially, the words represent proposals for modifying West Germany's capitalist structure through redistribution of capital, resources and decision-making powers. And Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic Party, the heir to Germany's tradition of moderate socialism, has long dreamed of making them an integral part of German life.

The expectations of party ideologues have been raised by the 46-seat parliamentary majority that Brandt's coalition of Social Democrats and liberal Free Democrats won in November's elections. For the first time they see themselves within striking distance of implementing the concepts.

Thursday Brandt will appear before the new Parliament to outline the government's proposals for the next four years, and he has already made it clear that the emphasis in his new term will be on domestic problems.

Brandt is highly sensitive to the fact that he was never able to deliver on his first-term promise to be "the chancellor of internal reform." Now, armed with a vastly strengthened majority in Parliament, he hopes to redeem that pledge.

His proposals are expected to be far-ranging, assigning a high priority to such conventional problem areas as tax reform, education, housing and scientific research. To be watched most closely, however, is what he has to say about the concepts of wealth and power redistribution, which are cherished by powerful

elements in his party.

Passage Questionable

Despite the government's theoretically strong mandate, it is by no means certain that Brandt will be able to put these programs across. To pass controversial legislation he must still depend on the coalition's 41 Free Democrat deputies.

Unlike the Social Democrats, who have their power base in the labor movement, the Free Democrats are a more conservative party whose basic support comes from the professional and managerial class and, in some cases, from big business.

Because of this constituency, the Free Democrats tend to a more orthodox view of capitalism and are far more cautious about making major changes in the system. In fact, during the recent campaign they appealed to the electorate on the grounds that they were needed in the government to act as a "brake" on the Social Democrats.

For this reason, Brandt's policy speech this week will be keenly analyzed for the degree of agreement—or the lack of it—reached by the two parties on domestic legislation. Where the more radical Social Democratic proposals are concerned, political circles here predict a scenario something like this:

• **MITBESTIMMUNG.** This is a process whereby employers and employees are represented on the supervisory boards of management in industry. The concept is not really a new one to Germans, since various forms of this "co-determination" system have existed in some segments of German industry for years.

What interests industrialists and trade union leaders now is the degree to which the Brandt government will try to extend the system and to give a stronger voice to the representatives of labor.

From the trade unionists' point of view, the ideal model is the coal and steel industry, where workers and managers are equally represented on the supervisory boards. Union leaders want this parity spread across the entire range of German industry, and they are pressing Brandt to propose

legislation that would extend it to every firm employing more than 2,000 workers.

The Free Democrats, however, have other ideas. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, the Free Democrats' leader, recently flatly rejected the idea of parity, with the assertion that his party is "not going to open the way for union officials to dominate industry."

Instead, the Free Democrats have advocated a system that would see supervisory boards composed of six employer representatives, four from labor and two "executives" drawn from the ranks of middle to upper-level management.

Won't Budge

Since it seems clear that the "executives" would invariably side with the employers in any dispute, the unions have pronounced this plan unacceptable and have subjected Scheel to a heavy barrage of criticism.

Nevertheless, all indications are that the Free Democrats won't budge. In practical terms, this means that Brandt can probably win an extension of *Mitbestimmung* throughout German industry—but only in a watered-down version that would leave control in the hand of the employers.

• **VERMOEGENSBLDUNG.** This is a newer and somewhat less clear concept, aiming at earmarking a percentage of industry's profits for redistribution to workers, thereby allowing them to accumulate capital. The most frequently discussed method is legislation that would require all firms of a certain size to put aside part of their profits—for example everything over 5 percent—for this purpose.

In broad outline, it resembles a legislated version of the profit-sharing plans that many American companies have voluntarily instituted for their employees. But some Social Democratic theoreticians envision using the money in ways that go far beyond a prorated, annual profit-sharing payment to a firm's workers.

They advocate putting the money into special funds under the control of unions or other employees groups.

These would then use the accumulated capital to create new enterprises owned by the worker groups. In time, they argue, such a system could result in a vast parallel network of factories and other businesses, owned cooperatively by the workers and competing directly with traditional private industry.

The Free Democrats are on record as supporting the basic concept of "wealth formation" through a greater sharing of profits. In fact, one of their ministers in the new Brandt Cabinet, Werner Maihofer, is widely regarded as the foremost expert on the subject in West Germany.

However, the indications are that the Free Democrats will never go along with what strikes them suspiciously as plans to undermine traditional capitalism and prepare the way for transferring the ownership of industry from private hands to the workers.

Instead, their thinking tends toward more traditional forms of profit-sharing that would apply the funds toward such things as pensions, opportunities for workers to acquire stock in the firms where they work, or annual "bonus" payments.

Thus, in this area, too, there appears to be a possibility for compromise between the coalition parties that could swing them jointly behind support of "wealth formation" in some form.

• **BODENRECHT.** This refers to the idea that West Germany's land ownership and tenancy laws should be comprehensively overhauled to insure that property is being utilized in ways that provide maximum benefit to the community.

Lately, the concept has been associated with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the former mayor of Munich and Brandt's new minister for city and country planning. Vogel is among the handful of Social Democrats regarded as leading contenders for the chancellorship when Brandt leaves office, and he has seized on "Bodenrecht" as the area in

NEW YORK TIMES
12 January 1973

Europe Weighs Nixon's Move And Worries About the Dollar

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Special to The New York Times

which he hopes to make his mark.

Definition Not Easy

As explained by its proponents, the concept is not easy to define because it covers an endless range of problems. Its most obvious feature is that it attempts to curb the rampant land speculation that has been a long-running scandal in West Germany.

Among the solutions tentatively proposed are changes in the system of land taxation to discourage speculation. For example, someone who buys land to hold for future resale at a heavy profit would be subjected to taxes so heavy that his gains would go to the community rather than into his pocket.

Vogel and other supporters of the concept are also interested in enabling poorer families to purchase land and making it easier for municipalities to acquire land in expensive central city areas for "socially useful" things like schools and parks.

In general, the subject is so new and of such a vast scope that it requires considerable study and refining. Eventually the government hopes to come up with a comprehensive package of legislative proposals in this area, but for the moment, no one in either coalition party seems able to say what form and approach will finally be adopted.

In sum, it does not seem likely that the Social Democrats are going to effect any overnight transformation of the German society. Instead, they will almost surely have to lower their expectations and settle for "half a loaf"—at least where their more radical proposals are concerned.

This would still allow them to introduce some innovations among the major industrial countries of the West. And once the beginnings have been made there is no telling how far the concepts might spread.

As some people here point out, there was a time when another German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (who was certainly no Socialist), first introduced the world to a couple of radically strange ideas called social security and health insurance.

PARIS, Jan. 11—The modification of wage, price and rent controls in the United States and higher lending rates in Europe have started caution signals blinking over the dollar in the Continent's financial centers.

The dollar's rate in these centers has been declining in the last few days because of concern that the flow of money to the United States may stop and that the dollar-choked central banks of Europe will acquire still more greenbacks.

At the same time financial specialists in Europe are worried that inflation in the United States, now relatively low, will increase. A writer for the Paris financial daily *Les Echos* observed: "Should inflation lose its virulence in Europe and should it pick up in the United States, as seems to be the case, it will not be long before the dollar is removed from its shelter and a new monetary crisis will break out."

In Frankfurt today, after the announcement that the Federal Reserve Bank of Germany had raised its principal lending rate from 4.5 per cent to 5 per cent, the dollar bought 3.2026 marks compared with the high this week of 3.2080 on Tuesday.

This was the fourth time the German central bank had raised its lending rate in three months.

A Classic Strategy

Interest rates are rising, not just in Germany but all over Europe, as monetary authorities battle the dangerously rising cost of living.

The rate of inflation in Western Europe, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, has been running at 9 per cent

lately, compared with a little over 3 per cent in the United States. Making money less available is one of the classic ways of curbing price increases. The basic interest rate in Britain has just been raised from 7.5 to 8.25 per cent. The rate in Belgium is expected to rise soon. And France and Switzerland are clamping down hard on the money supply.

Lending rates have been rising in the United States, too, but less rapidly than in Europe. The Federal Reserve Board chairman, Arthur F. Burns, has told Congress that the United States wants to keep the cost of money as low as possible to avoid slowing the present expansion in economic activity and employment.

But the International Monetary Fund, a multinational watchdog agency, and some European central bankers want American interest rates to rise faster to keep the flow of dollars moving westward. On top of the higher interest rates in Europe, the suspension of most controls in the United States has aroused some concern here over the possibility that the American expansion will be accompanied later by a new bout of rising prices.

The United States has gained considerable competitive advantage in world markets from the spread between American and European interest rates, and this is expected to reduce last year's yawning \$6-billion trade deficit.

The change in currency values that took place 13 months ago is also expected to help. Specialists at the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental organization that looks at the economic performance of nations, see the United States getting an advantage of around 12 per cent over other countries on average.

For the nation's over-all international accounts, this should be worth, these specialists say, around \$8-billion a year.

But the point is that these advantages have been very slow in coming, mainly because of the magnitude of the trillion-dollar American economy and the current boom-whetted appetite for imports.

A Long Way to Go

Third-quarter figures released in early December showed some redressment of the United States balance of payments deficit, but there is a long way to go yet before anything approaching equilibrium is reached.

This means there is a continual problem of financing the deficit. Somebody has to pay for American spending.

What has been happening is that private or nongovernmental foreign interests have been investing more in the United States. A rising confidence in the dollar, on the expectation that the balance of payments would improve and that the American economy would score large gains this year, made foreigners more willing to hold dollars.

As a result European central banks, the agencies of their governments, were spared the burden of having to finance the deficit by taking more dollars into their bulging coffers.

The European governments are anxious not to have to acquire more dollars because this would go counter to their anti-inflation programs.

The more dollars they acquire, the more of their own currency they have to print, and it is the rush of money from the presses that has been one of the fundamental cause of inflation.

Near East

WASHINGTON POST
21 JANUARY 1973

'Camel Money'

By Ronald Koven

Washington Post Staff Writer

AT A RECENT conference of European and American opinion leaders, former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, now a Wall Street investment banker, facetiously offered an easy solution to the problems of the Middle East. "Let the Arabs buy out Israel for \$100 billion," Ball proposed. "That would come out to about \$250,000 per family of five. And then resettle the Israelis in Northern Ireland."

"I have another idea," interjected John J. McCloy, former U.S. high commissioner in Germany and former chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank. "Why not let the Arabs buy up all the big Western corporations—GM, Imperial Chemical and so forth. Then we'll expropriate them. Without compensation, of course."

The jokes were about a very serious problem that is only beginning to attract the attention of Western leaders. As American, Japanese and European petroleum needs periodically redouble and other sources of supply dwindle, Middle Eastern desert oil sheikhdoms are going to find themselves amassing billions of dollars more than they need for improving the lot of their tiny populations, let alone for buying themselves more air-conditioned palaces, Cadillacs, yachts and executive jets.

The mischief-making possibilities of all that loose "camel money," as the New Yorkers call it, can be nightmarish. It is easy to imagine tiny sheikhdoms using their funds as war chests to manipulate Western currencies, to withhold oil for months or years as political blackmail or to finance armed insurgencies. The possibilities are endless; but the likelihood of all or even most of them occurring is uncertain.

As the House Foreign Affairs Near East subcommittee put it in September, in the first congressional report on U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf: "Never before in the history of mankind have so many wealthy, industrialized, militarily powerful and large states been at the potential mercy of small, independent and potentially unstable states which will provide, for the unforeseeable future, the fuel of advanced societies."

Many Imponderables

AMERICANS are used to thinking of the Arab world as a single unit of more than 100 million people. But the desert Arabs who are amassing the

great bulk of the oil revenues number 10 to 12 million in Libya and the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia, which sits atop a quarter of the world's known petroleum resources, is the largest, with fewer than 8 million people, but no one knows the exact numbers in some of the remote emirates of the southern Gulf.

The accumulation of massive oil revenues in states with such small populations is an aspect of the world energy crisis that has received little attention so far. McCloy, who has broad, high-level contacts in the Nixon administration, complains that he has yet to meet anyone in government who has given the matter serious thought. In fact, however, a small but growing number of officials at the White House, the Treasury and State Departments and the International Monetary Fund are thinking, talking and writing about the problem—largely among themselves.

Except in some academic circles, few conclusions are offered. Official estimates must be based on all kinds of assumptions about the future—the price of oil, the amounts needed and produced, the spending and saving proclivities of the sheikhs, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the leftward drift of the Arab world.

One estimate, perhaps the highest, is that the Middle Eastern oil producing countries will earn \$1 trillion in less than 30 years. But this estimate, recently cited by Robert O. Anderson, chairman of the Atlantic-Richfield Oil Co., seems to presume an unmodified continuation of all present upward trends.

The Middle East's monetary reserves have risen more than 50 per cent in the past 12 months. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has tripled its central bank reserves since January, 1971, to more than \$2 billion.

George A. Lincoln, director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, referred to this in testifying before the Senate Interior Committee this month that "certain of the oil states are accruing large revenues which will eventually permit them to risk losses of revenue for considerable periods of time for political ends." But Lincoln's warning was against organized oil boycotts, not against the damage that use of the money itself could do.

Money Beats Oil

OIL BOYCOTTS head most lists of the potential disasters that the Arab world could inflict on the West. But many students of the matter con-

sider an effective Arab oil boycott an iffy possibility at best. When it was tried after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the oil "leaked" in great streams from consuming countries not being boycotted to the nations the Arabs were trying to punish.

The State Department view, however, is that after 1975, boycotts—even by one supplier at a time—could become more effective. This is because a consuming country's ability to switch to alternate sources of supply will become severely restricted as the world's spare producing capacity rapidly declines.

Nevertheless, money may prove a far more effective weapon than oil. Most oil boycott scenarios involve a group of oil producers acting in concert. But a single country can apply monetary muscle against anyone; to do as much damage with a production boycott, it first must make a consuming nation vulnerable by becoming its regular source of oil.

Even the strongest currencies can be subject to periods of weakness, and a sophisticated central banker can lie in wait for such a critical point to cause a run on another country's money. Money, in many ways, is a commodity like any other obeying the laws of supply and demand. When a particular currency is a glut on the market at a given rate, the pressure is on for devaluation. Dumping more of the currency on the market, or even threatening to do so, leads to panic selling. Such behavior was a standard part of the foreign-policy weaponry among the nations of prewar Europe.

In the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle used France's reserves (then \$6 billion, now \$10 billion) to hurt the United States by cashing in French dollar holdings for gold. His example, it is generally accepted, was closely watched by Middle Eastern governments. It is alleged by some bankers that Israel subsequently turned the general's own monetary tactics against him, orchestrating the dumping of francs at a weak moment to retaliate against de Gaulle's embargo on arms for Israel.

A variant of such tactics was discussed recently at an Arab oil conference in Kuwait, according to James E. Atkins, head of the State Department's Office of Fuels and Energy. "The suggestion was put forward that Arabs should move their money around from bank to bank within a country 'as a warning' if the host governments were suspected of taking anti-Arab actions. If this government, where the money

was being held, persisted in its 'hostile' actions, the funds would be withdrawn."

Another nightmare possibility is that Arab governments would enter Wall Street with the objective of political manipulation, buying stocks and dumping them, taking over companies that deal with Israel and so on.

Games Libyans Play

PUNITIVE shifting of funds has already been employed by Libya's mercurial Muammar Qaddafi. A year ago, angered over Britain's allowing Iran to occupy three islands in the Persian Gulf, Qaddafi ordered Libyan funds converted out of pounds sterling. Estimates of the amount involved range anywhere from \$300 million to \$1.2 billion—precise intelligence in such matters is hard to come by. He now is said to be shifting his holdings into Eurodollars.

Qaddafi's monetary reserves total about \$3 billion, which may not sound like a lot in these days of a \$1 trillion U.S. economy. But Washington currently holds about \$13 billion in reserves for a population of 210 million, while Libya's \$3 billion is supposed to cover the contingencies of a population of fewer than 2 million. U.S. reserves are enough to cover what economists consider a healthy minimum of three months' worth of American imports; Libya's reserves would cover 15 months of imports.

Obviously, the Libyans can afford to play games and the Americans cannot. The Libyans are already hard at work trying to make some of the Western nightmares come true. The political pressure of the Libyan example seems to have induced conservative Saudi Arabia to do some of the same.

Qaddafi has announced that Libyan money bought arms for Irish Republican army terrorists in Ulster. He pledged support for Malta in its negotiations to get more money from NATO for the allied naval base on the strategic Mediterranean island. And there are signs that Libyan money has recently been used to sever Israel's ties to African nations.

As one highly placed Arab put it, "Why do you think all these African countries are suddenly cutting their relations with Israel? They didn't get a messenger from God. They got oil money."

In the case of Chad, Qaddafi publicly pledged about \$90 million for the sparsely populated country. Saudi Arabia's King Faisal recently visited Niger, another of the five African countries that have broken with Israel. The king reportedly left behind \$10 million as a gift.

Funds For Fatah

ARAB OIL MONEY has already been in use for some time to finance the Palestinian guerrilla movements and their terrorist offshoots. There is so much loose change in the Persian Gulf that even a small fraction of it devoted to guerrilla activities can produce significant results.

In the Arab oil sheikhdoms, the distinction between governmental money and the income of ruling families and

their cousins is not always strict. Palestinian fund raisers are said to do the circuit of the Persian Gulf emirates, as one U.S. official put it, "just like the United Jewish Appeal canvasses American Jewish businessmen, in search of 'conscience money.'"

The Palestinian fund raisers are effective not only because of the obvious appeal that they are in the front line of the Arab nation's struggle, but also because Palestinians have become a potent source of skilled professional manpower throughout the region. In comparison with other Arabs, the dispossessed Palestinians are both highly educated and underemployed. They therefore serve as a pool of advanced expertise for the Gulf states, whose populations are largely illiterate and only beginning to enter the 18th century.

In Kuwait, by far the most advanced Gulf state, the governmental apparatus has become largely dependent on Palestinian bureaucratic talent, which helps explain why that tiny oil state has become one of the Palestinian movement's major bankrollers.

There is a limit, however, to how many bazookas and submachine guns the Palestinian groups, as presently constituted, can absorb. It must at least have crossed the minds of the Israelis that future Arab oil revenues could be used for huge expansions of the arsenals of the Arab armies. Some private authorities actually suggest that encouragement of heavy arms purchases would be a logical way of sopping up excess oil revenues.

The State Department's Akins pointed out in a recent speech that Iraq has already spent hard currency to buy Soviet bombers capable of "hitting Rome and returning without refueling."

"Should Iraq, or indeed any country with almost unlimited income from oil," he observed, "decide to buy sophisticated armaments, there would seem to be no practical limits on how much of this could be spent—as depressing as it may seem. I suppose that Iraq could spend \$8 billion of its \$10 billion a year on arms. These new weapons might enable the government to exterminate the Kurds. . . ."

But, Akins added, he found it difficult to believe that even this kind of arms buying could affect Israel's position in the next few years because "training troops, pilots, tank commanders takes a long time."

Husbanding Resources

FOR THE WORST of the West's nightmares about "camel money" to come true, a series of assumptions about future trends would have to be borne out. These assumptions turn out to contain varying degrees of probability:

- The first assumption: that oil production will continue to expand at the present fantastic rates for the rest of the century.

There are already signs that Arab governments view oil as a finite source of wealth which must be husbanded.

Kuwait, whose 66 billion barrels in proven reserves are exceeded only by Saudi Arabia's 145 billion (and the Soviet Union's mostly remote 75 billion), has already announced that it will stop expanding production. It is a tiny territory, and almost all of its oil must have been found by now. The population of 750,000 already has welfare state benefits rivaling Sweden's, no income taxes and two air conditioners per capita. Combined monetary reserves are slightly more than the Saudis—enough to cover 40 months' imports. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Kuwaitis are thinking of preserving their "national patrimony" for future generations.

Partly to spite the British, Libya has restricted production. Iran plans to establish a production plateau at less than double the present levels. Even the Saudis, whose annual oil discoveries still exceed annual production, are talking about eventual limits, albeit at four times the present levels. Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Zakī Yamani has said that his country will continue to double and redouble production only "provided it can find adequate uses for its income at home and satisfactory investment opportunities abroad."

Yamani was serving notice that Saudi Arabia will not be satisfied to add more than \$1 billion a year to its monetary reserves indefinitely. The Saudis say they would rather see their money earning 10 or 12 per cent from investments rather than let foreign banks cream off half the earnings for managing Saudi funds. Money that is tied up in long-term investments would not be available for the kind of monetary fun and games that must be rapidly organized.

Assuming present trends hold, Akins calculates that Arab monetary reserves would increase tenfold by 1980 over the present total of \$10 billion. "This is staggering," he adds, "but I do not believe there is any chance this will be achieved. Long before that point, the money will have been spent or invested or, if it cannot be, production would have been cut back."

Will Prices Keep Rising?

- The second assumption: that the price of a barrel of Middle East oil will continue to rise, and that the producing governments' share will also continue to rise.

The assumption of indefinitely rising prices for a barrel of oil ignores the need for the oil producers to hold price levels below those of alternate energy sources lest such still uneconomic schemes as extracting oil from shale or from heavy petroleum tar are made profitable. Oil's real future rival is, of course, atomic energy. But, with the international producers' cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (most of the Arab oil states plus Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia), the sellers have created an effective, centrally controlled oil-pricing system that seems to insure a price advantage for petroleum at least until the end of the century.

There are also those who have predicted that oil prices would drop

sharply. Prof. Morris Adelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology predicted in 1963 that prices would drop to \$1 a barrel. (They are now reaching for \$6.)

In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, Adelman said his prediction would have been correct in strictly economic, supply-and-demand terms, but that he had not expected "the consuming countries, especially the United States, to cooperate so zealously" with OPEC in negotiating higher prices under the threat of production boycotts.

How Much Dependency?

• The third assumption: that the United States will eventually become dependent on the Middle East for more than half its oil.

What gives this assumption—and many of the others—a special impact is an often unstated set of Western beliefs about the Arabs: They are fundamentally unstable. They are governed by passion. They are vindictive. They are childlike. Even the most committed Arabists, sooner or later, seem to betray a paternalistic, and therefore condescending, attitude.

Justified or not, the all-pervasiveness of this attitude led one State Department man to remark, "I can't help wondering if we would worry so much about this problem if the oil were not in the Middle East. We don't worry much, after all, about the other oil in underdeveloped countries—Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia. And those countries are not any more fundamentally stable than the Arab states."

As an expression of this attitude, the report in early 1970 of the President's Task Force on Oil Import Controls headed by then-Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz said that dependence on Middle East oil for more than 10 per cent of U.S. needs would be dangerous. The group predicted that that point would not be reached before 1985. In fact, Middle East oil already represents 15 per cent of U.S. consumption, and more than 80 per cent of Western Europe's. Last September's House Near East subcommittee report estimated that the United States would need to import half its petroleum by 1980, and that two-thirds of the imports would be Middle Eastern.

The dominant thinking in the U.S. government seems to be that the United States, the world's biggest fuel burner, must take steps to reverse the trend to Middle East oil at home. This involves a variety of approaches—increased exploration for Alaskan and offshore oil, diversification of energy sources, research and development, an alliance with the ecology movement to encourage European-style automobiles with more-miles-to-the-gallon, Western Hemisphere preferences for Venezuelan as well as Canadian oil, etc. It all spells an eventual plateau in the U.S. demand for Arab oil.

"Threats to use oil as a political weapon made by the government of Libya and others are of considerable assistance," says Akins, "in getting popular acceptance of the proposed belt-tightening."

GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUES (In millions of dollars)

Year	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Iraq	Dhabi	Qatar	*Others	Mideast	Libya	Total
1961.....	464	400	301	266	...	53	13	1,498	3	
1962.....	526	451	334	267	3	56	13	1,649	39	
1963.....	557	502	398	325	6	60	13	1,861	109	
1964.....	655	561	470	353	12	66	14	2,131	197	
1965.....	671	653	522	375	33	69	16	2,342	371	
1966.....	707	777	593	394	100	92	19	2,682	478	
1967.....	718	852	737	361	105	102	24	2,898	631	
1968.....	766	966	817	476	153	110	83	3,370	952	
1969.....	812	1,008	938	484	191	115	118	3,666	1,132	
1970.....	897	1,200	1,076	513	231	122	150	4,189	1,295	

Sources: Petroleum Press Service, from the Washington Papers volume, "Oil, The Middle East and the World," by Charles Issawi.
*Bahrain, Oman (beginning in 1967) and Dubai (beginning in 1969).

"Turban in Your Tank"

• The fourth assumption: that the Arab oil states will simply stockpile money, while—in something of a contradiction—they simultaneously acquire the high degree of monetary sophistication needed to manipulate the world's money market.

Sheikh Yamani, who is also OPEC's chief negotiator, has offered one way to tie down the loose cargo of Arab oil money. He has proposed what one Washington wag calls the "Put a Turban in Your Tank" solution—a Saudi guarantee of a large, specified supply in exchange for the elimination of tariffs and import quotas and the granting of the right for Saudi Arabia to invest in "downstream" oil operations of U.S. companies: tankers, refineries, marketing and distribution systems and, ultimately, the corner gas pump. U.S. officials have publicly responded that the Saudis are welcome to invest, but that a long-term government-to-government oil treaty is out.

The reason seems obvious. What Yamani is asking for is that Washington grant Saudi Arabia a monopolistic preponderance in supplying oil to the United States. While Americans, as the world's largest energy consumers, will probably become dependent on the Saudis in any case, a formal contract would only accentuate the weakness of the U.S. position.

The Saudis, in fact, defend their growing relations with the United States against radical Arab criticism by pointing out that a strong Saudi-American economic connection would eventually give the Arabs far more political leverage over U.S. policy than any amount of revolutionary, anti-American rhetoric.

The influence of Arab money on Wall Street seems inevitable. Students of such phenomena say that the strong pro-Israeli influence on the Street would have made unthinkable four or five years ago the now frequent listing of Kuwaiti banks in announcements of underwriters for new corporate stock and bond issues. Sheer financial weight has won the Kuwaitis that place.

But the Arabs risk eventually provoking the same kind of Gaullist-style nationalistic backlash that finally met once-welcome U.S. investors in Western Europe.

George Lincoln testified that "perhaps there may be a point beyond

which such (Arab) investments would become undesirable, but that is certainly a long way off."

Investments in America and Europe will undoubtedly sop up many of the Arab oil dollars. This is now positively viewed by the U.S. government as an offset for the \$10 billion yearly outflow projected by 1980 for U.S. oil imports and because it will give the Arabs a stake in the American economy. "It will give us something to expropriate if they expropriate us," was the way one official put it. It will also give the oil companies the investment capital they desperately need and will no longer be able to finance out of their reduced profits as the Arab governments take the lion's share of revenues.

But the real potential market for the "camel money" is in the Arab world itself, American experts think. They look forward to the establishment of a Middle Eastern "Arabodollar" market, like the Eurodollar market, where dollars are trapped in a closed European circuit and rarely come home.

Arabodollars are already at work to some extent. The new apartment houses of Beirut are largely a sheikhly preserve. The sheikh's appreciate the virtues of blue chip real estate. Kuwait is estimated to have distributed \$1 billion in grants, loans and gifts to less-fortunate Arab countries.

The real expansion of the Arabodollar market is waiting, however, for the conversion of the Egyptian economy from a war footing to peaceful development. Egypt, the region's political giant, is an economic pygmy. With a population of more than 30 million, Egypt has a gross national product of \$5 billion. If Egypt's federation with Libya becomes a reality, Qaddafi will find that meeting Egypt's overwhelming needs will more than absorb his oil revenues, much diminishing his capacity to rock the international monetary system.

But Egypt's needs are so great that they are bound to suck Saudi money into the economic vacuum also. There are those who think the process is already beginning. It is said to be hard to get a hotel reservation in Cairo nowadays because of all the visiting sheikhs looking over the investment and other opportunities. A match between the Arab world's leading petroleum power and its leading political, population and cultural power would only need peace and a moderate government in Cairo to take place almost au-

tomatically, many American experts believe.

Support for Israel

• A final assumption: that economic self-interest both on the U.S. and Arab sides will be subordinated to politics, with the Americans continuing to support Israel at the risk of inciting the Arabs to a more anti-Western stance and with at least some of the Gulf states—possibly even Saudi Arabia—cutting themselves off from their natural Western customers by following the revolutionary path of Libya and Iraq.

The Israelis have generally taken the position that U.S. oil policy has no real relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict. So far, the U.S. oil companies, acting as spokesmen for their Arab suppliers, have not had any measurable impact on the pro-Israeli aspects of U.S. policy, but the pressures are mounting. As George Lincoln put it, "a total energy policy" requires a number of U.S. measures, including "foreign policy actions to further the stabilization of the Middle East."

That can mean only one thing: pressing harder for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

Lincoln was testifying before Senate Interior Committee Chairman Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), one of the most vocal supporters of Israel in U.S. public life. Jackson recently returned from a visit to Saudi Arabia, the first in five years by a U.S. senator. While Jackson is not known to have modified his views on Israel, the Saudis see his willingness to come and listen to them as a favorable straw in the wind.

Inevitably, there will be an erosion of U.S. support for a stand-pat position in which Israel prefers to sit pretty with the territory it now holds to making a compromise with the Arabs. The future U.S. dependency on Arab oil, the coming Arab shareholding in the U.S. economy and the still-latent fear of Arab monetary warfare, quite aside from the desire to reduce Soviet opportunities for intervention in the Middle East, will all converge to create a stake in the kind of Arab moderation represented by Saudi Arabia's Faisal.

It has often been argued that the trend to radical, "revolutionary" regimes in the Arab world has been fostered by the struggle against Israel, that deposed rulers like Egypt's King Farouk, Libya's King Idris and the Imams of Yemen proved themselves incapable of meeting the Israeli challenge. Not that the revolutionaries have done any better, but they seem to have convinced Arab opinion that at least they mean business. This is the basis for the assumption that sooner or later one or more of the Persian Gulf emirates will go the way of Libya, Iraq and Syria. The U.S. stake in maintaining moderate regimes is bound eventually to start tipping against the American commitment to Israel.

As the guardian of the Moslem holy places, even Faisal must be ideologi-

cally committed to opposing unqualified Israeli control of Jerusalem. He is therefore vulnerable to Palestinian appeals for help, even when they come from self-proclaimed Marxist revolutionaries. He helps finance Al Fatah, the main guerrilla group. But he has demonstrated no fundamental opposition to an accommodation with Israel—especially since it might well ease some of the radical pressures on his highly traditional society.

That very traditionalism, with its inbred lack of worldly expertise, is another of the forces expected to militate against the political exploitation of "camel money" in the international arena. The head of the Saudi monetary agency, who was here recently to discuss with the likes of Chase Manhattan, First National City Bank and the International Monetary Fund how Faisal's reserves should be invested, is a Pakistani, not a Saudi.

The oil revenues do mean that there should be plenty of scholarships to send natives of the Gulf states to the Wharton School and Harvard Business to learn how to run their own national monetary agencies. The Saudi government provides 1,000 U.S. scholarships a year for future civil servants. The products of such educations are not very likely to become Arab revolutionaries inclined to play Samson with the international monetary system.

In any case, the oil states are still so strapped for qualified personnel that there are not even any petroleum affairs experts to serve with Saudi embassies in such key oil-consuming countries as the United States, Britain and Japan. University graduates with assured jobs to come home to do not have the same radical temptation as the students of other Third World countries like India or Egypt, where the educated simply join the uneducated in the pool of unemployed.

THERE IS A feeling of relief at the IMF, where the problem of how to deal with excessive central bank reserves in any reform of the world monetary system has been under discussion. Treasury Secretary Shultz has been pressing for a system of penalties, such as automatic revaluation of heavily backed currencies, aimed at discouraging West German and Japanese accumulation of reserves.

But the representatives of the OPEC states in the IMF's Group of 20, in a reaction some officials hope is a clue to healthy future attitudes toward their reserves, have argued that such penalties should not be applied to them, because their reserves are not reserves in the traditional sense but long-term investment funds.

Yet even the most optimistic U.S. officials volunteer that the magnitude of the funds expected to accrue to the Gulf states is such that even if 95 per cent were put to economically productive uses, the potential for political blackmail in the small unproductive balance is still enough to cause nightmares in the West.

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 20, 1973

Israel

The case of the poison pen

FROM OUR ISRAEL CORRESPONDENT

Rabbi Meir Kahane and his Jewish Defence League are still trying to make their mark on Israeli public opinion. But, having chosen as its target the politically explosive issue of the Arabs living in Israel or Israeli-occupied territories, the league is heading on collision course with the government.

Late last year Rabbi Kahane declared that he wanted to meet the mayor of Hebron to explain to him that Hebron should be Jewish and that, because of Hebron's pogrom against its Jewish population in 1929 there was now no room for Arabs in the town. Mr Moshe Dayan tried to calm the very angry mayor by assuring him that the Jewish Defence League was no more than a very small extremist group which the government would not allow to do any harm. The truth is that this new immigrant from America has no more than a few hundred adherents, most of them students from America and young immigrants from Russia.

After going to ground for a few weeks, they struck again a fortnight ago when several hundred Arabs and Druzes received letters advising them that since the whole territory was Jewish country they would be wise to leave. The defence league offered them financial assistance to subsidise their immigration. This time Rabbi Kahane made his mark, though not perhaps as he intended. Both Arabs and Jews were horrified and the government instructed the police and government attorney to collect material to indict the letter-senders. A few days later the minister of justice told the Knesset that suits would be filed. The rabbi, undismayed, made his peace with Druze leaders, saying their letters had been sent by mistake, and then called a press conference to announce that he was ready to face prosecution—and that he would be sending out more letters to Arabs.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

23 JAN 1973

Oil & Money

Western Nations Fret
As Arabs Accumulate
Massive Sums From OilU.S., Other States Worry
How Funds Will Be Used,
Fear Monetary Instability

'Up, Up Into the Stratosphere'

By RAY VICKER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia—Thanks to their oil, Arab nations are accumulating undreamed-of wealth—which, of course, makes them happy. And they now have successfully put the squeeze on the West to get even more money for their oil—which makes them even happier.

But not everyone is happy. The flood of dollars and other Western currencies into Saudi Arabia and other oil nations threatens to become the "No. 1 problem of the world monetary system during the next decade," says an international economist for a major New York bank. The key question: How can the money be used? In the most pessimistic view, this new situation could mean monetary instability or oil shortages—or both.

At the very least, major changes in international relationships are likely in the long run,

The huge amounts of money that Arab nations will get from selling their oil could imperil the world monetary system and spur the U.S. to new political activity in the Mideast. This is the first of two stories examining the situation.

according to officials interviewed in this Saudi Arabian capital; in Jeddah, the nation's diplomatic center; and in Dhahran, its oil center. Western central bankers may have to find a seat for this nation at their councils. Arab money may become a new source of investment in the U.S. oil industry. America's exporters may have to work harder if the U.S. is to stem a dollar drain because of oil imports. And, like it or not, Washington may have to pay more attention to Arab wishes and sensitivities—because by 1985 it is estimated the U.S. will be importing about half of its oil, and most of this will come from the Middle East. (Right now, the U.S. imports 23% of its oil, mostly from Latin America and Canada.)

In another decade, this desert nation of five million to eight million persons is likely to have reserves of about \$30 billion in gold and foreign exchange. That would be more than double the present American total, and it clearly would turn this developing country into a monetary giant. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations will become industrial giants. They signed an agreement with Western oil companies giving those nations a 25% equity interest in the firms' oil production, effective Jan. 1 of this year. Companies in Saudi Arabia currently produce about six million barrels of oil a day—roughly half the output of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

The Need for Cooperation

So what will happen? In an interview here in Riyadh, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Harvard-trained minister for oil, declares:

"We don't believe in the use of oil as a political weapon in a negative manner—embargoes and things like that. We believe the best way

for Arabs to employ their oil is as a basis for true cooperation with the West, notably with the U.S."

In the Saudi view, cooperation should include opportunities for Arab investments in refining and marketing of oil. This month representatives of nine Arab nations took the first steps at a Kuwait meeting to launch a tanker fleet company. And Abdullah Absi, director of petroleum affairs for the neighboring sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, is talking with interests in Pakistan and Malaysia about possible joint-venture refineries there. He says he has received "several offers" from the U.S. for joint-venture refineries on the American East Coast that would be served with Abu Dhabi oil.

Non-Arab Iran, another Persian Gulf state, isn't involved in participation takeovers because it nationalized its oil industry two decades ago. Still, it also is going into other operations: It now has part of a refinery in South Africa, has plans for other joint refineries in Belgium and Greece, and is even looking for oil in the North Sea in cooperation with British Petroleum Co.

If the Arabs are sounding conciliatory on matters of oil, so, too, are they on matters of money. Anwar Ali, the governor of Saudi Arabia's monetary agency, which is based in Jeddah, says, "International cooperation on a broad scale will be necessary to minimize the disruptive effect of a massive accumulation of foreign reserves by Arab nations in the Middle East. We realize it is to our advantage to handle our surplus funds in a manner that doesn't disrupt the system. Stability is as important to us as it is to the Western world. You must help us by providing opportunities for us to invest our surplus funds."

Monetary Repercussions

But can the U.S. and other nations provide such investment opportunities? The answer isn't clear yet. Saudi Arabia's offer to invest in the U.S. oil industry is conditional: The U.S. must lift all duties and import restrictions on petroleum from Saudi Arabia. This arrangement would help tie down surplus Arab funds and would ease the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. But it would be opposed by other oil producers, such as Iran, which also want privileges in the U.S. market. In addition, Washington doubts that such close financial arrangements with any foreign power are wise.

Walter J. Levy, an oil consultant based in New York, told a recent meeting of the American Petroleum Institute that it is "most unlikely" that the U.S. or any other developed country "would permit continued massive foreign investments on a scale that would progressively result in foreign takeovers of important companies and industries."

If the Arab money stays in short-term financial holdings, as at present, and continues to grow, billions could be transferred quickly from one Western nation to another for whimsical reasons, raising monetary havoc. Unless this vast accumulation of funds can be immobilized, Sen. Hubert Humphrey warns: "The sheikhs of Arabia will control the dollar."

In less alarmist terms, Mr. Levy, the oil consultant, says the short-term money markets couldn't handle "such excessive and most likely very volatile funds without undermining the world's monetary arrangements." He sees the risk of "severe international repercussions."

So a lot of people are worried. In Western Europe, some central-bank officials realize that the \$30 billion reserve figure projected for Saudi Arabia within a decade is about the size of the flow of "hot money" that helped upset the old monetary system in 1971. Hot money refers to funds that are transferred across borders to take advantage of higher interest rates, safe money havens or other short-term factors.

Bankers also remember how in the 1960s, when Britain's pound sterling was weak, the

Arabs made periodic, politically inspired threats to transfer funds out of England to bring down the pound. At that time the principal funds consisted of the more than \$1 billion holdings by Kuwait—peanuts by the standards of the 1970s.

As a result of all this, Mr. Levy, the oil consultant, sees the possibility of "potentially extensive restrictions on the free flow of capital." He adds, however, that any international restrictions on capital or short-term movements of funds would harm the monetary system. "In the affected Middle East and capital-surplus countries," he asserted in his speech, "any restrictions on their investments abroad would probably be accompanied by restrictions on the output of oil."

As the economy in the U.S. thrives, the dollar is picking up some strength. But with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Libya promising to become nations with big balance-of-payments surpluses, it remains to be seen whether the dollar can remain strong.

By 1980 fuel imports are expected to cost the U.S. a net \$10 billion more annually; thus the U.S. would have to take in vast new hard-currency earnings just to maintain the status quo in its international payments. And with this year's deficit estimated to be \$15 billion by one leading measurement, Washington already considers the payments imbalance unacceptable.

Skirting the Issue

In preliminary discussions about revision of the monetary system, the Committee of 20 has skirted the issue of monetary imbalances. The committee consists of officials from 20 nations whose task is to recommend new rules and procedures for maintaining international monetary stability. The U.S., for instance, would like a system that would compel any nation accumulating huge surpluses to make an immediate upward revaluation of its currency. However, any such system wouldn't work with Saudi Arabia or sister states; oil payments are designated in dollars with provisions for automatic increases if the dollar's value deteriorates. And, anyway, European nations aren't ready to accept the U.S. proposal.

The new participation agreements with the oil companies are adding even more money to the accelerating revenue of the Persian Gulf nations. Abu Dhabi, for instance, estimates that participation will add another \$220 million in the next three years. Kuwait puts its net additional gain at \$300 million. The nations are buying 25% of the companies' holdings at a price of about \$1 billion. The states' percentage is to rise in steps to 51% by 1982. Involved are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, with Iraq likely to follow.

In 1971, oil-producing nations of the Middle East earned \$7.1 billion in revenues. In the 1972-75 period, they are expected to take in a total of \$79 billion or so. And by 1980, according to the reckoning of the Conference Board in New York, these nations will be collecting about \$30 billion a year.

Saudi Arabia's gold and foreign-exchange reserves totaled \$2.5 billion last Nov. 6, the latest date for which figures are available. This is a rise of \$794 million from Jan. 1, 1972, Mr. Ali says. The buildup is expected to continue under the triple combination of rising oil prices, much higher production and a larger share of revenue going to the country rather than the companies.

The monetary agency estimates that Saudi Arabian oil revenues in the year ending next August will be \$2.9 billion, without making any allowance for the "substantial revenue increase" expected to stem from the participation agreement. The year-earlier total was \$2.3 billion. Saudi officials are reluctant to do much forecasting, but some sources predict that oil revenues will double from the current level by

THE NEW REPUBLIC

27 JAN 1973

Fruit of his Errors

around the middle of the decade and may double again by the end of the decade.

One Western banker who has been operating as a money adviser here says, "Saudi Arabia's reserves will be going up and up, right into the stratosphere."

Much of the oil that the U.S. is likely to take from the Middle East in the future will probably come from Saudi Arabia. Oil Minister Yamani summarizes the situation this way: "The U.S. is the world's biggest oil market. We are the world's biggest oil supplier. It is natural that we should cooperate with each other."

A U.S. Commerce Department report says:

"With U.S. dependence on foreign oil increasing and with Saudi Arabia fast becoming a leading supplier of our requirements, it is only a matter of time before the U.S., for the first time in the history of its trade with Saudi Arabia, slips into a net deficit." The report adds: "The aggressive selling on the part of U.S. exporters that might possibly prevent this from occurring has yet to develop."

Output Is Rising

Because of rising taxes and royalties and the recent participation agreement, major international oil companies with operations in this part of the world are experiencing an increase in the per-barrel costs of their oil. So they raised their average price level to consumers by about 10 cents a barrel, and consumers are likely to face a steady rising price trend in the years ahead. Some oil sources say consumer prices in 1980 will be at least double what they are today, and even higher than that if inflation is added to raise crude prices.

Saudi Arabia is pushing its production hard. In 1972, the country's output was 5.73 million barrels a day, up 28% from 1971. Expectations are that production this year should average about 7.3 million barrels a day. And in 1975 the country is expected to be producing at a level of 10 million barrels—a figure that would exceed U.S. output. By the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia's daily production may rise to 20 million barrels. With proven reserves of more than 150 billion barrels, the country has the capacity for such increases.

Mr. Ali says that such increases are "conditional upon receipt of cooperation from the Western world so that oil may be produced and delivered at reasonable prices in a situation agreeable to both producers and consumers." He adds that a "just settlement" of the Arab-Israeli question would be one of the best ways to assure the cooperation of the Arab world, and some sources in this part of the world believe that such talk is spurring the U.S. to seek a solution to the Mideast dispute.

The Cairo Documents by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal

(Doubleday; \$10)

Nasser, like the man whom he despised the most, Anthony Eden, is a classical example of why a clean bill of health should be required of any head of government. Heikal, editor of the frequently quoted Cairo daily, the "semi-official *Al Ahram*," makes it obvious, though he does not put it so inelegantly, that Nasser's rule in the '60s was first and foremost the rule of a diabetic. Heikal is an Egyptian cross between Kissinger and Boswell; he remains, the reader senses, puzzled by some of the things that Nasser said and did in his more and more impulsive moods, but feels perhaps that it would be undignified to suggest that the naive, honest, ascetic hero of modern Arab history was finally too emotionally diminished to govern Egypt. (On the other hand, one significant factor in this book is just how many leading players in the Mideast crisis thought that their colleagues or opponents were demented. Dulles is quoted as finding Eden "a little mad," while Khrushchev found Dulles a "mad monk.")

The documents referred to in Heikal's title are letters to and from Nasser—missives exchanged with Johnson, Kennedy, Khrushchev, Nehru, Hammarskjöld and others. The book is full of little Nasserian insights into these and others whom Nasser met at length—Tito, Eden, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Che Guevara. But mostly the book is a chronicle of Nasser's early victories and later defeats, the fruit of his transparent errors.

Historically, the importance of Nasser's errors were the uses Israel made of them. Many turns of history still remain unclear: there are now a dozen interpretations of most of the major events in the Middle East since 1950. The only universally accepted fact seems to be that Eden was a nincompoop. But it is clear, even from this slightly gung-ho Egyptian account, that Israel has always kept the initiative. When war broke out, it was often because of things that the Arabs did, but never when Israel did not want it.

Because the trait is so germane to Arab history, the temptation for historians will be to attribute Nasser's volatility to his asceticism. He had the attitude to personal wealth of a Ralph Nader. He hated uniforms and protocol. His principal meal was cottage cheese and unleavened bread. Yet Nasser, although

a revolutionary, was no insensitive Almoravid. He saw the pan-Arab dream as his hero, Bismarck, saw the pan-German dream. He failed to see that it had been the preposterous birth of Israel, not his revolution, that had given the Arabs the limited unity they had.

Heikal is an advocate, not a judge, but on some points he cannot honestly be faulted. Nasser, at least originally, hated war. As Heikal notes, he raised the *fedayin* as a response to Israel's parcel bombs and other terror, notably the "Lavon affair" (which Heikal blames on Ben Gurion, not Lavon). Heikal also reports fairly on other people's well-meaning "solutions" to the Mideast problem. The US, it appears, at one point proposed sharing the Negev between Jordan and Egypt, with a linking road: an Israeli road would pass underneath it on its way to Eilat, which would have remained Israeli. Proposals like this were hardly the "help" the Arabs sought.

As Nasser's one-time special envoy to Washington, Anwar as-Sadat, put it then, all the "aid" that Egypt really wanted from Washington was "understanding." But no one made much attempt to understand anyone else. Dulles, while doubting Eden's emotional stability, basically accepted Eden's Etonian analysis of a sassy Wog. Nasser in turn misunderstood most Americans at the highest level—especially Johnson—while enjoying those from the CIA and the embassy. The British believed that Nasser had engineered the dismissal of General Glubb, the English commander of Jordan's Arab Legion—while Nasser thought the British had shoehorned Glubb out themselves, to save Hussein.

According to Heikal, the US withdrawal of Aswan aid in 1956 (because of Nasser's recognition of Peking) had been planned in advance at a Baghdad Pact meeting that March. Notes of this parley apparently reached Nasser from Iraqi sources in April.

Nasser and his Washington ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, publicly accepted the West's terms for continued aid; but Lincoln White, at the State Department, was announcing Dulles' cancellation of aid just as Hussein and Dulles were sitting down to talk in another room. In return for this, Nasser nationalized Suez—perhaps his least morally defensible and silliest act. (Earlier he had

written Nehru approving internationalization of the waterway.)

Sources in Malta and Cyprus and at Baghdad Pact offices in Iraq kept Nasser informed of Anglo-French plans for the Suez war. Even the CIA fed information on General Keightley's invasion preparations and of "how Eden's health is affecting his judgment"—Dulles' words. Nasser decided that Eden was "a velvet fist in an iron glove." At the UN, the US threw its vote against Britain, France and Israel: Nasser made sure that when pipelines were blown up in Syria, American lines should not be touched.

One reason Heikal is tolerant of the declining Nasser is that he never shared his master's passivity. He relates with intemperate pleasure two different deaths for Premier Nuri Said of Iraq. But Heikal's was another view which Nasser needed, just as he needed the Levantine guile of his foreign minister Mahmoud Fawzi, who carefully avoided being for or against the President's controversial decisions. On the whole, like Khrushchev, Fawzi and Heikal were moderating influences.

Symbolic of Nasser's decline were his quarrels with old friends like Tito and especially Hammarskjöld, whose Congo policy Nasser found too evenhanded. Nasser's mistakes in the Congo were among those that paved the way for Mobutu's right-wing dictatorship. When the US and Belgium rescued hostages from Stanleyville in 1964, Nasser failed to see a noble corollary between this and Arab support for Palestinians, and allowed a mob to burn the US library in Cairo. He refused to apologize when one of his triggerhappy MIGs shot down an unarmed US oil company plane. Sensitive to insults himself, he publicly called Johnson a "cowboy," of Nasser's recognition of Peking) had been planned in advance at a Baghdad Pact meeting that March. Notes of this parley apparently reached Nasser from Iraqi sources in April.

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But unlike Anthony Nutting in a recent book, Heikal does not blame Nasser's triggering of the Six-Day War on Israeli cleverness. He relates the familiar argument that Nasser only wanted certain UN posts deactivated. Ralph Bunche decided—presumably on the advice of Brigadier Indarjit Rikhye—that it was all or nothing. U Thant agreed. Nasser, a colonel, should have understood why: but he apparently lacked the moral courage to back down. The whole UN force was withdrawn—and Israel went in, in its place.

First, the Israelis "informed" Washington that the Egyptians would invade at dawn on May 27, 1967. Washington asked Moscow to pressure Egypt. Nasser persuaded the Russians that the "invasion" report was baseless, publicly announced that Egypt "would not fire the first shot"—then made his saber-rattling speeches to his pilots and the world. Many Egyptians wanted war and did their best to keep mediators, like the Americans, at bay. Nasser left friends, but no evidence, to testify that he did not want war at all.

The last years were a festival of over-reactions—arresting his guest, Premier Moise Tshombe of the Congo, in 1964, rejecting Nahum Goldmann out of hand in 1968, responding to Bonn's objections to Walter Ulbricht's Cairo convalescence by making it an "official" visit. The loss of Nehru's sobering influence was capital. Nehru had wanted to bring the Jews and Muslims together: told that the impediment was the existence of a million Palestinian refugees, he said partition, in 1947, had given India 16 million refugees.

Nasser never got along quite so well with his other Asian adviser, Chou En-lai. Chou told him to put "brigades" of guerrillas into the Sinai to "live with the people." Nasser was understandably startled. Earlier (in June 1965), Chou had told Nasser that he wanted the US to escalate in Vietnam, where US forces would be China's "hostages," amenable to China's plans to demoralize the US Army with opium. Nasser was puritanically shocked on both counts.

Balancing Moscow and China was, of course, never easy. Khrushchev told Nasser that Mao was an opportunist who had left it to Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Japanese. But Peking clearly saw Cairo as being special: its ambassador there was the only diplomat not recalled during the Cultural Revolution.

Heikal's book is timely, titillating and as true as anyone dared expect. Now the Middle East looms once more as the main world crisis, the confrontation area between China and the West. Egypt and Jordan seem prepared to settle for a return of their lands—in exchange, it's thought, for free navigation in the Suez Canal and internationally policed demilitarization of key frontier zones. If Israel seizes the opportunity, the Palestinians would be left with little more than Syrian support. Would Nasser, had he lived, have offered such a deal to Israel, over the Palestinians' heads? Heikal, one surmises, would have pressed him to. But Nasser probably would have felt compelled to fight on for justice—and a later generation might have blamed him for another defeat. *In fine*, what use, if any, is a good man in politics, especially when he suffers from diabetically induced bouts of "nervous exhaustion." Nasser found, like Kaunda and Nyerere, that there could only be one Gandhi.

Russell Warren Howe

WASHINGTON POST
18 JANUARY 1973

Tad Szulc

Pakistani POWs: 'The New Forgotten People'

NORTH VIETNAM'S determination to hold American prisoners of war, now close to 600, as hostages against a truce or peace settlement has all along been a grim but accepted reality of the Vietnamese conflict and the parallel Paris negotiations. Yet, the assumption always was that these Americans would be released the moment the hos-

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ilities involving United States forces in Vietnam have ceased.

Elsewhere in Asia, however, the precept of international law that prisoners must be freed with the cessation of hostilities does not seem to apply: Pakistani military and civilian personnel are still interned by India in POW camps. They remain there today although the latest subcontinent war ended in mid-December 1971, more than 13 months ago.


For all practical purposes, the estimated 92,000 Pakistanis, including approximately 16,000 civilians, captured in the fighting over the emergence of the new state of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), are hostages to the complex and angry politics of the subcontinent and the ever-deep distrust between India and Pakistan.

This indefinite condition of hostage for the largest number of people in foreign captivity since World War II is tacitly recognized by Indian officials for reasons they privately admit to be overwhelmingly political. Pakistan, of course, has repeatedly charged that its defeated soldiers are India's hostages. But, incredibly, only the International Committee of the Red Cross, which periodically inspects the 53 POW camps under the provisions of the two Geneva Conventions on war prisoners, has openly and insistently demanded the release of the Pakistanis.

MOST OF THE WORLD appears to be conveniently looking the other way, including the United States which, to say the least, was supportive of Pakistan in the 1971 war. The 92,000 Pakistanis are, then, Asia's new forgotten people: the officers and soldiers, the civilian officials and professionals, the women, the children and the babies born in the camps. This general indifference is, presumably, a reflection of the underlying political stalemate in the subcontinent engaging India and Pakistan on one level and the related interests of each of the superpowers on the other.

At this stage, when New Delhi and Washington actively seek to improve their frayed relations and the Nixon administration hopes to expand the detente with Moscow, nobody in this town is prepared to rock the precarious status quo in South Asia by raising the fate of the Pakistani POWs as a major international issue.

In fact, the United States nowadays seems to feel cooler toward Pakistan as it edges toward better ties with In-



dia. Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for one thing, has publicly condemned the United States Christmas bombings in North Vietnam while India kept mum. Even China, an ally of Pakistan, is singularly quiet on the subject of the POWs. Moscow is India's treaty partner and, therefore, uncritical of her. Only Romania, the Communist maverick, has expressed support for Pakistan over the prisoners.

But beyond all these power considerations there remains an array of moral, legal and political questions concerning the 92,000 captive Pakistanis.

THE MORAL QUESTION has two aspects. One is the matter of mass atrocities committed by the West Pakistani forces in Bangladesh before and during the independence war. This is perhaps what the outside world remembers the best: The atrocities set off a wave of indignation here and elsewhere. Thus it may be understandable that Bangladesh wishes to punish through trials those responsible for the murders. But it has indicated that at most 1,500 of the Pakistanis now held in India, less than two per cent of the total, may be wanted for such trials.

This raises the obverse moral question: Is it justifiable to hold 92,000 persons indefinitely in prisoner camps (quite aside from the current controversy between India and the Red Cross over proper treatment of the prisoners, the shooting of escapees, the overcrowding of camps and so on) because a tiny minority may be guilty of war crimes? One wonders—at least for the sake of consistency—about the absence of major international outrage concerning the 92,000 captives.

The legal situation seems to be crystal clear, but this is no solace to the POWs. Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, to which both India and Pakistan are signatories (Bangladesh acceded to it last August), provides that "prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." When the Pakistani forces capitulated on Dec. 15, 1971, the Indian Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, formally assured the Pakistani commander that "I shall abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions."

On Dec. 21, the United Nations Secu-

rity Council noted that "a cessation of hostilities prevails." In the Simla Agreement, signed on July 3, 1972, India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and President Bhutto pledged themselves to the "establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent" and instructed their representatives to discuss outstanding problems, "including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees," before the next summit meeting.

ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS for the release were thus met, but India (which 20 years ago handled the repatriation of the Korean War POWs) now invokes a host of political and security reasons for refusing to free the Pakistanis.

The first reason cited by India is that she cannot release the prisoners without consent of Bangladesh on whose territory most of them surrendered to the joint Indian-Bangladesh command. But the catch in the intricate subcontinental political game is that the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, refuses his consent until Pakistan recognizes his new state and until he has made up his mind about the war trials.

The vicious circle in which the POWs are caught extends to Islamabad where Bhutto, fighting hard to convince his rightwing opposition that ultimately Bangladesh must be recognized, insists for his own political reasons that this must be preceded by a personal meeting between him and Mujibur. Bhutto, who released Mujibur from prison late in 1971 and probably saved his life, argues that such problems as Pakistan's responsibility for prewar external debts for projects in Bangladesh should be settled prior to recognition. But Mujibur refuses to meet Bhutto before recognition.

Late last year, Pakistani diplomats at the United Nations privately asked the Indians whether New Delhi would guarantee in writing that the Bangladesh recognition would bring the POWs' release. Diplomatic reports say that the Indian reply was at best non-committal. Bhutto's letter to Mrs. Gandhi last Dec. 21, proposing a new summit, has not yet been answered and Indian diplomats here are vague as to when such a meeting might be possible.

Finally, Indian officials have begun talking about Pakistan allegedly preparing a "new round" and rearming with "massive" weapons shipments from China. Significantly, they now speak of the POWs in terms of "four-and-a-half divisions of trained troops." A senior Indian official remarked recently: "How can we let such an army go free when Pakistan is again preparing for war?"

Thirteen months after the cessation of active hostilities, the Geneva Conventions and all the precedents notwithstanding, the deadlock seems unbreakable and the 92,000 Pakistani prisoners may be fated to remain India's hostages for an unpredictable period of time. International morality, it would appear, has seen better days.



NEW YORK TIMES
24 January 1973

CHURCH COUNCIL WIDENS BOYCOTT

To Add Banks Dealing With
White-Ruled Africa

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Jan. 23 — The World Council of Churches has decided to include banks in its boycott of concerns doing business with African countries ruled by white minorities.

Frank Northam, the council's finance director, said today that there was "complete agreement" in the council that the "banking community provides considerable facilities and services that represent support" of the white regimes in black Africa.

The council, he said during an interview, must take action against banks "comparable" to that announced yesterday when it sold holdings in concerns doing business with South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese-ruled African territories of Guinea, Mozambique and Angola.

However, before such action is taken, he said, a more precise definition of the banks to be blacklisted must be formulated than the one used now by the church agency's central committee.

Last August this group said that none of the council's funds were to be deposited in banks maintaining "direct banking operations" with the African countries dominated by white minorities.

Action To Be Studied in August
A formula for identifying the banks falling under the prescribed ban is to be drafted for submission to the central committee at its next session in August, in Helsinki, Mr. Northam said.

It was in the same resolution dealing with banks that the committee ordered that the council sell all its holdings in corporations "directly" investing in or trading with African countries under white rule.

The council announced yesterday that it had complied with this request by selling off stocks with a market value of about \$1.5-million. The shares were all of companies on a list of 650 United States, British, Dutch and Swiss concerns that the council said had been identified as coming within the ban.

At the end of last September, according to Mr. Northam, the council's holdings included 611 shares of International Business Machines valued at \$248,000, 1,500 shares of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing listed at \$111,825 and 400 shares of Burroughs Corporation worth \$88,600.

These were some of the more

WASHINGTON POST
21 December 1972

Panthers Find Little Warmth in Algeria

By Elias Antar
Associated Press

ALGIERS—Seven Americans who hijacked two airliners in the United States and forced them to fly here last summer are finding that Algeria is not a pleasant refuge.

Taken under the protective wing of Eldridge Cleaver, former leader of the Black Panther Party, they have been kept muzzled and restrained by the Algerian government. The hijackers are not prisoners, but they are not allowed to move out of the capital.

"The government has no enthusiasm for them or for whatever cause they think they are upholding," said one source close to the situation.

President Houari Boumediene prides himself on being a revolutionary socialist who gives a helping hand to liberation movements and victims of political oppression. He allowed Cleaver to open a Black Panther office here in 1970.

The hijackers extorted \$1½ million from Western and Delta airlines in the two incidents. Boumediene returned the money and the planes, but has not responded to extradition requests from the United States. Nor has he put the hijackers on trial in an Al-

important investments in United States concerns on the list of companies doing business with white governments in Africa that are no longer held by the council.

Sell-off Called Profitable

"We made a profit all along the line," Mr. Northam said regarding the changes made in the council's shareholdings as a result of the sell-off.

However, he added that only time would tell whether the professional managers of the church organization's portfolios would be able to match their past performances under the limitation placed by the blacklist.

The managers of one of the portfolios resigned because of the restrictions, Mr. Northam said.

The council's shareholdings totaled about \$3.6-million before the blacklist was sent to the portfolio managers, the finance official explained. Now this total has been reduced to \$2.4-million by the investment of about \$1.2-million in short-term notes and other interest-bearing securities, he said.

gerian court.

"The Algerians don't want to seem to be prosecuting blacks on behalf of Washington," said one source.

But Boumediene has not replied to their demand that political asylum be officially granted them.

Underlying the Algerian attitude is the possibility of improved relations with the United States following a settlement in Vietnam.

Those who first flew here last summer were William Holder, a 23-year-old Vietnam deserter from Oakland, Calif., who claims he is a member of the Panthers, and his girl friend, Catherine Kerkow, 20, formerly of Coos Bay, Ore. They are accused of forcing a Western Airlines jet to fly here June 3 after collecting \$500,000 in ransom.

On Aug. 1, a "hijacking family" arrived on a Delta Airlines DC8 after pirating it over Florida and extorting \$1 million. The suspects are George Wright, 29; George Brown, 28; Joyce Tillerson, 21; Melvin McNair, 21, and his wife, Jean, 25. All are from Detroit. They brought three small children along.

Wright escaped in 1970 from state prison at Leesburg, N.J., where he was serving time for murder. Brown, who was held for armed robbery, escaped from the same prison at the same time.

Holder announced here last September that he was the new leader of the "international section" of

the Black Panthers, a job Cleaver formerly held.

The "hijacking family" lives somewhere in the Pointe Pescade suburb five miles west of the city.

Officials of Algeria's only party, the National Liberation Front—which gives them a reportedly meager subsidy—refuse to disclose where they are or what they are doing.

The family declined, through Cleaver, to be interviewed. "They don't see where it would do them any good to meet the press," Cleaver said.

Asked about Holder's alleged Panther connections, Cleaver said: "This is something that concerns him and since he doesn't want to talk about it, I won't."

Cleaver, who jumped \$50,000 bail in 1968 when his parole was revoked on a conviction for attempted murder in a shootout between Panthers and police in Oakland, refused to discuss his personal plans.

Asked what had become of his announced intention to return to the United States to lead a battle for liberation, he replied:

"It's not something I would want anyone to print anything about. It's private information. My legal situation has not changed so there is nothing to talk about."

Cleaver embarrassed the Algerians by demanding that Boumediene turn over \$1 million in hijack funds to the Palestinian guerrilla movement. Without giving a reason, Boumediene declined.

While supporting the Palestinian guerrilla movement, Algeria has not specifically approved of the Palestinians' multiple hijackings. It has, however, said they should be excused because their actions were the result of desperation.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 January 1973

Wrong-Flag Embarrasses British Concorde in Angola

LONDON, Jan. 27 (AP)—Officials of the British Aircraft Corporation are trying to find out who was to blame for their supersonic Concorde flying into a Portuguese colony displaying the flag of an anti-Portuguese guerrilla movement.

A spokesman for B.A.C. which is building the 1,600-mile-an-hour jet with Aerospatiale of France, said: "The crew honestly thought they were flying the flag of Angola, the Por-

tuguese province in West Africa."

Angola, however, has no flag. The offending pennant belonged to the Movement for the Liberation of Angola, an African movement at war with Portuguese troops in the province for the last 12 years.

"We have offered our deepest and most sincere apologies to the Portuguese government for this unfortunate error," the spokesman said. "We would like to make it clear that it was a silly mistake and there was no intention of being offensive."

Western Hemisphere

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 January 1973

New signs of U.S.-Cuba detente

Sentiment rises for renewed relations

By Charlotte Salkowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

As talks with Cuba on a hijacking pact move into their third month, sentiment seems to be rising here for a normalization of relations with that long-estranged, Communist neighbor.

A group of 12 Republican representatives presented a position paper Monday calling for legislative and executive initiatives to consider the re-establishment of ties between Washington and Havana. The move is only a modest beginning, but there may be significance in the fact that it comes from a Republican contingent.

Three developments, say the 12 lawmakers, now create a new political climate favorable to detente: President Nixon's policy of dealing with all types of governments, including China and the Soviet Union; the trend among Latin American countries to recognize Cuba; and indications that Havana itself is softening its foreign policy.

Hearings recommended

With a view to moving toward detente, the congressmen recommend that hearings be held in the House and Senate to assess the state of relations and that President Nixon likewise direct an interagency review of the problem.

Congressional observers feel it is premature to judge the impact of the recommendations. They believe that any serious action has to come from the executive branch and that if the group's proposals were put before the House now they would be overwhelmingly defeated because there is no need to do anything and because of Premier Fidel Castro's continuing anti-U.S. attitudes.

But it is not ruled out that, if the move sparks a thorough review in the Congress, this could lead to an opening on the Cuba question.

State Department officials, for their part, are careful to make clear that the talks on an antihijack agreement are entirely isolated from the total U.S.-Cuban relationship and the question of normalization. Echoing President Nixon's comments of last year, they state that no change in American policy is contemplated until Premier Castro alters his policy of exporting revolution to Latin America and letting the Soviet Union use Cuba for military purposes.

There is less export of revolution, these

days say U.S. officials, but it continues, and the Cuban apparatus for carrying it on is still in place.

The Republican congressmen contend, however, that many Latin American governments no longer see Cuba as a subversive threat and that a growing number of them have normalized relations in the past two years or indicated a desire to do so.

Many problems seen

Before Washington could recognize Havana, the legislators' report states, a number of problems would have to be resolved. These include the matter of Cuban refugees fleeing to the U.S., the American tenancy of the Guantanamo Naval Base, compensation for the expropriation of U.S. properties, and the sugar quota question.

Voicing reservations about the report, some observers feel it deals only with subsidiary issues, omitting the substantial question of the Cuban-Soviet relationship. The basic question for Washington, they believe, is what threat the Soviet presence in Cuba poses to the United States and what effect a normalization of ties would have on Premier Castro's options vis-a-vis the Russians — issues they say are not raised.

Benefits seen

The group of legislators, who include Rep. Charles W. Whalen Jr. of Ohio and Paul McCloskey of California, see significant benefits accruing from a renewed dialogue with the Castro government. They name these as a probable reduction of plane hijackings to Havana, restoration of Cuba as an important trading partner and improved relations among the Western Hemisphere nations.

After a complete appraisal of the question, they suggest, Congress should consider, among other things, lifting the trade embargo against Cuba.

Meanwhile, State Department officials say the outlook for a pact with Cuba on hijacking is hopeful but not yet certain. Progress has been made in the negotiations, they say, the issues have been narrowed, and Havana now is considering the latest U.S. proposals, submitted through the Swiss Embassy about 10 days ago.

At issue in the talks has been the question of political asylum and the definition of hijackers and hijacking. Washington reportedly has wanted a treaty covering the prosecution or extradition of those who escape to another country by seizing a plane or a boat with the use of force. Cuba, on the other hand, apparently has sought to define as hijacking such acts as stealing a plane or a boat to escape to Florida.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 January 1973

A Step Toward Cuba

The United States effort to perpetuate the isolation of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere is a conspicuous anachronism in 1973, one of those aloof standoffs that does no one any good. It has been an anachronism at least since President Nixon's historic trips to unblock the American stalemate with the People's Republic of China and to expand and improve relations with the Soviet Union. Even before those journeys, the Cuban quarantine was steadily eroding.

Yet, despite some progress toward an anti-hijacking accord with Cuba, Washington's official word to Latin America still reflects the rigid line toward Fidel Castro's regime voiced by the President last November. Only a few weeks ago, the State Department sharply criticized four small Caribbean nations, three of them members of the Organization of American States, for daring to open diplomatic relations with Cuba in defiance of the sanctions invoked by the O.A.S. in 1964. Last June, the United States defeated a Peruvian bid to relax the O.A.S. quarantine, whereupon Peru promptly went ahead on

its own to restore ties with Havana. Mexico never adhered to the sanctions and Chile resumed relations with Cuba in 1970.

With his incessant abuse of Mr. Nixon and the O.A.S., Premier Castro does not make it easy for Washington to change course. Yet these attacks are no more extreme than those from mainland China against Mr. Nixon and the United Nations right up to the Washington initiatives that led to the President's trip and indirectly to Peking's arrival at Turtle Bay. Mr. Castro's attempts to export his revolution—the main motivation for the O.A.S. sanctions—have long been a conspicuous failure.

No dramatic Washington overture is called for; merely a quiet passing of the word that the Administration will no longer bar Cuba's return to the inter-American system if and when Mr. Castro wishes to lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union. Normalization of relations between Washington and Havana cannot come quickly; the important thing is to make a modest start to remove an anachronism that not only no longer serves any American purpose but, if clung to indefinitely, could eventually produce a wholly unnecessary diplomatic humiliation for this country.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1973

U.N. Council to Meet in Panama Despite Objections

By ROBERT ALDEN
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Jan. 26—The Security Council made a final decision today to hold a disputed series of meetings in Panama City.

A committee reporting to the Council today said that the meetings, to be held from March 15 to 21, would cost the United Nations \$92,000. A 150-man staff, in addition to the Secretary General and his personal staff, will be sent to Panama to assist at the sessions.

Solution to Canal Problem

Those favoring meetings away from headquarters to consider regional problems—the first was held last January in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia—say that such meetings give the people of the underdeveloped countries a feeling that the United Nations has an immediate and real concern for their problems.

Aquilino E. Boyd, the representative of Panama, who will serve as chairman of the Council

during the month that his country is to be its host, said today that Panama was looking forward to the meeting because it wanted to find a solution to the Panama Canal problem.

Efforts by Panama and the United States to replace the canal treaty signed in 1903 have thus far proved fruitless. In 1964 there were anti-American riots in Panama because of unrest over the treaty.

Today, Mr. Boyd expressed hope that the Council would be able to find "formulas to defuse the explosive situation due to the colonialist-type enclave called the Panama Canal Zone, which bisects my country and stands in the way of its territorial, political, economic and social integration."

Speaking for the United States, Christopher H. Phillips said that the holding of such meetings—with an agenda that embraced all the problems of Latin America—opened the door to the kind of general debate that was the function

of the General Assembly, not the Security Council.

He said that Mr. Boyd's reference to the canal underlines the fact that it "will be difficult to avoid the discussion of bilateral issues, which are not before the Council."

Along with Britain and Australia, the United States fears that by moving the Security Council about "like a traveling road show," the effectiveness of the Council's primary function—the maintenance of international peace and security—may be impaired.

In arguing against regional meetings, these countries have said that meetings away from New York headquarters, where communications are excellent and where records are kept, impair the Council's ability to function effectively, should an emergency arise.

But despite these objections, an informal alliance of the underdeveloped countries, including Latin American, Asian, African and Arab blocs—with firm support from China

and the Soviet Union—have had wide success in pushing the view that the United Nations should be further decentralized.

In addition to Security Council meetings away from New York, the Third World countries have also pressed for a decentralization of the headquarters of some United Nations bodies.

As a result, the new United Nations body dealing with the earth's environment will have its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will be held in Santiago, Chile.

At this stage, the form that the Panama Council meeting will take is not clear.

All the Latin American countries are expected to be represented and to be invited to appear before the Security Council. Some may be represented at the ministerial level. It is possible that some heads of state—Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba has been specifically mentioned—may appear.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 January 1973

Loan Abstention On Brazil Reflects Split by Agencies

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

Differences between Treasury and State Department decisions have seldom been in sharper focus than in the recent abstention from a World Bank vote on a loan to Brazil by the U.S. director, Robert E. Wiczorowski.

In general terms, the Treasury takes a stern and pragmatic view of politico-economic decisions both to defend the U.S. currency against perceived possibility of misuse and to carry out the letter of the law, much as a commercial banker would do. State is more concerned with diplomatic impact and the niceties of relationships with governments.

The United States and Brazil are the closest of allies and the State Department wants no problems with the South American nation. But Wiczorowski gets his instructions from the Treasury Department and Treasury has no direct responsibility for the state of relationships between the United States and any foreign nation.

"Touched Base With Us"

At State, they faced the necessity for explaining to the Brazilians that the abstention did not mean that Washington had changed its friendly policy toward Latin America's largest and richest nation. At Treasury, they do not encounter the aftermaths of such incidents.

Perhaps to mollify Brazil, State indicates Wiczorowski "may have exceeded his instructions" or possibly "misinterpreted his discretionary powers."

But at Treasury, it is firmly said that the United States director "touched base with us" and abstained because it was not thought that the loan would benefit the lower income groups in Brazil.

The vote took place Dec. 19 on whether to approve a World Bank loan of \$26 million to help about 700 Brazilian ranchers to increase meat production in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso, Santa Catarina and Sao Paulo. Despite the U.S. ab-

stention on a panel where this country has about 23 percent of the voting power, the Brazilian loan was approved narrowly.

The incident is important because the United States and Brazil, as the two great powers of the Western Hemisphere, are close allies. Brazil, however, is hypersensitive to even implied criticism of its military-dominated government and is especially thin-skinned about foreign attitudes toward its current economic boom and aspirations for great power status.

Shocked and Puzzled

The Wiczorowski vote shocked and puzzled the Brazilians and their diplomats made haste to contact the State Department to ask if the United States had gone off on some new policy tack. Brazilian editorial writers did not fail to take note of the U.S. vote at the World Bank although their reaction was restrained rather than outraged.

The United States hurriedly assured the Brazilians that there was no change in Washington's policy and that the abstention had been made on technical aspects of the loan in the light of the bank's stated development policy. Wiczorowski is not commenting on the incident but it is believed he abstained because the loan appeared to be more to the advantage of a few well-to-do ranchers producing for the export market than to help the Brazilian masses through social change and redistribution of wealth.

The loan actually was a renewal of an earlier 1967 loan and is cast in "soft" terms, meaning the repayment period spans 17 years with the first five years as a grace period.

Privately, some officials raised eyebrows over the Brazilian loan on such soft terms because Brazil's prosperity wave now has raised that nation's hard currency reserves to more than \$4 billion. Others thought the abstention would have a good effect by making it plain that U.S. approval of Brazilian loans was not automatic but that each case would be decided on its merits.

WASHINGTON POST
27 JANUARY 1973

Taking the U.N. to the People (of Panama)

The notion that the Security Council should periodically meet outside New York and in another country, there to see and be seen close up, was tested warily last year at Addis Ababa. "On balance a plus," the then-American ambassador pronounced. He was speaking for President Nixon, who had voiced the idea of "taking the United Nations to the people of the world, as it were," and he was reflecting an international consensus as well. So this year the Council has been invited to meet in Panama for a week in March, with the Panamanians paying most expenses. Since the Canal issue remains unresolved, the United States, which favors gatherings outside New York (but not at "pressure points"), is not overjoyed. But we are being brave about it. Although U.S. Ambassador Bush, speaking a few days before his retirement, sounded unhappy ("capricious, thoughtless . . . a meeting seeking an agenda"), the Panama City meeting is virtually sure to go on.

One doesn't have to believe that a particular meeting place has magic to like the idea of the Council's going on the road. It points up the global character of the United Nations and conveys the impression—consistent with developing American policy—that the United States doesn't want to hog the international show. Permanent quarters for various U.N. offices have long existed outside the United States; recently, environmental headquarters were set up in Nairobi. Decentralization in its different aspects is plainly the order of the day.

Though many Latins will use the Security Council meeting in Panama City to press their hemispheric concerns, especially their grievances against the United States, Panama is certain to make a disproportionately large reach for support in its Canal dispute with Washington. This is fine: an appeal to international sympathy is a common negotiating tactic; the other party commonly rejoins by warning that the appeal threatens to undermine delicate and otherwise promising negotiations. In fact, indefensible as are the old terms on which the United States has held the Canal and the Canal Zone for 70 years, we find it hard to believe that the new terms proposed by Washington cannot withstand close public scrutiny. Nor should it be assumed that Council members are unable to distinguish the posturing sometimes felt necessary in Panamanian politics from the agreement with the United States required by the Panamanian interest. Or would both sides rather have the status quo—which gives Panamanians an issue and Americans control—than a new Canal treaty?

NEW YORK TIMES
22 January 1973

Government by Colonel

By Jaime Calderon
and James Petras

On Aug. 21, 1971, the American public was informed that the Bolivian armed forces led by Col. Hugo Banzer had overthrown the regime of Gen. Juan J. Torres. There has been little discussion of the causes and implications of the coup or of the policies of the new regime. It is one of Washington's staunchest allies in the Andean area.

What has been happening in Bolivia? It has become a terrifying place for those concerned with social justice and political freedom.

The Banzer regime often goes about its cruel activities at night, in silence, without publicity. Everyone, not excluding the sick, the pregnant or the old are vulnerable to detention for voicing criticism of the regime; even a relative of a critic is likely to be sent off to a dungeon. Political dissenters are beaten by police or paramilitary hooligans. The Bolivian Government has concentration camps in at least four locations—in Achocalla

(a La Paz suburb), in Viacha (a town twenty miles south of La Paz), in Coati (the Island of the Moon, according to Inca mythology near Titicaca Lake), and in Madidi (a disease- and insect-infested region).

With the exception of Madidi, the camps are located in cold and barren regions. If the political prisoners are from the tropics, they are sent to Achocalla, Viacha or Coati, without blankets or warm clothes.

Only the Government knows for certain how many political prisoners are confined in the camps. Various estimates put the number around 1,500, which is quite significant given the fact that perhaps three times that number were able to escape abroad. The political inmates in Bolivia are luckier than those who daily meet death in the streets, bus depots and frontiers, caught in the process of finding refuge. The communiqués on these deaths are always short, concise and take no more space than a newspaper want-ad. The Government almost always justifies these deaths as shoot-outs between guerrilla suspects

and Army or police units.

The Banzer Government has spared no opportunity to abuse individuals and programs that could have guided Bolivia in the struggle for liberation. Instead, the leader has produced a disconnected conglomerate of doctrinal elements opportunistically designed to carry on a political program of total domination. His ideological pronouncements are products of each situation and change when the situation changes. The bombardment and shelling endured by the University of San Andres is matched by the bombardment of distortions, banalities and memorized jargon aimed at the Bolivian people. The basic objective of the Banzer Government is the preservation of the military institution and the privileged classes at all costs. This regime is, in practice, a totalitarian, anti-Communist military dictatorship.

Jaime Calderon and James Petras are members of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners.

BALTIMORE SUN
30 January 1973

For a Caribbean Detente

In the conduct of U.S. relations with Cuba, President Nixon is not a man to be swayed by calls for detente from the likes of Senator Kennedy or 13 liberal Republican congressmen. Without being specific, the President has made it clear that if U.S.-Cuban relations are to improve, the opening gestures will have to come from Fidel Castro, a personality who is no more lacking in pride than is Mr. Nixon. If the situation were limited to a clash of wills, we might have here the ingredients for a continuing impasse detrimental to both countries.

Fortunately, however, there are changes taking place that may, in time, lead to the shelving of anachronistic policies. So far as Cuba is concerned, the notion that Castroism is a revolutionary panacea for all of Latin America died long, long ago. For more than a decade the island's 8 million people have

had to endure exclusion from much of the hemisphere, the poor performance of a distorted economy and an unseemly dependence on Soviet aid. Even Cuba's strategic importance has declined with the development of intercontinental Soviet missiles.

The United States, for its part, has found it prudent to adopt policies toward the Communist superpowers, China and the Soviet Union, that stand in embarrassing contradiction to our frozen stance toward little Cuba. Equally important, Washington has had to watch a growing tendency among Latin American nations to restore relations with Cuba despite tough lobbying from Washington.

While these circumstances have generated new pressures for an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations, they have been insufficient up to this point. What has been needed is a catalyst and, by chance

or otherwise, one at last is available in the current negotiations on the hijacking problem. The Castro government has made at least one overture by letting it be known that two sets of air pirates who commandeered planes to Havana late last year will be tried as the criminals they are. The United States, perhaps in response, is believed to have endorsed a hijacking accord in which this country would punish or extradite persons who use violent means to flee Cuba.

All this is encouraging, but the catch is whether Havana will agree that refugees who do not use force in escaping are entitled to the asylum the U.S. is determined to grant them. If Cuba is flexible on this issue, President Nixon should display hemispheric leadership by parlaying a hijacking accord into the kind of detente Senator Kennedy and those iconoclastic House Republicans have advocated.

WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973

Nationalism the Rule in Latin America

By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES—Chilean President Salvador Allende's world speaking tour in December focused growing Latin American concern over the power of giant international corporations.

But not all of the area shares Allende's contention that the firms are destructive. The coming months will indicate whether Chile can accomplish the formidable task of uniting a front for restrictions against them.

Allende, a Marxist socialist, was ideologically ill-disposed to foreign capital from the outset. Then came the revelation last March that International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., with investments in Chile, had plotted to prevent the duly-elected Allende from coming to power.

Later, Kennecott Copper Corp. sought to recover investments that Allende nationalized under Chilean law by having courts impound Chilean copper shipments to Europe.

To sympathetic audiences
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
12 January 1973

Ex-nun keeps secrets of Che Guevara group

By IAN BALL
in New York

AN American former nun, arrested in Bolivia for belonging to a guerrilla organization, has been held in jail in La Paz for more than five weeks because she will not reveal the identities of other members of the group.

The woman, Miss Marv Harding, of Fairhaven, Massachusetts, a former member of the Maryknoll Order, has admitted that she is a member of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation.

Friends of Miss Harding, who arrived in New York this week, said she was being held in a small, damp cell that had little other than a mattress on the floor.

Miss Harding is said to have told a priest who visited her that she had been beaten with a hard rubber mallet during the first 72 hours after her arrest, on Dec. 5.

A spokesman for the Bolivian Embassy in Washington con-

in the third U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting in Santiago last April, and later Mexico and at the United Nations, Allende called for a concerted reigning in of what he calls the "transnational corporations."

But the official attitude here in neighboring Argentina illustrates the obstacles to united action by the relatively underdeveloped nations, let alone by the industrialized states.

"We are both the recipient and the origin of transnational enterprises," said Antonio Estrany y Gendre, subsecretary of International economic relations.

Estrany, who represents Argentina at world trade forums, pointed out that any common restrictions on the giant world firms would also affect numerous Argentine-based companies that deal in other Latin American countries, and that would provoke strong internal reaction.

Argentine law makes no distinction between transnational corporation activities here and other forms of foreign investment.

An investment law restricts activity in banking

and some heavy industry but always on the premise that "foreign investment is necessary . . . as a complement to national capital," as Estrany put it.

Politically, foreign investment has provoked bitter attacks here for decades, and the new focus of what are also termed multinational corporations has found vehement advocates.

Judge Salvador M. Lozada, who decreed the bankruptcy of a main meatpacking house owned by Deltec International, has declared that such firms threaten the existence of the national state.

A document issued by the military government, which is trying to revive civil rule via elections, states that among points on which all parties and the military agree is the need to protect against "penetration of multinational monopolistic enterprises."

But none of the parties has spoken out for control of Argentine firms that have remitted profits from foreign operations. Mexico and Brazil, with larger concentrations of firms operating at once internally and internationally, show caution similar to Argentina's on ac-

tually enacting political slogans.

One of Chile's specific charges against ITT, aside from the meddling in internal politics, is that its subsidiary phone company in Santiago paid inflated prices for equipment imports from ITT plants in Brazil or Europe.

A study by the UNCTAD staff alleges that over half of the exports generated by multinational corporations—and ballyhooed as a benefit for the host countries—consist of just such intra-company transactions.

Opponents of the firms would establish international vigilance over this kind of operation. Their champions say the firms have served a globally useful function in breaking down narrow national restrictions on trade, and that what is needed is still fewer barriers so trade can flourish.

With the benefits and liabilities difficult to sort out, any multilateral controls may be slow in coming. Till then, the options of Latin countries seem to be to deal with the world firms by applying national restrictions, or, like Chile, virtually to exclude them.

WASHINGTON STAR
29 January 1973

Naval Base Won't Bar Cuba Pact, Group Says

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

Cuban leaders, including Prime Minister Fidel Castro, have indicated the U.S. military presence at Guantanamo Bay would not be a major issue in negotiations to improve Cuban-American relations, 12 Republican House members disclosed today.

The representatives, at a press conference, urged immediate congressional and presidential initiatives to reestablish normal relations between Havana and Washington.

"Publicly, the Cuban leadership persistently demands that the U.S. evacuate the (naval) base; privately, Cuban leaders reportedly have indicated that Guantanamo would not be a major issue in negotiations,"

Rep. Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Ohio, said.

Whalen declined to identify his source for this statement during the press conference. But staff members said later that the report is considered authoritative because it comes from a respected Latin diplomat at the United Nations who spent three weeks in Cuba last year and held several sessions on the subject with Castro and other Cuban leaders.

Whalen and the other 11 House members called for hearings by Senate and House subcommittees to evaluate present U.S. policy toward Cuba and to consider the proposed changes. They also called for removal by Congress of a trade embargo imposed by Congress in 1961 and repeal of a Cuba resolution passed in 1962.